What’s in a Name? The Journey of Geographical Indications from Paris 1883 to Geneva 2015

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Muriel Lightbourne

Abstract While the negotiations on geographical indications within the World Trade Organization have been stalled since their inception in 1996, many new developments resulting from bilateral or regional endeavours may be observed in this field. The present article will first briefly retrace the evolution of the concept and recall the different entrenched positions within the World Trade Organization (WTO). It will then show the impact of WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) reports on the European Union system and discuss the recent bilateral agreements between China and the European Union on one side, and the United States of America on the other. It will also look at the entry into force of the Geneva Act of the Lisbon Agreement on appellations of origin and geographical indications. Whether the latter will manage to bridge the divide between the countries that promote the sui generis model of protection of indications of origin and common law jurisdictions remains to be seen, as does the outcome of the discussions on geographical indications and place names within the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 175-194
Author(s):  
Kenyth Alves de Freitas ◽  
Bruno de Almeida Vilela ◽  
Rui Fernando Correia Ferreira ◽  
André Edson Ribeiro de Souza Aprigio

The intensification of trade between countries has led to the need to regulate the conduct of trading partners. The World Trade Organization (WTO) forum emerged with the mission of arbitrating these disputes and making trade fairer. However, many countries choose not to participate in this forum because of the financial and legal resources required to conduct the proceedings. The purpose of this research was to verify how the relations within the WTO were configurated in 2014. We identified the dichotomy between central and emerging countries through the concept of forum shopping. The most important actors in the network were shown to be the United States and the European Union, whereas small economies had low participation, especially African and Central American countries. Thus, this study shows that many WTO’s members do not use its forum, which allows inferring they choose regional forums due to the restriction of resources.


1995 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amelia Porges

On 30 December 1994 in Geneva, the four major players in world trade -the United States, the European Union, Japan, andCanada - accepted the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement).The entry into force of the Agreement on 1 January 1995 brings both expanded and improved trade rules and greatly improved enforcement. We have entered a new era in international dispute settlement. This brief article discusses the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes in Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement, the negotiating process that led to it, and the implementation of the Understanding in the United States.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 89
Author(s):  
Naiara Arriola Echaniz

Resumen: En el presente artículo se analiza la confluencia de ordenamientos jurídicos entre la OMC y la UE desde la perspectiva del sistema de fuentes del Derecho. Esta interconexión normativa ha derivado en disputas comerciales sobre las que se ha pronunciado no sólo el Sistema de Solución de Diferencias de la OMC sino el propio Tribunal de Justicia de la UE.Palabras clave: Derecho constitucional, sistema de fuentes, Derecho de la UE, Organización Mundial del Comercio, interconexión normativa.Abstract: The objective of this article is to analyze the conjunction of legal systems between the World Trade Organization and the European Union. This normative interconnection has caused dis-putes solved not only by the Dispute Settlement System within the WTO but also applied within the EU judicial system.Keywords: Constitutional Law, conflicts of norms, European Union Law, World Trade Organi-zation, normative interconnection.


2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 1850222
Author(s):  
John Olienyk ◽  
Robert J. Carbaugh

For decades, Boeing and Airbus have struggled for dominance in the large commercial aircraft market. In 2010 and 2011, the World Trade Organization ruled that each firm has received illegal subsidies from the governments of the United States and the European Union, which have enhanced their competitive positions. This paper considers the nature of these rulings and the future competitive environment in the global jetliner industry.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 ◽  
pp. 316-321
Author(s):  
Richard H. Steinberg

The Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is facing a crisis. Appointment of AB members requires a consensus of the Dispute Settlement Body (comprised of all WTO members), and the United States has been blocking a consensus on further appointments since Donald J. Trump became the president. Without new appointments, the ranks of the AB have been diminishing as AB members’ terms have been expiring. If this continues (and many expect the United States to continue blocking a consensus on appointments), then in December 2019, through attrition, the number of AB members will fall below the threshold necessary to render decisions, at which point the AB will cease to function.


2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 1358-1389 ◽  
Author(s):  
Julia Gray ◽  
Philip Potter

How do countries settle disputes in the shadow of the law? Even in the presence of legalized dispute settlement, countries still rely on diplomatic channels to resolve conflicts. But it can be difficult to assess diplomacy’s impact on dispute resolution because those channels tend to be opaque. We present both an original theory of the impact of diplomacy on dispute resolution and a novel measure of diplomacy. If countries with close or, conversely, distant relationships use legal channels for dispute resolution, diplomacy will have little impact on dispute settlement; resorting to legal recourse among friends or adversaries likely means that the dispute is intractable. However, diplomacy can increase the chances of settlement between countries with moderate levels of affinity. We test this argument using a protocol-based proxy for diplomatic interactions—gifts given at the occasion of meetings between diplomatic counterparts—that would otherwise be difficult to observe. Using the case of the United States and its disputes in the World Trade Organization, we find support for our argument. This suggests that even when countries resort to legalized methods of dispute settlement, bilateral dealmaking still plays an important role.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Victor Crochet ◽  
Marcus Gustafsson

Abstract Discontentment is growing such that governments, and notably that of China, are increasingly providing subsidies to companies outside their jurisdiction, ‘buying their way’ into other countries’ markets and undermining fair competition therein as they do so. In response, the European Union recently published a proposal to tackle such foreign subsidization in its own market. This article asks whether foreign subsidies can instead be addressed under the existing rules of the World Trade Organization, and, if not, whether those rules allow States to take matters into their own hands and act unilaterally. The authors shed light on these issues and provide preliminary guidance on how to design a response to foreign subsidization which is consistent with international trade law.


Author(s):  
Sivan Shlomo Agon

The present chapter concludes the work. It sums up the key findings of the study while discussing the results emerging from a comparative analysis of the three categories of disputes examined throughout the book. The chapter then revisits the central arguments put forth in the book and articulates the lessons to be learned for the study of the goals, operation, and effectiveness of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement System (DSS), and of international courts more broadly. It also discusses some of the insights to be offered with respect to possible institutional changes or reforms of the WTO DSS, with a view to ensuring the system’s future effectiveness. The chapter closes with several observations that go beyond effectiveness, pertaining to the costs and unintended consequences attendant on more effective and empowered international adjudication.


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