scholarly journals Crossing Over: Majority Party Control Affects Legislator Behavior and the Agenda

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
NICHOLAS G. NAPOLIO ◽  
CHRISTIAN R. GROSE
Keyword(s):  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Revealed Preferences ◽  
Crossing Over ◽  
Agenda Control ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Legislative Session ◽  
Party Control ◽  
Legislative Agenda ◽  
Floor Control ◽  
Legislative Policy

Does majority party control cause changes in legislative policy making? We argue that majority party floor control affects legislator behavior and agenda control. Leveraging a natural experiment where nearly one tenth of a legislature’s members died within the same legislative session, we are able to identify the effect of majority party floor control on the legislative agenda and on legislator choices. Previous correlational work has found mixed evidence of party effects, especially in the mid-twentieth century. In contrast, we find that majority party control leads to (1) changes in the agenda and (2) changes in legislators’ revealed preferences. These effects are driven by changes in numerical party majorities on the legislative floor. The effects are strongest with Republican and nonsouthern Democratic legislators. The effects are also more pronounced on the first (economic) than the second (racial) dimension. Additional correlational evidence across 74 years adds external validity to our exogenous evidence.

Partisan agenda control in the US house: A theoretical exploration

2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 555-570 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffery A Jenkins ◽  
Nathan W Monroe
Keyword(s):  
Agenda Setting ◽  
Median Voter ◽  
Voter Model ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Agenda Control ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Party Government ◽  
The Us ◽  
Median Voter Model ◽  
Party Members

While a number of scholars have focused on the importance of partisan agenda control in the US House, few have examined its uneven consequences within the majority party. In this paper, we explore ‘counterfactual’ utility distributions within the majority party, by comparing policy outcomes under a party-less median voter model to policy outcomes under party-based positive and negative agenda control models. We show that the distribution of policy losses and benefits resulting from agenda control are quite similar for both the positive and negative varieties. In both cases, moderate majority-party members are made worse off by the exercise of partisan agenda control, while those to the extreme side of the majority-party median benefit disproportionately. We also consider the benefit of agenda control for the party as a whole, by looking at the way changes in majority-party homogeneity affect the summed utility across members. Interestingly, we find that when the distance between the floor and majority-party medians decreases, the overall value of positive and negative agenda control diminishes. However, we also find support for the ‘conditional party government’ notion that, as majority-party members’ preferences become more similar, they have an increased incentive to grant agenda-setting power to their leaders.

Legislative Reform and the Decline of Presidential Influence on Capitol Hill

1979 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 465-479 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric L. Davis
Keyword(s):  
Jimmy Carter ◽  
Legislative Reform ◽  
Party Control ◽  
Legislative Agenda ◽  
Capitol Hill ◽  
Positive Action ◽  
Lyndon Johnson ◽  
Legislative Proposals ◽  
Political Scene ◽  
Presidential Influence

Observers of the American political scene might at times wonder why the 95th Congress, with nearly two-to-one Democratic majorities in both houses, did not take positive action on many of President Carter's important legislative proposals in 1977 and 1978. After all, it was argued when Carter was inaugurated at the beginning of 1977, the return of common party control to both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue would bring to an end the legislative-executive confrontations of the Nixon-Ford years. Thus, was not the unwillingness of Congress to approve his major programs an indication that Carter was inept, or even perhaps incompetent, as a legislative leader? If Lyndon Johnson could obtain swift approval of an extensive legislative agenda from the 89th Congress (1965–66), which in partisan composition was quite similar to the 95th Congress, why could Jimmy Carter not achieve comparable results?

Parliaments in Time

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Koß
Keyword(s):  
Western Europe ◽  
Institutional Development ◽  
Process Tracing ◽  
Agenda Control ◽  
Ideal Types ◽  
Legislative Procedures ◽  
Legislative Agenda ◽  
Western European ◽  
System Threat ◽  
Distributive Bargaining

