Concessions as a Modernizing Strategy in the Dominican Republic

2009 ◽  
Vol 83 (4) ◽  
pp. 731-758 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cyrus Veeser

In the late 1800s, Latin American modernizers faced major obstacles to economic growth. In the Dominican Republic, elites embraced concessions as a policy to attract foreign capital to infrastructure, industry, and cash-crop agriculture. In contrast to Mexico, where concessions were public and impersonal but failed to create viable firms, Dominican concessions were public, yet corrupt, formally opposed to monopoly, yet prone to convey exclusive privileges. Dominican modernizers recognized that concessions created “monopolies that are always a hateful tyranny,” yet found no better way to attract investment. Only after the United States took control of Dominican finances in 1905 were the “burdensome” contracts canceled as an “impediment to future progress.”

Author(s):  
Stephen G. Rabe

On March 13, 1961, President John F. Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress, an economic assistance program to promote political democracy, economic growth, and social justice in Latin America. The United States and Latin American nations formally agreed to the alliance at a conference held in August 1961, at Punta del Este, Uruguay. U.S. delegates promised that Latin America would receive over twenty billion dollars in public and private capital from the United States and international lending authorities during the 1960s. The money would arrive in the form of grants, loans, and direct private investments. When combined with an expected eighty billion dollars in internal investment, this new money was projected to stimulate an economic growth rate of not less than 2.5 percent a year. This economic growth would facilitate significant improvements in employment, and in rates of infant mortality, life expectancy, and literacy rates. In agreeing to the alliance, Latin American leaders pledged to work for equality and social justice by promoting agrarian reform and progressive income taxes. The Kennedy administration developed this so-called Marshall Plan for Latin America because it judged the region susceptible to social revolution and communism. Fidel Castro had transformed the Cuban Revolution into a strident anti-American movement and had allied his nation with the Soviet Union. U.S. officials feared that the lower classes of Latin America, mired in poverty and injustice, might follow similarly radical leaders. Alliance programs delivered outside capital to the region, but the Alliance for Progress failed to transform Latin America. During the 1960s, Latin American economies performed poorly, usually falling below the 2.5 percent target. The region witnessed few improvements in health, education, or welfare. Latin American societies remained unfair and authoritarian. Sixteen extra-constitutional changes of government repeatedly unsettled the region. The Alliance for Progress fell short of its goals for several reasons. Latin America had formidable obstacles to change: elites resisted land reform, equitable tax systems, and social programs; new credits often brought greater indebtedness rather than growth; and the Marshall Plan experience served as a poor guide to solving the problems of a region that was far different from Western Europe. The United States also acted ambiguously, calling for democratic progress and social justice, but worried that Communists would take advantage of the instability caused by progressive change. Further, Washington provided wholehearted support only to those Latin American governments and organizations that pursued fervent anticommunist policies.


2017 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 1627-1630

Markus Poschke of McGill University reviews “The World Economy: Growth or Stagnation?” by Dale W. Jorgenson, Kyoji Fukao, and Marcel P. Timmer. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Fourteen papers analyze the long-term process of structural change and productivity growth across the world using World KLEMS (capital, labor, energy, materials, and purchased services) Initiative research and provide comparisons of industries and economies in order to investigate the impact of international trade and investment. Papers discuss US economic growth—a retrospect, prospect, and lessons from a prototype industry-level production account for the United States, 1947–2012; the structural causes of Japan's lost decades; productivity growth in Europe before and since the 2008–09 economic and financial crisis; Latin American KLEMS (LA–KLEMS)—economic growth and productivity in Latin America; China's strategic move for a new stage of development—a productivity perspective; productivity growth in India under different policy regimes; whether mining is fueling long-run growth in Russia—industry productivity growth trends in 1995–2012; intangibles, information and communications technology, and industry productivity growth—evidence from the European Union; whether intangibles contribute to productivity growth in East Asian countries—evidence from Japan and the Republic of Korea; a Bureau of Economic Analysis–Bureau of Labor Statistics industry-level production account for the United States—integrated sources of growth, intangible capital, and the US recovery; measuring human capital—country experiences and international initiatives; a half-century of trans-Pacific competition—price-level indices and productivity gaps for Japanese and US industries, 1955–2012; searching for convergence and its causes—an industry perspective; and the rise of global manufacturing value chains—a new perspective based on the World Input–Output Database. Jorgenson is Samuel W. Morris University Professor at Harvard University. Fukao is Professor with the Institute of Economic Research at Hitotsubashi University and Program Leader at the Research Unit for Statistical and Empirical Analysis. Timmer is Professor of Economic Growth and Development and Director of the Groningen Growth and Development Centre at the University of Groningen. ”


