European Communities restrictions on imports of beef treated with hormones—nontariff trade barriers—control of food additives—scientific basis for restrictions—WTO dispute settlement mechanisms—scope of review

1998 ◽  
Vol 92 (4) ◽  
pp. 755-759 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernard H. Oxman ◽  
David A. Wirth
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Food Additives ◽  
Meat Products ◽  
The United States ◽  
Scientific Basis ◽  
Safety Measures ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement

European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products. WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R & WT/DS48/AB/R.World Trade Organization Appellate Body, January 16, 1998.This report of the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is both the most recent development in a long-running trade battle between the United States and the European Communities and the first dispute to be addressed under a new Uruguay Round agreement concerning food safety measures.

scholarly journals The Impending Dejudicialization of the WTO Dispute Settlement System?

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 316-321
Author(s):  
Richard H. Steinberg
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

The Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is facing a crisis. Appointment of AB members requires a consensus of the Dispute Settlement Body (comprised of all WTO members), and the United States has been blocking a consensus on further appointments since Donald J. Trump became the president. Without new appointments, the ranks of the AB have been diminishing as AB members’ terms have been expiring. If this continues (and many expect the United States to continue blocking a consensus on appointments), then in December 2019, through attrition, the number of AB members will fall below the threshold necessary to render decisions, at which point the AB will cease to function.

scholarly journals THE SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE WTO: HOW TO AVOID JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

2004 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 861-895 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorand Bartels
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Amicus Curiae ◽  
The Public ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
The Right

As with other legal systems based on a separation of powers, the World Trade Organization is marked by a degree of tension between its political organs and its quasi-judicial organs, in particular the Appellate Body. In late 2000 this tension spilled out into the public domain, when the Appellate Body announced a procedure for the filing ofamicus curiaebriefs in theEC-Asbestoscase.1The question of public participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings is sensitive to many WTO Members, and in expressly encouraging the submission ofamicusbriefs in this way the Appellate Body was felt to be overstepping its functions.2In the end, this dispute settled with a draw, the Appellate Body deciding that it had no need to consider any of theamicusbriefs submitted in that particular case, and yet still maintaining that panels and the Appellate Body have the right to take unsolicitedamicusbriefs into account, should they so choose.

WTO Dispute Settlement: Praise and Suggestions for Reform

1998 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 647-658 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas J. Schoenbaum
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Uruguay Round ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Objective Standard ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Appeal Process

We have now had three years' experience with the dispute-settlement process of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which came into existence as a result of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations on 1 January 1995. By any objective standard, this system of dispute settlement is a resounding success. Well over 100 cases have been brought to the WTO, and, as at the end of 1997,25cases had been settled at the consultation stage, 61 were under consultations and 36 were in or beyond the panel-appeal process. The newly created Appellate Body has decided nine cases, the quality of its opinions as well as those of the dispute-settlement panels is generally excellent. Member States of the WTO are complying with the rulings and recommendations adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO.

scholarly journals U.S. Refusal to Appoint Members Renders WTO Appellate Body Unable to Hear New Appeals

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (3) ◽  
pp. 518-525
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Appellate Body Report ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The World ◽  
Bona Fide ◽  
Wto Appellate Body

Over the last few years, the United States has been pressuring the World Trade Organization (WTO) to reform the Appellate Body by refusing proposals to fill vacancies. On December 10, 2019, the terms of two Appellate Body members expired, leaving one member left for the seven-member body. This has brought new appeals to a standstill, as an appeal from a panel established by the Dispute Settlement Body must be heard by three Appellate Body members. In February of 2020, the United States elaborated on its complaints about the Appellate Body in a report published by the Office of the United States Trade Representative. In the spring of 2020, in response to the continued U.S. resistance to filling vacancies on the Appellate Body, a group of WTO members established an interim arrangement to handle appeals through arbitration. Also in the spring of 2020, the United States described as invalid a recent Appellate Body report regarding a dispute between Canada and the United States, asserting that none of the three persons who issued the report were in fact bona fide Appellate Body members.

WTO Dispute Settlement Body—Article XX environmental exceptions to GATT—national treatment—consistency urith GATT of U.S. rules regarding imports of reformulated gasoline

1996 ◽  
Vol 90 (4) ◽  
pp. 669-674 ◽  
Author(s):  
Judith Hippler Bello ◽  
Maury D. Shenk
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
International Trade ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
Environmental Protection Agency ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
Clean Air ◽  
Gatt 1994

United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline. 35ILM 603 (1996).World Trade Organization Appellate Body, April 29, 1996.In United States—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (Gasoline), the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Body in its first decision addressed one of the most difficult contemporary issues in international trade— the tension between the growth of international trade and the protection of the global environment. The Appellate Body decided that rules regarding standards for cleanliness of gasoline (Gasoline Rule) adopted under the Clean Air Act by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which required importers of gasoline to meet different standards from those required of domestic refiners, were not justifiable restrictions on trade under the environmental exceptions of Article XX of GATT 1994 (GATT).

scholarly journals China Perspective in Reforming of the World Trade Organization