This book sheds light on the institutional development of four (emerging) Western European parliaments. Parliaments in Western Europe are noteworthy for several reasons. Their institutional designs differ remarkably, with distinct consequences for their policy output. Scholars have diagnosed the decline of legislatures for over a century now. Based on a model of distributive bargaining over legislative procedures, this book engages in a comparative process-tracing analysis of ninety reforms, which restructured control over the plenary agenda and committee power in Britain, France, Sweden, and Germany between 1866 and 2015. The analysis presented suggests that legislators in Western Europe rationalize procedures as a response to growing levels of legislative workload. As a consequence, legislatures evolve towards one of two procedural ideal types: talking or working legislatures. In talking legislatures, governments enjoy privileges in legislative agenda-setting (resulting in centralized agenda control) and committees are weak. In contrast, working legislatures combine decentralized agenda control with powerful committees. Which path legislators chose is determined by the appearance of anti-system obstruction. If anti-system parties obstruct legislative business, legislators surrender ancient procedural privileges and agree to a centralization of agenda control. Otherwise, their demand for legislative mega-seats on committees triggers the evolution of working legislatures. If legislators fail to respond to an anti-system threat, legislative procedures break down. For this reason, the central aim of procedural reforms in Western European parliaments is to maintain legislative democracy. Rather than a decline of legislatures, for talking legislatures to successfully overcome an anti-system threat indicates the resilience of legislative democracy.

Extreme Reversion Points and Party Leadership from 2011 through 2016

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Buchler
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Republican Party ◽  
Unified Model ◽  
Divided Government ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Party Leadership ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Legislative Agenda ◽  
Debt Ceiling ◽  
Sincere Voting

When a majority party works on normal legislation, it faces a collective action problem of sincere voting, and must prevent legislators from centrist districts from voting against noncentrist legislation. From 2011 through 2016, though, Republican Party leadership faced a different challenge, and leaders were pitted against the extremists in their caucus. This occurred because of a change to the legislative agenda resulting from the combination of extreme polarization and divided government introduced by the 2010 election. With no incentive to work on normal legislation, the agenda did little but avoid reversion points, like debt ceiling breaches, which the extreme elements in the caucus actually found acceptable. Speaker Boehner was forced to solve a new collective action problem, then, convincing a group of Republicans to join with Democrats on bipartisan deals to avoid these reversion points. While historically unusual, the dynamic is what would be expected from the unified model.

Agenda Control, Intraparty Conflict, and Government Spending in Asia: Evidence from South Korea and Taiwan

2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
O. Fiona Yap
Keyword(s):  
South Korea ◽  
Party System ◽  
Party Leader ◽  
Leadership Roles ◽  
Agenda Control ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Institutional Rules ◽  
Budgetary Control ◽  
Policy Transformations ◽  
Intraparty Conflict

In nations where the executive has budgetary control, how are spending decisions and allocations affected? Is intraparty conflict relevant? This article sets out to show that institutional rules and leadership roles affect budgetary outcomes. It makes the following argument: if intraparty conflict exists in a one-party dominant or majority-party system, the executive reduces spending to punish the party in the legislature; if no intraparty conflict exists, then the executive increases spending to reward or cultivate loyalty to himself as the party leader. If intraparty conflict exists in a minority government or majority-coalition within a competitive multiparty system, the executive increases spending to reward or cultivate loyalty to himself as the party or coalition leader. Evidence from South Korea and Taiwan between the 1970s and 2000 supports the theory. This study advances scholarship in three ways. First, it shows that institutional rules that provide the executive with agenda control also lead to the strategic use of the budgetary process and outcomes to generate loyalty to the executive as leader. Second, it reveals that this strategy affects spending outcomes in election years; this is an important caveat to electoral spending manipulations. Third, the strategic use of the budget to control intraparty conflict occurred prior to and following democratization; this reveals that institutional changes need to include modifications in rules for policy transformations.

From Rolls to Disappointments

2016 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew J. Clarke ◽  
Jeffery A. Jenkins ◽  
Nathan W. Monroe
Keyword(s):  
Agenda Setting ◽  
Spatial Model ◽  
The Other ◽  
Agenda Control ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Reconstruction Era

Much of the literature on partisan agenda setting in Congress focuses on the majority’s ability to exercise negative agenda control. As a result, the empirical emphasis has been on “rolls,” or how often the majority of the majority party opposes legislation that nonetheless passes. Although interesting, rolls are only one source of majority party failure. The other source, largely unexplored in the literature, is when the majority of the majority party supports legislation that is subsequently defeated. These cases represent “disappointments,” and are a means to determine how effective the majority party is at exercising positive agenda control. Making some basic modifications to a standard spatial model of agenda setting, we articulate why and where we might expect the majority party to fail to exercise positive agenda control effectively. We then derive hypotheses regarding (1) which members should vote “no” on roll calls that result in a disappointment and (2) why disappointments vary on a Congress-by-Congress basis across time, and test them using a dataset of final-passage votes on House bills in the post-Reconstruction era.

