District magnitude and electoral mobilization: how uneven electoral systems shift the focus of campaign efforts by political parties

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Michio Umeda
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Survey Period ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Party Strategies ◽  
Electoral Mobilization ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract This paper shows how an uneven electoral system in Japan shapes political parties' mobilization strategies by utilizing a majoritarian electoral system with heterogeneous district magnitudes, which in turn contributes to the gap in turnout across districts. Scholars have long debated the relationship between electoral systems and turnout; it is known that countries with proportional representation electoral systems – those with larger district magnitude – tend to have higher turnout rates than countries with majoritarian electoral systems, especially single-member district (SMD) systems. The current discussion on turnout and district magnitude of an electoral system assumes a monotonic relationship between these factors: the larger the district magnitude of the electoral system, the more (or less) participatory the electorate, due to competitiveness and mobilization efforts by political parties and other relevant groups. In contrast, this paper shows a mixed relationship between district magnitude of the electoral system and party mobilization and subsequent turnout, investigating a majoritarian electoral system with uneven district magnitude in the Japanese Upper House. During the survey period, the party system in Japan consisted of two major parties and a few smaller parties; consequently, the two major parties focused their efforts on SMDs in order to maximize their seat share, while smaller parties focused their resource on districts electing more than two members (where they have some chance to elect their party's candidates). In combination, these party strategies have resulted in the lowest mobilization and turnout rates in districts with two members.

Wahlsystemreform in Deutschland

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peggy Matauschek
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Parallel Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Suitable Alternative ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Alternative Vote

Is plurality or majority electoral reform a sensible option in Germany’s muddled electoral system debate? Yes, it is. Since Germany’s mixed-member proportional system fails to concentrate the party system in a sufficient way, Peggy Matauschek searches for a suitable alternative to the principle of proportional representation. She discusses the following options according to their contextual conditions: single-member plurality and majority electoral systems—like the alternative vote system—, parallel systems, proportional representation systems with a low district magnitude and majority bonus systems. In light of its balanced performance, the study advocates the introduction of a system with a majority bonus for a coalition.

Proportional Representation, Large District Magnitude and Closed Lists

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
Radek Buben ◽  
Karel Kouba
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Political Representation ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Historical Sociology ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Public Debate ◽  
The Public ◽  
District Magnitude

AbstractChoosing the type of electoral system in new democracies has become a contested issue for social scientists as well as for political actors. Contrary to the state of the public debate on the issue, the article advances the position from a multidisciplinary standpoint (political science, historical sociology, economics) that proportional representation with large districts and closed lists performs better on a variety of key indicators. We review recent literature on the performance of electoral systems especially in post-communist and Latin American democracies. The article identifies the centripetal theory of democracy as a normative basis for our institutional prescriptions and discusses how distinct types of political representation relate to the debate on electoral systems. We focus especially on four main concerns commonly associated with proportional representation (the rise of “extremist” parties, government instability, party system deconsolidation, and corruption and clientelism). Contrary to much of the public debate on electoral systems, we conclude that further steps towards personalization (by opening lists or reducing district magnitude) are not advisable.

scholarly journals Mixed-Member Electoral Systems

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erik S. Herron
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
East European ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Spatial Coverage ◽  
As If