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 104
Author(s):  
Asif khan ◽  
Ahmad Arafa Abd Elrhim ◽  
Nishan-E-Hyder Soomro ◽  
Muhammad Abid Hussain Shah Jillani
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Reform Process ◽  
Dispute Settlement Mechanism ◽  
Primary Position ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The World ◽  
Negotiation Mechanism

In recent years, the World Trade Organization (WTO), the multilateral trading system, has faced many difficulties and challenges due to the great vows of anti-globalisation and trade protectionism. The appellate body, as a significant portion of the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSU) of the WTO, has been suffering from an unprecedented crisis of suspension because the United States continues to prevent the appointment of vacant members. Now to save the World Trade Organization from an unprecedented crisis of survival reform has become a consensus. However, each member has a different opinion concerning the basic principle and specific contents of WTO reforms. In general, it is proposed to increase the flexibility of the negotiation mechanism and break the deadlock in multilateral negotiations caused by "consensus" and advocate the system in terms of substantive rules. It is proposed to establish new trade regulations, strengthen trade fairness, and eliminate investment Obstacles; in terms of disciplinary constraints, it advocates better use of the WTO's review and supervision functions and strengthens the constraints on members' compliance with transparency and notification obligations. In dispute settlement, it proposes to amend the relevant agreements as soon as possible To break the deadlock in the selection of judges of the Appellate Body and ensure the regular operation of the World Trade Organization. China clarifies its primary position and fundamental concerns, based on the existing paper, and introducing specific reform programs to participate more effectively in the WTO reform process. Qualitative research methodology has been applied to the following article.

scholarly journals Addressing (or Not) Widespread Concerns with the WTO

2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 321-322
Author(s):  
Terence P. Stewart
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Dispute Settlement System ◽  
Advisory Opinions

The United States for at least sixteen years has had serious concerns with whether the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system was operating according to the terms upon which WTO Members had agreed. While the United States has been a major supporter of the WTO system and the dispute settlement system generally, concerns about sovereignty and the proper functioning of the system have been important since at least 2002, reflected in U.S. legislation and actions by three administrations. Concerns have existed on (1) whether panels and the Appellate Body have honored the limitations contained in Articles 3.2 and 19.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) not to create rights or obligations; (2) the issuance of advisory opinions on issues not raised or not necessary to the resolution of the dispute; (3) actions of the Appellate Body that permit deviation from the DSU without affirmative authorization by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB); and, former Appellate Body members continuing to be involved in cases after their term has expired (failure to complete appeals in the DSU required maximum time of ninety days). These are all issues that have concerned the United States for years but also have been raised by other members.

scholarly journals United States Continues to Block New Appellate Body Members for the World Trade Organization, Risking the Collapse of the Appellate Process

2019 ◽  
Vol 113 (4) ◽  
pp. 822-831 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Selection Processes ◽  
The World ◽  
Wto Appellate Body

With only three remaining members of what is supposed to be a seven-member body, the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Appellate Body may soon cease to function. Since 2016, the United States has blocked the reappointment of Appellate Body members and rejected over a dozen proposals to launch selection processes that could fill the remaining vacancies. As a lead reason for these blocks, the United States has cited concerns about the practice whereby members whose terms have expired continue to serve on appeals to which they were previously appointed. On December 10, 2019, the terms of two Appellate Body members will expire, leaving only one member remaining. Because the WTO's dispute settlement process requires three Appellate Body members for each appeal, WTO members will be unable to make any new appeals by this year's end unless a solution emerges to the current impasse.

scholarly journals Discontinuity in the Internalization of the World Trade Organization Rules: Assessing the Democratic Deficit Critique Against the World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System

2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 1039
Author(s):  
Yuka Fukunaga
Keyword(s):  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Democratic Deficit ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Member States ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

International institutions are often criticized for their democratic deficit. Among these institutions, the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system is most frequently targeted. This article focuses on the strength of this critique and aims to refute its factual premise through the examination of several Panel and Appellate Body decisions. The author also argues that the WTO dispute settlement system deliberately leaves a certain degree of discontinuity between members’ domestic legal orders and the WTO Agreement, such that the system pays a degree of deference to member states and allows substantial discretion in the process of internalizing the rules of the WTO Agreement within domestic legal orders. Finally, the author concludes that this discontinuity remains strong, and serves to enhance the democratic autonomy of member states instead of defeating it.

What’s in a Name? The Journey of Geographical Indications from Paris 1883 to Geneva 2015

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muriel Lightbourne
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
World Trade Organization ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
The United States ◽  
Geographical Indications ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The World ◽  
The Impact

Abstract While the negotiations on geographical indications within the World Trade Organization have been stalled since their inception in 1996, many new developments resulting from bilateral or regional endeavours may be observed in this field. The present article will first briefly retrace the evolution of the concept and recall the different entrenched positions within the World Trade Organization (WTO). It will then show the impact of WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) reports on the European Union system and discuss the recent bilateral agreements between China and the European Union on one side, and the United States of America on the other. It will also look at the entry into force of the Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement on appellations of origin and geographical indications. Whether the latter will manage to bridge the divide between the countries that promote the sui generis model of protection of indications of origin and common law jurisdictions remains to be seen, as does the outcome of the discussions on geographical indications and place names within the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.

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