European Communities —Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products. WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, & WT/DS293/R

2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (2) ◽  
pp. 453-459
Author(s):  
Daniel Bodansky ◽  
Simon Lester
Keyword(s):  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Genetically Modified Organisms ◽  
The United States ◽  
Regulatory Regime ◽  
Panel Report ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Production And Consumption ◽  
Phytosanitary Measures ◽  
Biotech Products

European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products. WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, & WT/DS293/R. At <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm>.World Trade Organization Panel, September 29, 2006 (adopted November 21, 2006).In what was by far the longest panel report in the World Trade Organization’s history, a WTO panel ruled last September that various parts of the European Communities’ regulatory regime for the approval and marketing of “biotech products” (that is, products that contain, or are made from or with, genetically modified organisms (GMOs)) violated the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). The panel report was not appealed and was adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body on November 21, 2006.In recent years, a heated international debate has developed regarding the production and consumption of food made from or with GMOs. Among the key players in this debate, the United States, supported by many companies who have developed GMO-based products, has pushed for their acceptance; by contrast, the European Communities (EC) and its member states, backed by consumer groups and other activists, have tried to restrict their use through various regulations.

The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of the World Trade Organization: Debunking Its Reliance on Scientific Evidence and Reluctance to Endorse Potential Biotechnology Risks

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Muhammad ISLAM
Keyword(s):  
Risk Assessment ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Scientific Evidence ◽  
Scientific Uncertainty ◽  
The World ◽  
Precautionary Measures ◽  
Phytosanitary Measures ◽  
Biotech Products

The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) relies on scientific evidence as a conclusive risk assessment criterion, which ignores the inherent limitations of science. This article highlights certain trade-restrictive effects of scientific evidence and comments on the Agreement’s aversions to precautionary measures and the consumer concern of the harmful effects of biotech products that may be necessary to protect public health and biosecurity in many WTO Member States. These measures and concerns have become pressing issues due to surging consumer awareness and vigilance concerning environmental protection and food safety. The Agreement is yet to overcome the weaknesses of its endorsed international standardising bodies, the problematic definition of scientific evidence and treatment of justification for scientific risk assessment methods and the implementation difficulties faced by most developing states. This article analyses these issues under the provisions of the Agreement and the interpretations of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in disputes involving SPS matters, which fall short of addressing scientific uncertainty surrounding biotech products and their associated risks.

European Communities restrictions on imports of beef treated with hormones—nontariff trade barriers—control of food additives—scientific basis for restrictions—WTO dispute settlement mechanisms—scope of review

1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 755-759 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard H. Oxman ◽  
David A. Wirth
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Food Additives ◽  
Meat Products ◽  
The United States ◽  
Scientific Basis ◽  
Safety Measures ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement

European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products. WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R & WT/DS48/AB/R.World Trade Organization Appellate Body, January 16, 1998.This report of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is both the most recent development in a long-running trade battle between the United States and the European Communities and the first dispute to be addressed under a new Uruguay Round agreement concerning food safety measures.

scholarly journals The Impending Dejudicialization of the WTO Dispute Settlement System?

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 316-321
Author(s):  
Richard H. Steinberg
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

The Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is facing a crisis. Appointment of AB members requires a consensus of the Dispute Settlement Body (comprised of all WTO members), and the United States has been blocking a consensus on further appointments since Donald J. Trump became the president. Without new appointments, the ranks of the AB have been diminishing as AB members’ terms have been expiring. If this continues (and many expect the United States to continue blocking a consensus on appointments), then in December 2019, through attrition, the number of AB members will fall below the threshold necessary to render decisions, at which point the AB will cease to function.

scholarly journals Addressing (or Not) Widespread Concerns with the WTO

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 321-322
Author(s):  
Terence P. Stewart
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Advisory Opinions

The United States for at least sixteen years has had serious concerns with whether the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system was operating according to the terms upon which WTO Members had agreed. While the United States has been a major supporter of the WTO system and the dispute settlement system generally, concerns about sovereignty and the proper functioning of the system have been important since at least 2002, reflected in U.S. legislation and actions by three administrations. Concerns have existed on (1) whether panels and the Appellate Body have honored the limitations contained in Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) not to create rights or obligations; (2) the issuance of advisory opinions on issues not raised or not necessary to the resolution of the dispute; (3) actions of the Appellate Body that permit deviation from the DSU without affirmative authorization by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB); and, former Appellate Body members continuing to be involved in cases after their term has expired (failure to complete appeals in the DSU required maximum time of ninety days). These are all issues that have concerned the United States for years but also have been raised by other members.

scholarly journals United States – Use of Zeroing in Anti-Dumping Measures Involving Products from Korea: It's déjà vu all over again

2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 409-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS J. PRUSA ◽  
LUCA RUBINI
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Policy Change ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Panel Report ◽  
Legal Assessment ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Long Line ◽  
Déjà Vu

AbstractThis paper analyzes the dispute between Korea and the United States regarding the method of calculating anti-dumping duties. The case mirrors other recent WTO disputes involving zeroing. Even though it ceased zeroing in original investigations in December 2006, the United States implemented the policy change only prospectively. As a result, the margins applied to the products in this dispute remained unchanged because they had been calculated prior to the policy change. The United States did not contest Korea's claims. The Panel confirmed that zeroing was used and, following the long line of Panel and Appellate Body rulings, found the practice inconsistent with the Anti-Dumping Agreement. After the Panel Report was adopted, the United States recalculated the margins without zeroing. It, however, refused to refund unliquidated cash deposits that were based on zeroing, highlighting the United States's continued lukewarm compliance with WTO rulings on zeroing. This dispute offers an opportunity to ponder on weaknesses of the WTO Dispute Settlement and the ability of one Member to take advantage of it. Since the facts and their legal assessment were undisputed, why was litigation necessary? Can compliance with WTO law be improved with broader findings and more incisive remedies?

