Legislative Reform and the Decline of Presidential Influence on Capitol Hill

1979 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 465-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric L. Davis
Keyword(s):  
Jimmy Carter ◽  
Legislative Reform ◽  
Party Control ◽  
Legislative Agenda ◽  
Capitol Hill ◽  
Positive Action ◽  
Lyndon Johnson ◽  
Legislative Proposals ◽  
Political Scene ◽  
Presidential Influence

Observers of the American political scene might at times wonder why the 95th Congress, with nearly two-to-one Democratic majorities in both houses, did not take positive action on many of President Carter's important legislative proposals in 1977 and 1978. After all, it was argued when Carter was inaugurated at the beginning of 1977, the return of common party control to both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue would bring to an end the legislative-executive confrontations of the Nixon-Ford years. Thus, was not the unwillingness of Congress to approve his major programs an indication that Carter was inept, or even perhaps incompetent, as a legislative leader? If Lyndon Johnson could obtain swift approval of an extensive legislative agenda from the 89th Congress (1965–66), which in partisan composition was quite similar to the 95th Congress, why could Jimmy Carter not achieve comparable results?

scholarly journals Crossing Over: Majority Party Control Affects Legislator Behavior and the Agenda

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
NICHOLAS G. NAPOLIO ◽  
CHRISTIAN R. GROSE
Keyword(s):  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Revealed Preferences ◽  
Crossing Over ◽  
Agenda Control ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Legislative Session ◽  
Party Control ◽  
Legislative Agenda ◽  
Floor Control ◽  
Legislative Policy

Does majority party control cause changes in legislative policy making? We argue that majority party floor control affects legislator behavior and agenda control. Leveraging a natural experiment where nearly one tenth of a legislature’s members died within the same legislative session, we are able to identify the effect of majority party floor control on the legislative agenda and on legislator choices. Previous correlational work has found mixed evidence of party effects, especially in the mid-twentieth century. In contrast, we find that majority party control leads to (1) changes in the agenda and (2) changes in legislators’ revealed preferences. These effects are driven by changes in numerical party majorities on the legislative floor. The effects are strongest with Republican and nonsouthern Democratic legislators. The effects are also more pronounced on the first (economic) than the second (racial) dimension. Additional correlational evidence across 74 years adds external validity to our exogenous evidence.

Patent Trolls and Patent Litigation Reform

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul R. Gugliuzza
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Patent Law ◽  
Patent Litigation ◽  
Legislative Reform ◽  
Legislative Proposals ◽  
Discrete Problems

This chapter critically examines recent legislative proposals to reform patent litigation in the United States. It begins by providing background on the dynamics that are driving the calls for reform, including complaints about so-called patent trolls. It then reviews proposed bills that would, among other things, impose heightened pleading standards on plaintiffs, limit discovery, and create a presumption that the loser should pay the winner’s attorneys’ fees. After surveying many recent changes to patent law already made by the courts and by Congress in the America Invents Act, the chapter concludes by arguing that additional legislative reform is largely unnecessary. Rather, Congress should focus on discrete problems in patent litigation that the courts may be unable to solve on their own, such as the unusually heavy concentration of cases in the rural Eastern District of Texas.

scholarly journals The Committee Process: Platform for Participation or Political Theatre?

2016 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Cara Faith Zwibel
Keyword(s):  
Parliamentary Democracy ◽  
House Of Commons ◽  
Political Theatre ◽  
Political Will ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Meaningful Participation ◽  
Legislative Agenda ◽  
Legislative Proposals ◽  
The Government ◽  
Process Platform

In Canada’s parliamentary democracy, the government controls the legislative agenda. At least in the case of a majority government, government bills tabled in the House of Commons will ultimately become the law of the land. While the passage of legislation emanating from the government may appear inevitable, the system is structured to provide multiple opportunities to debate and discuss legislative proposals. The process of making law provides some avenues to test and question legislative initiatives, particularly those that may appear inconsistent with Canada’s Constitution; lawmaking may also provide opportunities to ensure that the voices of Canadians — not all of whom feel represented by the government or their Members of Parliament (MPs) — are heard.Unfortunately, while some of these changes and many others are worthy of study and consideration, there is little evidence of any political will to reform the way our committees function. As a result, we are likely to continue to see political and partisan dramas play out before our committees and will have to look to different venues for meaningful participation and debate.

