Ending the LDP Hegemony: Party Cooperation in Japan. By Ray Christensen. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000. 228p. $52.00 cloth, $27.95 paper.

2001 ◽  
Vol 95 (1) ◽  
pp. 231-232
Author(s):  
Kenji Hayao
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Party System ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Party Politics ◽  
Socialist Party ◽  
Coalition Government ◽  
Japanese Politics ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
2000 Election

The Japanese party system has been in flux in recent years. In 1993, two groups defected from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and joined with the opposition to form a broadly based coalition government. A year later, the LDP regained power by creating a coalition government with its ideological opponent, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). Both events shocked virtually everyone at the time. The LDP had been in power for so long-almost 40 years-that it seemed almost inconceivable that it could lose power. For just as long, the JSP had been the main opposition. By the 2000 election, a dozen parties had come and gone, the JSP's strength dropped to a very small fraction of what it was a decade earlier, and the LDP had to turn to various coalition partners to maintain its control of government. All this is quite puzzling to even close watchers of Japanese politics, because party politics, especially the role of opposition parties, has been a relatively understudied area. For those who want to make sense of how these events came to pass, Ray Christensen's Ending the LDP Hegemony will be very helpful.

Evaluating Political Reform in Japan: A Midterm Report

2002 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 243-263 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven R. Reed
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Party System ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Political Reform ◽  
Coalition Government ◽  
Preliminary Evaluation ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Cost ◽  
First Time

In the 1993 general election the Liberal Democratic Party lost power for the first time since it was founded in 1955. The coalition government that followed enacted the most far-reaching political reforms Japan has experienced since the American Occupation. The country has now experienced two elections since these reforms so we can begin to analyze trends and dynamics. It is now possible to make a preliminary evaluation of the effects of these reforms. I evaluate the reforms under three headings: (1) reducing the cost of elections and levels of corruption; (2) replacing candidate-centered with party-centered campaigns; and (3) moving toward a two-party system which would produce alternation in power between the parties of the government and the parties of the opposition. In conclude that, with some notable exceptions, the reforms are working well, about as well as should have been expected.

Japanese Party Politics at a Crossroads?

2015 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 443-447
Author(s):  
Benjamin Nyblade
Keyword(s):  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Party Politics ◽  
First Century ◽  
Japanese Politics ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Electoral Defeat ◽  
Electoral Reforms

In 2009, the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan, which had successfully formed governments either alone or as the largest partner in a coalition government for all but a single year since 1955, suffered a devastating electoral defeat when the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) won nearly two-thirds of the seats available in the House of Representatives. The landslide DPJ victory was seen by many commentators and academics as the culmination of a decade-long trend toward two-party politics, driven in large part by party and voter adaptation to the electoral reforms of the 1990s, which introduced single-member districts as the means for electing a majority of members of parliament. The three books reviewed in this essay were written primarily in the two years following the 2009 DPJ victory, and each attempts, in quite distinct ways, to update our accounts of electoral and party politics and policymaking in Japan to account for the changes in Japanese politics in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

The Legislative Record: The Japan National Diet in 2004

2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 327-330
Author(s):  
JUNKO HIROSE
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Party System ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Conservative Party ◽  
General Election ◽  
Major Party ◽  
Japanese Politics ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
House Election

The general election in November 2003 and the Upper House election in July 2004 indicate that the Japanese politics is going from a one party dominant toward a two major party system. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) narrowly keeps a majority in both Houses by merging the New Conservative Party and by forming a coalition with New Komeito.

The Era of Coalition Government in Japan: The Institutional Logic of Surplus Majorities and Strange Bedfellows

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael F. Thies
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Coalition Government ◽  
Institutional Logic ◽  
Japanese Politics ◽  
Electoral Coalitions ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Lower House

For nearly four decades after its establishment in 1955, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party formed every government alone. Since mid-1993, however, coalition government has been the norm in Japanese politics. Interestingly, every coalition since 1999 has included a party with a lower house majority by itself. Nonetheless, these majority parties have taken on coalition partners. This chapter shows that the logic of “oversized” coalition government in Japan is driven in part by parliamentary bicameralism, and partly by the mixed-member electoral system, which incentivizes the formation of long-lived pre-electoral coalitions.

Testing the Causal Mechanisms in Additional Cases

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul D. Kenny
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Latin America ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Party System ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
System Stability ◽  
Relative Autonomy ◽  
Causal Mechanisms ◽  
Liberal Democratic

Case studies of Indonesia and Japan illustrate that party-system stability in patronage democracies is deeply affected by the relative autonomy of political brokers. Over the course of a decade, a series of decentralizing reforms in Indonesia weakened patronage-based parties hold on power, with the 2014 election ultimately being a contest between two rival populists: Joko Widodo and Subianto Prabowo. Although Japan was a patronage democracy throughout the twentieth century, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) remained robust to outsider appeals even in the context of economic and corruption crises. However, reforms in the 1990s weakened the hold of central factional leaders over individual members of the LDP and their patronage machines. This was instrumental to populist Junichiro Koizumi’s winning of the presidency of the LDP and ultimately the prime ministership of Japan. This chapter also reexamines canonical cases of populism in Latin America.

