Comparing Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Quotas, Thresholds, Paradoxes and Majorities

1992 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 469-496 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Gallagher
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Single Transferable Vote ◽  
Seat Allocation ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Allocation Methods

The relationship between electoral systems can be examined on a number of dimensions. Seat allocation methods are conveniently divided into two groups: those based on largest remainders and those based on highest averages. The single transferable vote has its own distinct characteristics. Focusing on certain elements – the quota, thresholds, paradoxes and the conditions under which a majority of seats can be won – enables comparisons to be drawn between seat allocation methods. Certain seat allocation methods conventionally seen as variants of proportional representation (PR) cannot be regarded as such. PR methods can be rank ordered according to whether, when complete proportionality is not attainable, they display electoral bias towards larger or smaller parties. However, a definitive ordering is elusive, since some methods that are generally more favourable to larger parties can in some circumstances set lower thresholds of representation than methods generally favourable to smaller parties.

Electoral Systems and the Substantive Representation of Marginalized Groups: Evidence from Women’s Issue Bills in South Korea

2021 ◽  
pp. 106591292110282
Author(s):  
Yesola Kweon ◽  
Josh M. Ryan
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Substantive Representation ◽  
National Assembly ◽  
Representation Of Women ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
Marginalized Groups ◽  
Original Dataset ◽  
The Relationship

How do electoral rules shape the substantive representation of traditionally underrepresented groups? Using an original dataset of introduced and passed bills in the Korean National Assembly, which has both single-member districts and proportional representation, we examine the extent to which institutions condition the relationship between lawmaker gender and the substantive representation of women. While women lawmakers engage in higher levels of substantive representation of women, proportional representation allows both women and men to introduce more women’s issue bills than their counterparts elected through single-member districts. Furthermore, legislators elected through proportional representation are more effective at achieving passage of women’s issue legislation when compared with those elected in single-member districts, and this effect is especially pronounced for men. Our findings show that electoral systems matter for the representation of marginalized groups and that proportional representation systems allow both female and male politicians to increase their substantive representation of women.

scholarly journals Fairness of seat allocation methods in proportional representation

ORiON ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
L Van Eck ◽  
SE Visagie ◽  
HC De Kock
Keyword(s):  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Seat Allocation ◽  
Allocation Methods

scholarly journals Electoral systems and income inequality: a tale of political equality

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Izaskun Zuazu
Keyword(s):  
Income Inequality ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Instrumental Variable ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Lower Income ◽  
Political Equality ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Mixed Systems

AbstractThe link between democracy and within-country income inequality remains an unresolved quest in the literature of political economy. To look into this debate, I propose exploring the implications of electoral systems, rather than political regimes, on income inequality. I surmise that proportional representation systems should be associated with lower income inequality than majoritarian or mixed systems. Further, I conjecture that the relationship between electoral systems and income inequality hinges on the de facto distribution of real political power, namely political equality. I use data on 85 countries covering the period 1960–2016 and specify models able to capture the persistence and mean reversion of income inequality. The estimates fail to significantly associate democracy with income inequality, and find other political institutions to significantly shape income inequality. The paper finds a robust association between more proportional systems and lower income inequality. However, this association depends on political equality. Changes towards proportional representation systems seem to lower income inequality at low and medium levels of political equality. Strikingly, instrumental variable estimates show that changes in electoral systems in political equal societies increases income inequality.

Electoral Systems in Context

2017 ◽  
pp. 650-672
Author(s):  
Michael Marsh
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
National Parliament ◽  
Republic Of Ireland ◽  
The Public ◽  
Single Transferable Vote ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
The Republic

The Republic of Ireland is unusual in using the single transferable vote to elect its national parliament. The system allows voters to rank candidates in order of preference, and those lower preferences are used to allocate seats when a count of first preferences shows that candidates have no overall majority or, in multiseat elections, do not reach a set quota. The party system showed little fragmentation until recently, and proportionality has been only a little less than in many proportional representation systems. The public twice rejected moves to change the system and continues to express satisfaction with the control it appears to give them over their representatives, despite the criticisms expressed by many politicians and commentators.

Electoral Systems in Context

2017 ◽  
pp. 740-762
Author(s):  
Louis Massicotte
Keyword(s):  
Prime Minister ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Single Transferable Vote ◽  
British Colony ◽  
Long Time

Starting in 1758, elections have been held in various Canadian jurisdictions using first past the post. The same system is now used everywhere in Canada, even though the country ceased a long time ago to be a British colony. Whether constituencies should elect one member or more remained an issue for a long time, but single-member constituencies now prevail for federal, provincial, and territorial elections. For limited periods of time, a few provinces have experienced with alternative voting, the single transferable vote, or the limited vote, but all later reverted to plurality. The debate on the appropriate electoral system remains lively. Many Canadians support proportional representation, and in recent years, mixed-member proportional has emerged as the option most preferred by reformers. However, all attempts in that direction have failed so far, including the process launched by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in 2015.

scholarly journals Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior: Explaining Voting Defection in the European Parliament

2004 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-223 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Hix
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
European Union Member State ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Legislative Behavior ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Selection Rules ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

