Technology Competition and International Co-operation: Friends or Foes?

2013 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 545-574 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sung Eun Kim ◽  
Johannes Urpelainen
Keyword(s):  
Renewable Energy ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Consumer Prices ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Technology Competition ◽  
Comparative Case Studies ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Cost

Is technology competition between commercial rivals an impediment to international co-operation? Or could it instead help states collaborate? Our game-theoretic model suggests that technology competition impedes international co-operation when states hold ‘techno-nationalist’ preferences but have starkly asymmetric abilities to capture new markets. States that expect to lose refuse to co-operate, so treaty formation fails. However, technology competition may also facilitate co-operation. While states invest in new technologies out of self-interest, doing so also reduces consumer prices for other states. Comparative case studies of environmental co-operation demonstrate the model's utility. For example, European co-operation on climate policy was easier to achieve because forerunner countries, such as Denmark and Germany, implemented industrial policies that enhanced the competitiveness of their renewable energy industries. This technology competition reduced the cost of renewable energy for other European countries, and thus lowered the economic costs of their emissions reductions.

The Interrelationship between Estimated Tax Payments and Taxpayer Compliance

2002 ◽  
Vol 24 (s-1) ◽  
pp. 27-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Glenn D. Feltham ◽  
Suzanne M. Paquette
Keyword(s):  
Cost Of Capital ◽  
Tax Compliance ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
High Type ◽  
Compliance Behavior ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Audit Strategy ◽  
Tax Payments ◽  
The Cost

This paper examines taxpayers' compliance behavior and the tax agency's audit decision in a broader, more realistic, setting. Whereas prior research has taken the taxpayer's prepayment position as exogenous, this study extends the literature by incorporating the estimated tax payment decision into a tax compliance game. A two-period game-theoretic model is used to examine the effect that the estimated tax payment rules have on taxpayers' incentives to evade and on the tax agency's audit strategy. Our primary results are as follows. First, in equilibrium taxpayers' estimated tax payment decision will depend upon the uncertainty about their true tax liability, and the cost from overpayment (the taxpayer's cost of capital) or underpayment (penalty interest) of installments of estimated tax. Second, under reasonable assumptions, high-type taxpayers who make higher installments of estimated tax are less likely to lie about their level of income than those who make lower installments—that is, taxpayers who pay low are more likely to evade. Third, the tax agency audits taxpayers who have made low reports and low estimated tax payments with a higher probability than those who have made high estimated tax payments. The gain to the tax agency from auditing taxpayers who make lower payments and evade arises not only from the penalties charged for evasion, but also from the interest charged on deficient installments of estimated tax.

scholarly journals Sexual signaling and the persistence of alternative reproductive tactics: a test of game theoretic predictions

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Courtney R. Garrison ◽  
Scott K. Sakaluk ◽  
Ned A. Dochtermann
Keyword(s):  
Genetic Variation ◽  
Individual Variation ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Relative Cost ◽  
Reproductive Tactics ◽  
Stable Strategy ◽  
Fitness Value ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Cost

AbstractIn many species, males produce signals to attract females. However, in some species and populations, only some males produce these signals with other males competing for and “sneaking” reproductive opportunities. In these systems, at least three tactics are expected: always signal, signal only when others are not (assessors), and never signal. The representation of these tactics within a population is unknown in part because the costs of signaling (C) and the fitness value of a single reproductive bout (V) are unknown. Using a game-theoretic model we predict that the always signal strategy only persists if the fitness value of calling is greater than twice the cost. We also show that always signal males are apparently absent in decorated crickets (Gryllodes sigillatus). Moreover, males of this species were not strict assessors and instead signaled infrequently (30% of the time) when signaling by others was constant. Males also exhibited substantial among-individual variation in the propensity to call when other males were not signaling (τ = 0.3). Our results suggest a high relative cost of signaling (2C > V) in this species. The presence of among-individual variation is indicative of underlying genetic variation and a mixed evolutionary stable strategy.

Design for Repair: A Game Between Manufacturer and Independent Repair Service Provider

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mostafa Sabbaghi ◽  
Sara Behdad
Keyword(s):  
Efficient Solution ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Repair Service ◽  
Design Decisions ◽  
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Viable Solution ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Cost

Design for ease-of-repair is an efficient solution to effectively use resources by extending the lifespan of products. However, designing a repairable product may not be necessarily an economically viable solution for manufacturers. Repairable products enable independent repair businesses to compete with original manufacturers on offering repair services. On the other hand, although designing a less repairable product may dissuade competition, it increases the cost of repair for manufacturers at the same time, in addition to decreasing consumers’ satisfaction. In this paper, a game-theoretic model is developed to represent the competition between a manufacturer acting as a leader, and a coalition of independent repair service providers acting as a follower. The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is derived, representing the optimal prices for repair services offered by the two service-providers based on the level of repairability. In addition, based on the information extracted from a repair-related survey, we provide insights about consumers’ attitudes towards repairability of products to help manufacturers make better design decisions.

scholarly journals Optimizing the Community’s Supports in Counter-Terrorism Operations: A Sticks – Carrots Game Theoretic Model

2020 ◽  
pp. 45-67
Author(s):  
M. O. Oladejo ◽  
I. J. Udoh ◽  
A. O. Abam
Keyword(s):  
Prevention And Control ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Operational Cost ◽  
Counter Terrorism ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Cost ◽  
And Control ◽  
Terrorism Prevention

