scholarly journals The Committee Process: Platform for Participation or Political Theatre?

2016 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 43
Author(s):  
Cara Faith Zwibel

In Canada’s parliamentary democracy, the government controls the legislative agenda. At least in the case of a majority government, government bills tabled in the House of Commons will ultimately become the law of the land. While the passage of legislation emanating from the government may appear inevitable, the system is structured to provide multiple opportunities to debate and discuss legislative proposals. The process of making law provides some avenues to test and question legislative initiatives, particularly those that may appear inconsistent with Canada’s Constitution; lawmaking may also provide opportunities to ensure that the voices of Canadians — not all of whom feel represented by the government or their Members of Parliament (MPs) — are heard.Unfortunately, while some of these changes and many others are worthy of study and consideration, there is little evidence of any political will to reform the way our committees function. As a result, we are likely to continue to see political and partisan dramas play out before our committees and will have to look to different venues for meaningful participation and debate.

Polar Record ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 32 (182) ◽  
pp. 209-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian R. Stone

ABSTRACTThe record of Parliamentary proceedings relating to the Franklin search covers the period 1848–1863. The main subject of discussion was the need for the government to mount search expeditions, while topics such as rewards for successful expeditions and the question of the provision of monuments to Sir John Franklin also occupied Parliamentary time. Interest in the matter among Members of Parliament crossed party boundaries. Most of the activity was in the House of Commons rather than in the House of Lords, because the former House had control of expenditure. A further reason was that the government was more exposed to questioning in the House of Commons, because, for most of the period, the First Lord of the Admiralty was a member of that House. Lady Franklin also had a wider range of acquaintance in the House of Commons and was able to conduct a lobbying campaign using it as a medium.


2021 ◽  
pp. 193-213
Author(s):  
Christopher Cochrane ◽  
Jean-François Godbout ◽  
Jason Vandenbeukel

Canada is a federal parliamentary democracy with a bicameral legislature at the national level. Members of the upper House, styled the Senate, are appointed by the prime minister, and members of the lower House, the House of Commons, are elected in single-member plurality electoral districts. In practice, the House of Commons is by far the more important of the two chambers. This chapter, therefore, investigates access to the floor in the Canadian House of Commons. We find that the age, gender, and experience of MPs have little independent effect on access to the floor. Consistent with the dominant role of parties in Canadian political life, we find that an MP’s role within a party has by far the most significant impact on their access to the floor. Intriguingly, backbenchers in the government party have the least access of all.


1967 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. J. Jupp

One generalization which can be made about politics in the reign of George III with a fair degree of certainty is that the vast majority of M.P.s did not consider their conduct in the House of Commons as predetermined by the wishes of their electors; they preferred to see themselves as elected as members of Parliament rather than as delegates to Parliament. Moreover, despite the recent concentration of some historians upon the history of Parliament, the discipline of psephology rarely engaged the attention of politicians after a general election. These two attitudes of mind, which together indicated a clear division between electoral and Parliamentary politics, were nowhere more prevalent than in constituencies where landed interests were predominant. These, which comprised the majority in Scotland and Wales, were, after 1801, also thought to predominate in Ireland. This, in fact, was part of the reason why the Whigs at Westminster so firmly opposed the Union during the debates in 1799 and 1800. They argued in effect that in Ireland, as in Scotland, there was little dependence upon electors and a great dependence upon patronage; that the union with Scotland had added a substantial proportion of the forty-five M.P.s to the ranks of the government of the day; and that the union with Ireland would add near a 100 more. In fact the traditional picture of Irish electoral politics between 1801–26 is that, notwithstanding the fact that in Ireland the economic and social position and above all the religious sentiments of the majority of the electors were nowhere more clearly opposed to those of their M.P.s, the constituencies remained firmly controlled by the leading landed, and therefore Protestant, interests, the majority of whom supported every administration. The purpose of this article, however, is to argue that the Catholic vote in Irish constituencies was an integral and important factor in elections before 1820; that it not only played its part at elections but that it also affected in some degree the conduct of Irish M.P.s in the House of Commons towards the question of Catholic emancipation.