Author(s):  
Alan Mcpherson

This chapter analyses Latin American nations’ efforts to create inter-American solidarity against U.S. military occupations in Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic from the 1910s to the 1930s. In their diplomacy, anti-occupation activists from these three nations were joined primarily by Cubans, Mexicans, and Uruguayans. It traces transnational outreach to three constituencies, in ascending order of success—the League of Nations, other Latin American governments, and Latin Americans in the United States. The question it asks is: What factors brought success or failure in these transnational anti-imperialist efforts in the early 20th century? Among the factors for success were cultural affinity among Latin Americans, direct diplomacy, fear of occupation, and racial solidarity. Among the factors contributing to failure were U.S. hegemony, poverty, and racial division. This chapter explains why anti-imperialism could be effective yet remained limited, and it allows comparison and contrast to Cold War-era solidarity.


Author(s):  
Elizabeth Manley

On March 12, 1956, Basque National and Columbia University lecturer Jesús María de Galíndez Suarez disappeared from New York City never to be seen again. While no conclusive evidence was ever uncovered, it has been widely accepted that he was taken by functionaries of the regime of Rafael Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, flown to the island, tortured, and killed. Galíndez, who had worked for the Trujillo regime after fleeing Spain in 1939 and subsequently immigrated to the United States in 1946, had just completed a dissertation on the Trujillato at Columbia. The regime did not look kindly on his chosen perspective and set in motion a plan to have him disappeared. Following his abduction, many U.S. solidarity activists joined forces with Dominican exile groups to push for greater attention to the atrocities of the Trujillo regime as well as for a closer investigation into Galíndez’s disappearance. While Trujillo had similarly disappeared a number of individuals in the United States and other Latin American countries, the Galíndez case is unique for several reasons. First, Galíndez’s life offers a prime example of a transnational identity, of someone who juggled multiple identities and causes, crossed physical and ideological borders, and operated daily with conflicting alliances and allegiances. Second, the murder of the Basque national mobilized a significant collective of solidarity activists in the United States, garnered considerable national press, and built a foundation for future activism. Moreover, as Galíndez had been working as a U.S. intelligence operative since before his arrival in the United States, his story complicates the traditional nexus of solidarity work. Finally, the case offers a unique window onto the geopolitics of the early Cold War (prior to the Cuban Revolution) and the intricacies of the second half of the Trujillo regime.


2000 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda K. Salvucci ◽  
Richard J. Salvucci

There is little historical evidence to support the thesis that deteriorating terms of trade hindered Cuban and Latin American economic growth, at precisely the time when large international disparities in income began to emerge (1820s to 1870s). For Cuba at least, it was resurgent Spanish imperialism in the form of new tariffs, taxes, and outright prohibitions that distorted patterns of trade, particularly with the United States. Likewise for Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Peru, the terms of trade do not appear to have contributed significantly, if at all, to underdevelopment.


1994 ◽  
Vol 33 (4I) ◽  
pp. 327-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard G. Lipsey

I am honoured to be invited to give this lecture before so distinguished an audience of development economists. For the last 21/2 years I have been director of a project financed by the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research and composed of a group of scholars from Canada, the United States, and Israel.I Our brief is to study the determinants of long term economic growth. Although our primary focus is on advanced industrial countries such as my own, some of us have come to the conclusion that there is more common ground between developed and developing countries than we might have first thought. I am, however, no expert on development economics so I must let you decide how much of what I say is applicable to economies such as your own. Today, I will discuss some of the grand themes that have arisen in my studies with our group. In the short time available, I can only allude to how these themes are rooted in our more detailed studies. In doing this, I must hasten to add that I speak for myself alone; our group has no corporate view other than the sum of our individual, and very individualistic, views.


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