A terrorist group’s (TG) ability to withstand attacks and recovered from sudden high strength depreciation after a major counterterrorism operation, as well as the Security Agencies’ (SA) ability to execute successful credible counter-terrorism operation is a function of both their individual bureaucratic structures and the level of community’s supports each organization is able to optimize within the period of operation. To study the security implications of undermining a given community’s optimal supports, we present and analysed a two-person two-periods evolutionary game theoretic model for an interaction between the SA and the TG; each playing either the “Sticks” or the “Carrots” or mixed strategies to win the community’s optimal supports. In the symmetric game variant, the result of the analysis shows that if the operational cost drops by 80%, then the SA playing the “Stick” may enjoy 50:50 chance of winning the community’s optimal supports. But if the cost rises by at least 30%, then SA playing the “Sticks” would be at-most 33.3% advantageous, while the “Carrots” approach would yield at-least 66.7% advantage. In the asymmetric variant, if the operational cost drops by 80%, then SA playing the “Sticks” would enjoy 100% chance of winning the community’s optimal supports, while the “Carrots” would yield at most 20% advantage. But if the cost rises by at least 30%, then SA playing the “Sticks” would enjoy 50:50 advantage. Comparatively, the TG would enjoy 50:50 chance of winning the community’s optimal supports by playing the “Sticks” if the cost of operation drops by 90%. But if the cost rises by at least 20%, then TG playing the “Sticks” would enjoy at most 33.3% while the “Carrots” would yield at least 66.7% advantage. Thus, the cost of operation is the major determinant of either player’s strategic approach. Under the mixed strategy, if the benefit of operation exceeds its cost, then SA playing the “Sticks” is an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), otherwise, combining the “Sticks and Carrots” simultaneously would yield an ESS. Summarily, the SAs’ stake in terrorism prevention and control using the “Sticks” approach is proportional to its operational cost and vice versa. Therefore, considering the capital intensive as well as the intelligence deficient characteristics of the “Sticks” approach, the SA cannot prevent/control terrorism using the “Stick” instruments only. Rather a viable “Carrots” approach or its combination with credible “Sticks” instruments would be necessary and sufficient to win the community’s optimal supports for effective terrorism prevention and control.

scholarly journals The association between technology type and diffusion pattern under duopolistic competition

2007 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-105
Author(s):  
Ching-Shih Tsou ◽  
Kun-Jen Chung ◽  
Chin-Hsiung Hsu
Keyword(s):  
New Technologies ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Competitive Advantages ◽  
Diffusion Pattern ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Cost ◽  
And Diffusion ◽  
Technology Type ◽  
Diffusion Profiles

Many firms consider adopting new technologies as a means for enhancing competitive advantages. Therefore, the subject of technology diffusion has been studied by many researchers from different disciplines in order to explore the diffusion profiles throughout the industry or the country. The argument has frequently been made that the pattern of diffusion associated with most new technologies will typically have certain characteristics. In general, the diffusion pattern within an industry will depend on the competitive arena and technology characteristics. Based on a duopolistic game-theoretic model, this paper tries to explore the association between technology type and diffusion pattern. The results show that the cost-reducing technologies are adopted sequentially within a duopoly. On the other hard, strategic technologies diffuse over time or in a swarm. Although both technologies might be adopted sequentially, the rate for strategic technologies is faster than that for cost-reducing technologies. .

Stability in the informal value transfer systems: norms of trust or institutions of control?

2017 ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
A. Lyasko
Keyword(s):  
Social Control ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Transfer System ◽  
Value Transfer ◽  
Partner Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Informal Value Transfer System

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.

Hollywood’s Movie Production Companies in Game Theoretic Model

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nargiz Mammadova ◽  
Aygun Malikova ◽  
Arzu Heydarova
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Digital Authoritarianism and the Future of Human Rights

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Tiberiu Dragu ◽  
Yonatan Lupu
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
New Technologies ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Human Rights Abuses ◽  
Human Rights Regime ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Future ◽  
Technological Developments ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Strategic Context

Abstract How will advances in digital technology affect the future of human rights and authoritarian rule? Media figures, public intellectuals, and scholars have debated this relationship for decades, with some arguing that new technologies facilitate mobilization against the state and others countering that the same technologies allow authoritarians to strengthen their grip on power. We address this issue by analyzing the first game-theoretic model that accounts for the dual effects of technology within the strategic context of preventive repression. Our game-theoretical analysis suggests that technological developments may not be detrimental to authoritarian control and may, in fact, strengthen authoritarian control by facilitating a wide range of human rights abuses. We show that technological innovation leads to greater levels of abuses to prevent opposition groups from mobilizing and increases the likelihood that authoritarians will succeed in preventing such mobilization. These results have broad implications for the human rights regime, democratization efforts, and the interpretation of recent declines in violent human rights abuses.

Augmenting Employees’ Efforts in Innovation

2021 ◽  
pp. 097674792198917
Author(s):  
Nikita Jain
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Wrongful Discharge ◽  
Equilibrium Level ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact

Strong labour laws play a major role in motivating innovation among employees. It has been found in the literature that stringency of labour laws is positively linked with employees’ efforts in innovation, in particular, wrongful discharge laws (WDL). However, employees may also bring nuisance suits against employers. Usually, the result of these suits is that both parties settle with each other. Thus, even if employees are justly dismissed, they may be able to bring nuisance suits against employers and gain a settlement amount. This article investigates how the possibility of nuisance suits affects the impact of WDL on employees’ efforts in innovation. In this respect, a game-theoretic model is developed in the article to find the equilibrium level of employees’ efforts in the presence of nuisance suits, where there is a possibility of employees getting discharged from the firm. I find that if nuisance suits are a possibility, the stringency of WDL has no impact on employees’ efforts if defence cost of the firm is low; but for higher defence costs, WDL affects employees’ efforts. The efforts exerted by an employee are found to be weakly increasing in the defence costs of the firm.

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