Scholarship on the classification, origins, incentives, and consequences of mixed-member electoral systems has matured, especially over the last two decades. While mixed-member electoral systems (also known as mixed electoral systems) have been in constant use since Germany adopted a mixed-member proportional system for assembly elections following World War II, researchers did not begin to fully probe the implications of this electoral system until its expansion across the globe beginning in the 1990s. Mixed-member electoral systems share an important characteristic: voter preferences are translated into outcomes by at least two allocation formulas applied in the same election. While voters typically receive a ballot to select a representative in a constituency (often using first-past-the-post) and a ballot to select a party list (often using a form of proportional representation (PR)), the institutional features of mixed-member systems vary substantially. A crucial distinction among mixed-member systems is whether or not seat allocation in the constituency and proportional representation tiers is linked (mixed-member proportional, or MMP) or unlinked (mixed-member majoritarian, or MMM). Across the universe of mixed-member systems, one finds additional differences in the number of ballots voters receive; the electoral formulas and thresholds used to determine winners; the proportion of seats allocated to each component; the ability of candidates to contest seats in both components during the same election; and other critical aspects of the rules. Scholarship classifying mixed-member systems has highlighted different aspects of the rules to sort them into categories. A substantial amount of scholarship on mixed-member systems has emphasized the debate about the incentives that the systems generate. The “controlled comparison” approach treats the components as if they are independent from one another and the “contamination effects” approach treats the components as if they are interdependent. These competing schools of thought generate different expectations, with the former generally anticipating compliance with Duverger’s propositions and the latter anticipating divergence. Subsequent scholarship has been split about which approach better explains observed behavior. However, many of the perceived differences between the approaches may be artificial, generated by extreme interpretations of the theoretical expectations that lack appropriate nuance. In other words, it may be inappropriate to treat this scholarship as strictly dichotomous. The extant literature on mixed-member systems evaluates data from surveys, interviews, personnel files, roll-call voting, and election returns to understand the behavior of voters, candidates, parties, and legislators. It assesses how the incentives of mixed-member systems contribute to outcomes such as the party system, descriptive representation, and policy decisions. It also explores the presence or absence of a “mandate divide”: the expectation that members of parliament (MPs) selected in the constituency component might behave differently than their counterparts in the party list component. The research is often cross-national, but studies of certain countries with mixed-member systems predominate: Germany, Japan, and New Zealand among established democracies, and central or east European countries among transitional societies. The literature presents many opportunities to generate more nuanced theory, explore different research methodologies (e.g., experimental work), and extend spatial coverage to under-studied countries.

Party Mobilization and Electoral Systems

2017 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Ignacio Lago ◽  
Sandra Bermúdez ◽  
Marc Guinjoan ◽  
Kelly Rowe ◽  
Pablo Simón
Keyword(s):  
Quantitative Data ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
European Elections ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Qualitative And Quantitative ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Party Strategies ◽  
Number Of Visits ◽  
Election Studies

How party strategies vary by electoral system remains largely unexplored in election studies. Using qualitative and quantitative data from Spanish national and European elections, we test how party strategies diverge between districted electoral systems and systems using a single national district. We use the number of visits to districts by the party leaders to determine if targeted party strategies are driven by district magnitude, the share of the population entitled to vote in every district, the number of districts or the strength of parties’ local organizations. Our results show that only the frequency of visits to districts by large parties are clearly affected by electoral systems and, more specifically, by the number of districts and district population.

Electoral Systems in Context

2017 ◽  
pp. 920-942 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan Allen
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Party System ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
The Other ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Political Outcomes ◽  
The Face ◽  
Over Time

This chapter examines the evolution of the Indonesian electoral system and its effects on political outcomes. Although Indonesia has repeatedly chosen to conduct elections using proportional representation, electoral rules have changed considerably over time. The chapter traces two trajectories of reform in the post-Suharto era: one restricting opportunities for small parties and the other restricting the power of party leadership. Efforts to shape party system outcomes using electoral rules have succeeded in some areas, particularly in preventing the formation of regional partisan cleavages. Yet the proliferation of political parties in the face of reforms meant to consolidate the party system underline the limits of institutional design.

The Impact of Mixed-member Districts on Legislators' Behavior: The Case of Bolivia

2016 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Margarita Corral ◽  
Francisco Sánchez ◽  
Cristina Rivas Pérez
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Survey Data ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Attitudes And Behaviors ◽  
And Behaviors ◽  
Personal Assistants ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The Relationship

AbstractMany studies suggest that mixed-member electoral systems produce different attitudes and behaviors among representatives. This article assesses how this type of electoral system shapes Bolivian legislators' perceptions of their roles as representatives, their district activities, and their relationships with their political parties. It examines these dimensions using elite survey data and interviews with legislators and their personal assistants. The results show that the electoral system does not produce a uniform impact. It shapes how legislators perceive their role as representatives and the nature of the relationship they build with their political parties, but it does not produce differences in the kinds of activities that both types of legislators carry out in their districts.