The Signaling Role of Politician Stock Ownership: Effects on Lobbying Intensity

2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (5) ◽  
pp. 2116-2141 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason W. Ridge ◽  
Aaron D. Hill ◽  
Amy Ingram
Keyword(s):  
Political Action ◽  
Signaling Theory ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Stock Ownership ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Legislative Agenda ◽  
Using Data

Adopting a signaling theory perspective, we argue that politician stock ownership sends signals of positive predispositions to firms, thereby alleviating some necessity for firms to emphasize lobbying expenditures to influence political action. Using data on congressional stock ownership, we find support for our arguments. We find that as the proportion of Congress owning stock in a firm increases, the firm decreases the intensity of lobbying. Furthermore, we find that the signals associated with stock-holding politicians with greater ability to affect the legislative agenda (i.e., affiliation with the majority party) relates to lobbying intensity. Our findings add to the literature on lobbying while also offering implications for practice and avenues for future research.

Filling the Amendment Tree: Majority Party Control, Procedures, and Polarization in the U.S. Senate

2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 724-747
Author(s):  
Neilan S. Chaturvedi
Keyword(s):  
Statistical Relationship ◽  
Modern History ◽  
Party Leadership ◽  
Majority Party ◽  
Restrictive Procedure ◽  
Party Control ◽  
Control Procedures ◽  
Parliamentary Procedure ◽  
The U.S

Harry Reid is often lauded by fellow Democrats as one of the most powerful Senate Majority leaders in modern history. One tactic that he used to usher in legislation was a parliamentary procedure known as “Filling the Amendment Tree.” Amendment trees are diagrams that demonstrate the amendment process for legislation, but Reid often limited the number of amendments that could be offered on a piece of legislation using this procedure. From the majority’s perspective, this procedure helps usher in legislation and protects vulnerable moderates from having to vote on controversial legislation. Still, others argue that the restrictive procedure limited the ability of moderate Democrats to distinguish themselves from their party leadership, making them vulnerable to attacks. In this article, I find that filling the amendment tree did not limit moderate Democrats from proposing amendments. In fact, although moderate Republicans shied away from the process of filing amendments in protest, there was no statistical relationship between ideology and the number of amendments filed for Democrats. Still, upon examination of voting data, the use of the procedure homogenized the voting records of moderate Democrats in the 112th and 113th Congresses. Furthermore, it forced moderate Republicans to vote more often with the Democrats in each of the Congresses in which Reid employed the procedure.

scholarly journals Ideology, Grandstanding, and Strategic Party Disloyalty in the British Parliament

2017 ◽  
Vol 112 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
JONATHAN B. SLAPIN ◽  
JUSTIN H. KIRKLAND ◽  
JOSEPH A. LAZZARO ◽  
PATRICK A. LESLIE ◽  
TOM O’GRADY
Keyword(s):  
House Of Commons ◽  
Agenda Control ◽  
Party Discipline ◽  
Individual Preferences ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Original Dataset ◽  
Party Control ◽  
Parliamentary Systems ◽  
Core Feature

Strong party discipline is a core feature of Westminster parliamentary systems. Parties typically compel members of Parliament (MPs) to support the party regardless of MPs’ individual preferences. Rebellion, however, does occur. Using an original dataset of MP votes and speeches in the British House of Commons from 1992 to 2015, coupled with new estimations of MPs’ ideological positions within their party, we find evidence that MPs use rebellion strategically to differentiate themselves from their party. The strategy that MPs employ is contingent upon an interaction of ideological extremity with party control of government. Extremists are loyal when their party is in the opposition, but these same extremists become more likely to rebel when their party controls government. Additionally, they emphasize their rebellion through speeches. Existing models of rebellion and party discipline do not account for government agenda control and do not explain these patterns.

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