Despite a sophisticated understanding of the impact of electoral institutions on macrolevel political behavior, little is known about the relationship between these institutions and microlevel legislative behavior. This article reviews existing claims about this relationship and develops a model for predicting how electoral institutions affect the relationship between parliamentarians and their party principals in the context of the European Parliament. The European Parliament is an ideal laboratory for investigating these effects, because in each European Union member state, different institutions are used to elect Members of European Parliament (MEPs). The results of this model, tested on four hundred thousand individual MEP vote decisions, show that candidate-centered electoral systems (such as open-list proportional representation or single-transferable-vote systems) and decentralized candidate-selection rules produce parliamentarians independent from their party principals. By contrast, party-centered electoral systems (such as closed-list proportional representation systems) and centralized candidate-selection rules produce parliamentarians beholden to the parties that fight elections and choose candidates: in the case of the European Parliament, the national parties.

scholarly journals When Does the Personal Vote Matter for Party Loyalty? The Conditional Effects of Candidate-Centred Electoral Systems

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Royce Carroll ◽  
Monika Nalepa
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Party Discipline ◽  
Legislative Voting ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Conditional Effects ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract When do candidate-centred electoral systems produce undisciplined parties? In this article, we examine party discipline under open-list proportional representation, a system associated with MPs cultivating personal constituencies. We present a model explaining how legislators’ preferences and support among voters mediate political leaders’ ability to enforce discipline. We show that disloyalty in candidate-centred systems depends on parties’ costs for enforcing discipline, but only conditional on MP preferences. MPs who share the policy preferences of their leaders will be loyal even when the leaders cannot discipline them. To test the model’s implications, we use data on legislative voting in Poland’s parliament. Our empirical findings confirm that disloyalty is conditioned on party leaders’ enforcement capacity and MP preferences. We find that legislators who contribute more to the party electorally in terms of votes are more disloyal, but only if their preferences diverge from the leadership. Our results suggest that the relationship between open lists and party disloyalty is conditional on the context of the party system.

District magnitude and electoral mobilization: how uneven electoral systems shift the focus of campaign efforts by political parties

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Michio Umeda
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Survey Period ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Party Strategies ◽  
Electoral Mobilization ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract This paper shows how an uneven electoral system in Japan shapes political parties' mobilization strategies by utilizing a majoritarian electoral system with heterogeneous district magnitudes, which in turn contributes to the gap in turnout across districts. Scholars have long debated the relationship between electoral systems and turnout; it is known that countries with proportional representation electoral systems – those with larger district magnitude – tend to have higher turnout rates than countries with majoritarian electoral systems, especially single-member district (SMD) systems. The current discussion on turnout and district magnitude of an electoral system assumes a monotonic relationship between these factors: the larger the district magnitude of the electoral system, the more (or less) participatory the electorate, due to competitiveness and mobilization efforts by political parties and other relevant groups. In contrast, this paper shows a mixed relationship between district magnitude of the electoral system and party mobilization and subsequent turnout, investigating a majoritarian electoral system with uneven district magnitude in the Japanese Upper House. During the survey period, the party system in Japan consisted of two major parties and a few smaller parties; consequently, the two major parties focused their efforts on SMDs in order to maximize their seat share, while smaller parties focused their resource on districts electing more than two members (where they have some chance to elect their party's candidates). In combination, these party strategies have resulted in the lowest mobilization and turnout rates in districts with two members.

Electoral System Changes and Voter Turnout: Reflections on New Zealand Local Elections

2013 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 145-162
Author(s):  
Jacky Yaakov Zvulun
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Citizen Participation ◽  
Voter Turnout ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Local Elections ◽  
Single Transferable Vote ◽  
General Elections ◽  
The Impact

Voter turnout in local and general elections is a key element in measuring citizen participation. From 2004, New Zealand local elections were unique in that local councils had the choice of two different electoral systems: plurality majority and proportional representation. We have here the opportunity to study more about New Zealand local elections and changes in electoral systems. This article analyses the impact of the "Single Transferable Vote” electoral system in those councils that adopted it, comparing it to those councils which used "First Past the Post". This article explains how the STV electoral system has not increased voter turnout and was not the cause of low voter turnout in the 2004-2007 local elections. It might, however, offer voters a better way to choose their preferences.

Preferential Voting: Definition and Classification

2017 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 737-761 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jurij Toplak
Keyword(s):  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Ranking Methods ◽  
Single Transferable Vote ◽  
Alternative Vote ◽  
Preference Voting ◽  
Election Systems ◽  
Common Understanding

There is no single definition for ‘preferential voting’ or ‘preference voting’ since the terms are used for a number of different election systems and groups of such systems. They can be synonymous with the single-transferable vote, the alternative vote, open-list proportional representation, or the group of all ranking methods. This article offers an overview of the various definitions and classifications of preferential voting and other terms used in the literature to describe it. It proposes a common understanding of preferential voting. I suggest that preferentiality ought to be one of the characteristics by which electoral systems are evaluated. All election systems are preferential, though to varying degrees. I offer a classification of numerous electoral schemes according to their preferentiality.

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