The Liberal Democratic Party: Its adaptability and predominance in Japanese politics for 60 years

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-22
Author(s):  
Michio Umeda
Keyword(s):  
Economic Development ◽  
Presidential Election ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Japanese Society ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Party Organization ◽  
Allocation System ◽  
Japanese Politics ◽  
Liberal Democratic

This article discusses the origin and continuity of the predominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japanese politics since the party’s formation in 1955. The LDP experienced two crises in its history, the first owing to the transformation of Japanese society by rapid economic development during the 1960–1970s, and the second due to the electoral reform in 1994 and the challenge from the Democratic Party of Japan thereafter. I argue that the LDP’s continuous success is attributable to its adaptability to new environments: the party overcame the first crisis by shifting the policy focus, reorganizing its support base and the party organization to achieve intraparty consensus. It coped with the second crisis by forming a coalition with the Clean Government Party and reforming the party’s presidential election and the ministerial post-allocation system. The article concludes with a summary and a brief discussion regarding the future of the LDP.

Bureaucrats and Politicians in Policymaking: The Case of Japan

1984 ◽  
Vol 78 (1) ◽  
pp. 126-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michio Muramatsu ◽  
Ellis S. Krauss
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Empirical Work ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Social Background ◽  
Civil Servants ◽  
Japanese Politics ◽  
The Government ◽  
Dominant Actor ◽  
The Relationship

This article extends the recent empirical work on the perceptions and role of bureaucrats and politicians in policymaking. The question of the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats and the role of each in policymaking is especially important in the case of Japan, because the prevalent models of Japanese politics and policymaking are those of the “bureaucracy dominant” or of a closely interwoven “ruling triad” of bureaucracy, big business, and the governing Liberal Democratic Party.Data are from a systematic survey of 251 higher civil servants and 101 members of the government and opposition parties in the House of Representatives, supplemented by data from other surveys and, wherever possible, compared to equivalent data from western democracies.The results indicate that Japanese politicians and bureaucrats resemble Western European elites both in social background and in the fact that although the roles of politician and bureaucrat are converging, there are still differences in their contributions to the policymaking process. However, politicians influence policymaking more than most models of Japanese politics have posited, and even government and opposition politicians share some consensus about the most important policy issues facing Japan. A factor analysis demonstrated that higher civil servants' orientations toward their roles vary significantly with their positions in the administrative hierarchy.The 27-year incumbency of the LDP as ruling party has been particularly important in determining the Japanese variant of the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats. We suggest that the Japanese case shows that the bureaucracy's increasing role in policymaking is universal; however, in late-modernizing political systems like Japan's, where the bureaucracy has always been a dominant actor, the growing power of politicians in postwar politics has been the most significant actor in bringing about more convergence in the two elites. Our data on this trend argue for a more complicated and pluralistic view of Japanese policymaking than that provided by either the bureaucracy-dominant or the ruling-triad model.

scholarly journals Electoral incentives, policy compromise, and coalition durability: Japan's LDP–Komeito Government in a mixed electoral system

2018 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam P. Liff ◽  
Ko Maeda
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Security Policy ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Japanese Politics ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Coalition Politics ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Mixed Electoral System

AbstractPolitical parties’ behavior in coalition formation is commonly explained by their policy-, vote-, and office-seeking incentives. From these perspectives, the 20-year partnership of Japan's ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its pacifistic Komeito junior coalition partner is an anomalous case. The longevity, closeness, and nature of their unlikely partnership challenges core assumptions in existing theories of coalition politics. LDP–Komeito cooperation has sustained for two decades despite vastly different support bases and ideological differences on fundamental policy issues. LDP leaders also show no signs of abandoning the much smaller Komeito despite enjoying a single-party majority. We argue that the remarkable durability of this puzzling partnership results primarily from the two parties’ electoral incentives and what has effectively become codependence under Japan's mixed electoral system. Our analysis also demonstrates that being in a coalition can induce significant policy compromises, even from a much larger senior partner. Beyond theoretical implications, these phenomena yield important real-world consequences for Japanese politics: especially, a far less dominant LDP than the party's Diet seat total suggests, and Komeito's remarkable ability to punch significantly above its weight and constrain its far larger senior partner, even on the latter's major national security policy priorities.

Constitution will overshadow Japan election campaign

2016 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Social Inclusion ◽  
Public Support ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Party Politics ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
House Election ◽  
Voting Age ◽  
First Time

Subject The outlook for legislation and party politics ahead of the July upper house election. Significance Now in his fourth year as prime minister, Shinzo Abe enjoys strong public support and faces no serious challenger. In an upper house election in July, his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) hopes to capture enough seats to call a referendum on revising the constitution -- Abe's ultimate political aim. Impacts Abe will use Japan's hosting of the G7 summit in May to present himself as a world statesman. A new emphasis on welfare and social inclusion will not come at the expense of the LDP's traditional pro-business policies. TPP ratification is likely before May. With the voting age lowered for the first time to 18, the more socially progressive but less pacificist youth vote becomes more important.

Rational Foundations for the Organization of the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan

1992 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 369-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masaru Kohno
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Political Process ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Japanese History ◽  
Japanese Politics ◽  
Electoral Incentives ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Electoral Laws ◽  
Average Size

Over the last two decades there have been numerous changes in the organization of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan. The pattern of factionalization has changed significantly in terms of the number of competing major factions, the average size of their membership, and their internal structure. Moreover, a new set of institutionalized norms, such as the seniority and interfactional balancing principles, has emerged to govern organizational processes within the LDP. The conventional approach in the literature on Japanese politics, which focuses on factors unique or distinctive to Japanese history, culture, and social behavior, cannot adequately explain these recent changes in the LDP. This paper proposes an alternative, rational-choice explanation based on the standard microanalytic assumptions. More specifically, it argues that the pattern of the LDP's factionalization is primarily determined by the electoral incentives of two sets of rational actors, LDP politicians and LDP supporters, operating under institutional constraints, such as electoral laws and political funding regulations. It also argues that the organizational norms originate in the promotion incentives of the LDP politicians whose strategies are influenced by the uncertainty in the dynamics of the interfactional political process.

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