Electoral systems applied to the Iraqi parliament elections after 2003 (comparative analytical study)

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kurdistan Saeed ◽  
Chawan Salah
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Party System ◽  
Analytical Study ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Political Systems ◽  
Electoral Laws ◽  
The Right

This study deals with the electoral systems applied in Iraq after 2003 for the Iraqi Parliament elections. The issue's importance lies in the fact that elections are the legitimate means adopted by modern political systems based on the separation of powers. Therefore, after changing the political system in Iraq in 2003 from a one-party system to a democratic parliamentary system, the permanent constitution of 2005 granted the right to political participation for citizens. Including the right to participate in elections through nomination or candidacy for the Iraqi Council of Representatives, this study examines the electoral systems applied after 2003 and the reasons for the instability of the Iraqi parliament elections on a specific law. The study dealt with the types of electoral systems by focusing on the concept and emergence of elections and the most critical electoral systems adopted by political systems. Furthermore, the electoral systems applied after 2003 in the Iraqi parliament elections by focusing on the electoral laws or their amendments that preceded each electoral cycle since 2003 until now. The study concluded that the electoral system in Iraq was not legally stable; several amendments have been made to the laws regulating the elections for the House of Representatives. So the two elections did not repeat under one law because of political parties' criticism leveled at it. Moreover, the attempt by the large parliamentary blocs, through their control of the Iraqi Council of Representatives, to legislate laws that limit the victory of the blocs and small parties.

Electoral Systems in Context

2017 ◽  
pp. 698-720
Author(s):  
Adam Ziegfeld
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
Ethnic Groups ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Local Level ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Historically Disadvantaged

Throughout its history, India has employed first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral rules for nearly all of its legislative elections. Though India uses a relatively common set of electoral rules, three features of India’s FPTP electoral system stand out. First, India’s election constituencies exhibit persistent malapportionment, even after a recent redrawing of constituency boundaries. Second, India mandates representation for historically disadvantaged ethnic groups—and, more recently, women at the local level—by setting aside, or “reserving,” seats in which only members of certain groups may compete for office. Third, political parties often form pre-election alliances in which multiple parties agree not to field candidates against one another. As a result of frequent pre-election alliances, India’s party system exhibits a number of characteristics rarely found in countries using FPTP rules.

scholarly journals When Does the Personal Vote Matter for Party Loyalty? The Conditional Effects of Candidate-Centred Electoral Systems

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Royce Carroll ◽  
Monika Nalepa
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Political Leaders ◽  
Party Discipline ◽  
Legislative Voting ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
Conditional Effects ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract When do candidate-centred electoral systems produce undisciplined parties? In this article, we examine party discipline under open-list proportional representation, a system associated with MPs cultivating personal constituencies. We present a model explaining how legislators’ preferences and support among voters mediate political leaders’ ability to enforce discipline. We show that disloyalty in candidate-centred systems depends on parties’ costs for enforcing discipline, but only conditional on MP preferences. MPs who share the policy preferences of their leaders will be loyal even when the leaders cannot discipline them. To test the model’s implications, we use data on legislative voting in Poland’s parliament. Our empirical findings confirm that disloyalty is conditioned on party leaders’ enforcement capacity and MP preferences. We find that legislators who contribute more to the party electorally in terms of votes are more disloyal, but only if their preferences diverge from the leadership. Our results suggest that the relationship between open lists and party disloyalty is conditional on the context of the party system.

Which electoral systems succeed at providing proportionality and concentration? Promising designs and risky tools

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 167-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johannes Raabe ◽  
Eric Linhart
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
Compensation Mechanisms ◽  
Level Of Details ◽  
Technical Details ◽  
System Designs

Electoral systems are typically faced with the problem of being asked to provide both proportional representation and party system concentration leading to accountable government. Which electoral system designs are able to successfully deliver on both these challenges and thus optimize the representativeness – accountability trade-off? This paper investigates the performance of different general electoral system designs as well as their specific technical details (such as legal threshold, tier linkages, and compensation mechanisms) based on a data set of 590 elections in 57 countries. The key results are that both proportional representation systems with moderate district magnitudes and mixed-member proportional systems are able to optimize performance. Going to the level of details confirms these results and deepens our understanding further: while different technical changes are able to improve the chances of reaching the best of both worlds, some of these (e.g. raising the legal threshold) also increase the risk of ending up with the worst.

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