2020 ◽  
pp. 003232172095350
Author(s):  
Thomas G Fleming

What shapes legislators’ incentives for personal vote-seeking in parliament? Recent work suggests that partisanship among voters deters personal vote-seeking, by limiting its effectiveness. This has potentially significant implications for policy-making, election results and patterns of accountability. However, empirical tests of this argument remain few in number and have several limitations. This article thus offers a new test of the relationship between partisanship and personal vote-seeking. Using legislators’ bill proposals as an indicator of their personal vote-seeking activity, I analyse legislative behaviour in the UK House of Commons between 1964 and 2017. I find that members of parliament make more legislative proposals when voters are less partisan. Moreover, partisanship appears to moderate the influence of other drivers of personal vote-seeking: electorally vulnerable legislators make more legislative proposals, but only at low levels of partisanship. These findings provide new evidence that voters’ relationships with political parties affect legislators’ electoral strategies and parliamentary behaviour.


2020 ◽  
pp. 11-26
Author(s):  
ANCA-JEANINA NIȚĂ

The present article aims to rediscuss the variables of constitutional revision. This effort stems from the recent initiatives purporting “to reform the Constitutional Court of Romania” and observations regarding the “major deficit of parliamentary democracy in the legislative procedure”, generated by the special procedures of “tacit adoption”, “assuming responsibility” and the excess of legislative power on part of the Government, as expressed through ordinances. Given a constitution needs a certain level of stability and the possibility to adapt to new, political and social realities, this article showcases the procedural rules and limits in relation to constitutional revision. It selectively presents possible outcomes of a future constitutional revision – stemming from the observation of disfunctions manifested in the functioning of the constitutional-statal mechanism (particularly the parliamentary practice of tacitly adopting bills and legislative proposals and the governmental practices in the field of assuming responsibility before Parliament and of adopting emergency ordinances). It showcases the constitutional and infraconstitutional framework regulating the organization and functioning of the Constitutional Court of Romania and remarks a recent bill to amend Law No. 47/1992. Last but not least, it analyses whether constitutional amendments would actually play a part in consolidating the democratic regime of Romania if not paired with a reform of the political elite, reshaping the conduct of the main political and institutional actors


2017 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian D. Williams ◽  
Indridi H. Indridason

The legislative agenda in most parliamentary systems is controlled tightly by the government and bills offered by individual members of parliament have low rates of success. Yet, members of parliament (MPs) do seek to present (private) members’ bills even where the rate of adoption is very low. We argue that members’ bills serve as an electoral connection but also as an opportunity for MPs to signal competence to their co-partisans. To demonstrate the presence of an electoral connection we take advantage of the random selection of private members’ bills in the New Zealand House of Representatives and show that survey respondents approve more of electorate MPs whose bills were drawn on the ballot. In addition, we show that MPs respond to the incentives created by the voters and parties’ willingness to reward legislative effort and, consequently, that electorally vulnerable legislators are more likely to place members’ bills on the ballot.


2021 ◽  
pp. 207-242
Author(s):  
Anne Dennett

This chapter explores the role and membership of Parliament’s two chambers, the House of Commons and the House of Lords, the operation of parliamentary privilege; and accountability of members. The key functions of Parliament include controlling national expenditure and taxation; sustaining the government; legislating and scrutinising government actions. The House of Commons is the pre-eminent chamber and dominates Parliament. The Commons’ membership consists of Members of Parliament (MPs) who are democratically elected by the public to represent their interests in Parliament. The membership of the House of Lords largely relies on patronage. Members of the Lords are appointed by the Queen on the Prime Minister’s advice. The House of Lords is an important revising and scrutinising chamber, and while it is subordinate to the democratically elected House of Commons, it is also a check on constitutional change by the Commons. The Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 redefined the Lords’ legislative powers over public bills and established the Commons’ primacy. The chapter then considers the operation of parliamentary privilege. Parliament needs parliamentary privilege to conduct its core business effectively, independently, and without fear of outside interference, and to protect everything said or done in the transaction of parliamentary business. Indeed, Parliament is self-regulating and, as a sovereign body, operates outside the jurisdiction of the courts except for the criminal law. Each House has its own standards of conduct and disciplinary powers which ensure accountability.