What’s in a Name? The Journey of Geographical Indications from Paris 1883 to Geneva 2015

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muriel Lightbourne
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Geographical Indications ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
The Impact

Abstract While the negotiations on geographical indications within the World Trade Organization have been stalled since their inception in 1996, many new developments resulting from bilateral or regional endeavours may be observed in this field. The present article will first briefly retrace the evolution of the concept and recall the different entrenched positions within the World Trade Organization (WTO). It will then show the impact of WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) reports on the European Union system and discuss the recent bilateral agreements between China and the European Union on one side, and the United States of America on the other. It will also look at the entry into force of the Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement on appellations of origin and geographical indications. Whether the latter will manage to bridge the divide between the countries that promote the sui generis model of protection of indications of origin and common law jurisdictions remains to be seen, as does the outcome of the discussions on geographical indications and place names within the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.

Why Adjudicate?

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christina L. Davis
Keyword(s):  
Policy Process ◽  
Steel Industry ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Domestic Politics ◽  
The United States ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
Checks And Balances ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Chinese Intellectual ◽  
Trade War

The World Trade Organization (WTO) oversees the negotiation and enforcement of formal rules governing international trade. Why do countries choose to adjudicate their trade disputes in the WTO rather than settling their differences on their own? This book investigates the domestic politics behind the filing of WTO complaints and reveals why formal dispute settlement creates better outcomes for governments and their citizens. It demonstrates that industry lobbying, legislative demands, and international politics influence which countries and cases appear before the WTO. Democratic checks and balances bias the trade policy process toward public lawsuits and away from informal settlements. Trade officials use legal complaints to manage domestic politics and defend trade interests. WTO dispute settlement enables states and domestic groups to signal resolve more effectively, thereby enhancing the information available to policymakers and reducing the risk of a trade war. The book establishes this argument with data on trade disputes and landmark cases, including the Boeing-Airbus controversy over aircraft subsidies, disagreement over Chinese intellectual property rights, and Japan's repeated challenges of U.S. steel industry protection. The book explains why the United States gains better outcomes for cases taken to formal dispute settlement than for those negotiated. Case studies of Peru and Vietnam show that legal action can also benefit developing countries.

General Principles for Integration

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan
Keyword(s):  
Conflict Resolution ◽  
Intellectual Property ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
World Trade Organisation ◽  
Resolution Function ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
History Of ◽  
Prior Analysis

This chapter reviews the broader principles in the international intellectual property (IP) system that fulfil an indirect integration or conflict resolution function, with a focus on those emanating from and applicable to the Trade Related Aspects of International Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. In focusing on Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS, the chapter builds on prior analysis about the role of these provisions in establishing an agreed, common object and purpose of the principal global IP treaty with relevance beyond TRIPS. In light of the origins and negotiation history of Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS, the chapter shows how these provisions can be applied to integrate ‘external’ objectives and interests via interpretation and implementation. Next, this chapter reviews their very poor record of application in the first twenty years of World Trade Organisation (WTO) dispute settlement. It concludes with suggestions for an appropriate recognition of external norms, objectives, and interests via Articles 7 and 8.

Extraterritorial Shrimps, NGOs and the WTO Appellate Body

1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asif H. Qureshi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Market Access ◽  
The United States ◽  
Consultation Process ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Us ◽  
Wto Appellate Body ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

At the centre of the international trading order, under the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO), lies a dispute-settlement system. This system offers a graduated conflict-resolution mechanism that begins with a consultation process; progresses to adjudication, through a panel system, and ends in an appellate process.1 Under this machinery, in October 1996 India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand (the complainants) requested joint consultations with the United States, regarding the US prohibition on the importation of certain shrimps and shrimp products caught with fishing technology considered by the United States adversely to affect the population of sea turtles—an endangered species under CITES.2 The US prohibition arose from section 609 of Public Law 101–1623 and associated regulations and judicial rulings (hereafter referred to as section 609). In a nutshell the complainants claimed denial of market access to their exports, and the United States justified this on grounds of conservation. However, as a consequence of the failure of the consultations, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a panel, around April 1997, to consider a joint complaint against the United States in relation to section 609. Australia, Ecuador, the European Communities, HongKong, China, Mexico and Nigeria joined the complainants as third parties. In May 1998 the panel's report was published, containing a decision in favour of the complainants. In July 1998 the United States appealed to the WTO Appellate Body, and in October 1998 the Appellate Body issued its report.4

Legalization in context: The design of the WTO’s dispute settlement system

2017 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 304-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manfred Elsig
Keyword(s):  
Rational Design ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Trading System ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Multilateral Trading System ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

This article asks why the dispute settlement provisions of the multilateral trading system underwent significant reforms during the negotiations that led to the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Why did the leading trading powers accept a highly legalized system that departed from established political–diplomatic forms of settling disputes? The contribution of this article is threefold. First, it complements existing accounts that exclusively focus on the United States with a novel explanation that takes account of contextual factors. Second, it offers an in-depth empirical case study based on interviews with negotiators who were involved and novel archival evidence on the creation of the new WTO dispute settlement system. Third, by unpacking the long-standing puzzle of why states designed a highly legalized system, it addresses selected blind spots of the legalization and the rational design literatures with the aim of providing a better understanding about potential paths leading toward significant changes in legalization.

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