Carter and Congress: From the Outside In

1985 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 269-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles O. Jones
Keyword(s):  
Second World War ◽  
Jimmy Carter ◽  
World War ◽  
Personal Style ◽  
Policy Goals ◽  
Capitol Hill ◽  
Second World

It seems a reasonable enough proposition that a president will organize his congressional relations to suit his policy goals and his personal style. Available literature supports this expectation – at least before the administration of Jimmy Carter. But, of course, recent presidents have been wise in the ways of Washington as a consequence of lengthy experience in the nation's capital. In fact, most have served in Congress. Among post-Second World War presidents, only Eisenhower before Carter lacked service on Capitol Hill (and Fred Greenstein now assures us that his political savvy was fine tuned).

Legislative Shirking in the Pre-Twentieth Amendment Era: Presidential Influence, Party Power, and Lame-Duck Sessions of Congress, 1877–1933

2008 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 111-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffery A. Jenkins ◽  
Timothy P. Nokken
Keyword(s):  
Agency Problem ◽  
Legislative Process ◽  
Democratic Accountability ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Legislative Agenda ◽  
Lame Duck ◽  
Presidential Influence ◽  
Party Power

In 1933, the Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution was adopted. Otherwise known as the Lame Duck Amendment, it reorganized the congressional terms of office and dates of annual convening, eliminating the short (or “lame-duck”) session that had existed up to that time. The amendment was the brainchild of Sen. George W. Norris (R-NE), who argued that lame-duck sessions posed a grave threat to democratic accountability and responsiveness, as they convened after the elections to the next Congress and thus were populated in part by members who were retiring or had lost their reelection bids. As a result, according to Norris, the potential for an agency problem in representation was great in lame-duck sessions. Using the literature on legislative shirking—especially the subliterature on last-term effects—as our theoretical backdrop, we investigate Norris's arguments in detail, examining whether his concerns regarding lame-duck sessions were justified. Using a variety of data and a number of tests, we find little systematic evidence to suggest that exiting members altered their behavior significantly (i.e., shirked) in their last terms in office. In short, the concerns that Norris expressed, such as excessive presidential influence in the legislative process and increased majority-party manipulation of the legislative agenda, were not in fact major problems in lame-duck sessions.

Wilbur D. Mills: A Study in Congressional Influence

1969 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 442-464 ◽  
Author(s):  
John F. Manley
Keyword(s):  
Legislative Process ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Political Processes ◽  
Capitol Hill ◽  
Lyndon Johnson ◽  
The Individual

All leaders are also led; in innumerable cases, the master is the slave of his slaves. Said one of the greatest German party leaders referring to his followers: “I am their leader, therefore I must follow them.”Georg SimmerPolitical scientists studying Congress have shown the same disinclination for the study of individual leaders as that of the profession as a whole. Whatever the reasons for avoiding an analysis of social and political processes from the perspective of an individual—and there are several good ones—it is difficult to ignore, if not discount, the extreme emphasis placed on personalities by experienced participants and observers of the congressional process. One may decide, with Fenno, to underplay references to specific individuals in an effort “to show how much generalization is possible short of a heavy reliance on personality data.” But the fact remains that those closest to the legislative process do see it in terms of individuals and personalities; more important, much can be learned, as evidenced by Huitt's work, by focusing on individual legislators and the contexts within which they function. Whether it is Lyndon Johnson as Senate Majority Leader searching for the man who is the “key” to a particular bill, the differences between a Rayburn and a McCormack, or the skill of a Judge Smith, the individual looms large on Capitol Hill.

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