2001 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 522-556 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Page Baldwin

The 1914 British Nationality and Status of Aliens (BNSA) Act stated that “the wife of a British subject shall be deemed to be a British subject, and the wife of an alien shall be deemed to be an alien.” By this reenactment of an 1870 law, a British woman who married an alien became an alien herself, losing the rights and privileges accorded to British nationality. During the 1920s and 1930s, British feminists from around the Empire worked to change this regulation, but only in 1948 were women in the United Kingdom granted the right to their own nationality regardless of their marital status. The House of Commons largely supported the feminists' efforts to reform the laws so that women would not automatically lose their nationality on marriage. Members of Parliament introduced several bills to equalize the nationality laws that were read without division. The Government, however, consistently blocked the bills, citing the imperial nature of the nationality laws and Dominion disagreement with the change. This contest over nationality has been a neglected topic in the study of twentieth-century British history. Legal historians have, by and large, only described changes in the laws regarding married women's national status. While some historians of the women's movement in the British Isles have noted the equal nationality campaign, most have not realized how it can contribute to our understanding of interwar Britain and British feminism. Pat Thane, however, has seen in this topic an example of the way the Empire has influenced British culture.


FORUM ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-124
Author(s):  
Jean Delisle

Parliamentary interpretation was introduced in the House of Commons of the Parliament of Canada on January 15, 1959, fifty years ago this year. The author describes the stages of establishing this new service and gives the names and background of the first seven interpreters. He also shows that, at the time, interpretation was perceived by the Members of Parliament and journalists as a constitutional necessity in a country officially bilingual. Thanks to the interpretation, the French unilingual MPs participated more actively in the political debates which took place mostly in English before. The interpretation has contributed to strengthen parliamentary democracy, institutional bilingualism and national unity.


1903 ◽  
Vol 49 (206) ◽  
pp. 474-483
Author(s):  
J. Carlyle Johnstone

Dr. Carlyle Johnstone, introducing the discussion, said: It is several years since any active steps have been taken by the Scottish Division, or by the Association itself, to obtain retiring allowances for the officers and servants of Scottish district and parochial asylums. Nothing has been done in the interval by the State or the local authorities to satisfy our reasonable claims or to remove the special injustice under which Scotland suffers. A memorial on this subject was presented to the Lord Advocate by the Scottish Division in 1877, and a similar memorial was presented to the Secretary for Scotland, Lord Lothian, in 1887. The representations of the Division were politely received, but no practical results have followed. It may be considered that it would be futile to send in a third petition; but the present Secretary for Scotland has never been approached by our body, and he may fairly consider that if we do not ask for pensions we do not want them. There is reason to believe that at any moment a Bill for the amendment of the Scottish Lunacy Acts may be introduced into the House of Commons. We should leave no stone unturned in order to secure that in this Bill provision shall be made for the granting of superannuation allowances in all Scottish public asylums. I have brought this question before the Asylum Workers' Association and the Parliamentary Committee of the Medico-Psychological Association, and both of these bodies have now memorialised Lord Balfour on behalf of the Scottish asylum workers. In my opinion our Scottish Division should do the same. The conditions of service in Scotland are so anomalous, so grossly unfair as compared with those in England and Ireland, that, if only we keep on protesting and agitating the matter, we may reasonably expect by our continual importunity to obtain justice sooner or later. At each General Election we ought to approach every candidate for Parliamentary honours, lay our case before them, and obtain from them individually, if possible, an expression of their sympathy with our claim and a promise to vote for a Bill which shall satisfy this claim. This is what we ought to have done at the last General Election. I hope that this meeting will resolve that this shall be done at the next one. It does not appear to me to be opportune to approach Members of Parliament at this moment. In a decaying House, with a dwindling majority on the side of the Government and many Members proposing to go into retirement at the dissolution, we can scarcely expect Members to pledge themselves to vote for what cannot be regarded as a “popular” or “economical” measure. But we ought, I think, to get into touch with Lord Balfour at once, and make plans for bringing pressure to bear on all Scottish candidates at the General Election, which may possibly occur at an early date.


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