The Decline of Innocence

1968 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 273-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanford H. Kadish

The criminological positivists at the turn of the century started a good deal of creative rethinking about the criminal law. Some of their proposals have gained widespread acceptance in the criminal law as we know it today. Others made no headway at all. One particular proposal, and a very fundamental one indeed, began a controversy which has ebbed and flowed regularly since. That is the proposal to eliminate from the criminal law the whole apparatus of substantive principles, or at least some of them, such as the legal insanity defence, which owe their presence to the law's traditional concern for distinguishing the guilty and the innocent in terms of their blameworthiness. The essence of the proposal is that innocence in this sense, moral innocence, if you will, should not disqualify a person from the consequences of the penal law. Moral innocence should, it is urged, give way to social dangerousness as the basis for a criminal disposition.

Author(s):  
Markus D. Dubber

Dual Penal State: The Crisis of Criminal Law in Comparative-Historical Perspective addresses one of today’s most pressing social and political issues: the rampant, at best haphazard, and ever-expanding use of penal power by states ostensibly committed to the enlightenment-based legal-political project of Western liberal democracy. Penal regimes in these states operate in a wide field of ill-considered and little constrained violence, where radical and prolonged interference with the autonomy of the very persons upon whose autonomy the legitimacy of state power is supposed to rest has been utterly normalized. At bottom, this crisis of modern penality is a crisis of the liberal project itself; the penal paradox is merely the sharpest formulation of the general paradox of power in a liberal state: the legitimacy of state sovereignty in the name of personal autonomy. To capture the depth and range of the crisis of contemporary penality in ostensibly liberal states, Dual Penal State leaves behind customary temporal and parochial constraints, and turns to historical and comparative analysis instead. This approach reveals a fundamental distinction between two conceptions of penal power, penal law and penal police, that run through Western legal-political history, one rooted in autonomy, equality, and interpersonal respect, and the other in heteronomy, hierarchy, and patriarchal power. Dual penal state analysis illuminates how this distinction manifests itself in the history of the present of various penal systems, from the malign neglect of the American war on crime to the ahistorical self-satisfaction of German criminal law science.


Author(s):  
Markus D. Dubber

The first part of Dual Penal State investigated various ways in which criminal law doctrine and scholarship (or “science”) have failed to address the challenge of legitimating penal power in a modern liberal democratic state. This, second, part explores an alternative approach to criminal law discourse that puts the legitimacy challenge of modern penal law front and center: critical analysis of criminal law in a dual penal state. Dual penal state analysis differentiates between penal law and penal police, two conceptions of penal power, and state power more generally, rooted in autonomy, equality, and interpersonal respect, on one hand, and in heteronomy, hierarchy, and patriarchal power, on the other. Chapter 4 applies the distinction between law and police as fundamental modes of governance set out in Chapter 3 to the penal realm and explores the tension between penal law and penal police as constituting the dual penal state.


2000 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 321-351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Ohana

The rules of criminal law that govern participation in crime often include special provisions with regard to accomplice liability for the commission of collateral offenses by the principal in the course of the unlawful undertaking. While some Anglo-American jurisdictions limit accomplice liability to cases where the commission of the collateral offense is effectively contemplated by the participant, other jurisdictions, including Israel, also provide for punishment of the participant where the collateral offense is reasonably foreseeable. Accordingly, participants are held liable for crimes that are perpetrated incidentally to the commission of the projected crime, on the basis of an objective, rather than subjective, foresight standard. Whether this deviation from the prevalent paradigm of accomplice liability is justified in principle and policy constitutes the main focus of this article.


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
Subaidah Ratna Juita

<p>Penjatuhan sanksi pidana terhadap pelaku kejahatan kesusilaan pada anak di Indonesia belum seimbang dengan dampak yang ditimbulkannya. Adapun anak sebagai korban dari kejahatan kesusilaan tentu mengalami trauma yang berkepanjangan hingga dewasa bahkan seumur hidupnya. Salah satu upaya yang dapat ditempuh dalam menghadapi problematika penegakan hukum adalah dengan cara pembenahan sistem hukum. Oleh karna itu perlu adanya pembaharuan sanksi pidana bagi pelaku kejahatan kesusilaan sebagai bagian dari sistem hukum. Pembaharuan ini perlu dilakukan karena sanksi pidana yang ada saat ini tidak memberikan efek jera bagi pelaku. Upaya pembaruan hukum pidana yang berkaitan dengan sanksi pidana dalam kasus kejahatan kesusilaan pada anak dapat ditelusuri berdasarkan perumusan sanksi pidana berdasarkan KUHP, UU Nomor 23 Tahun 2002 tentang Perlindungan Anak, UU Nomor 35 Tahun 2014 tentang perubahan pertama atas UU Nomor 23 Tahun 2002 tentang Perlindungan Anak, dan Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang (Perppu) No. 1 Tahun 2016 tentang Perubahan Kedua atas Undang-Undang Nomor 23 Tahun 2002 tentang Perlindungan Anak. Dengan demikian tulisan ini secara fokus mengkaji urgensi pembaharuan hukum pidana, khususnya hukum pidana materiil tentang sanksi pidana bagi pelaku kejahatan seksual dalam rangka untuk memberikan perlindungan pada anak korban kejahatan seksual.</p><p><em>The imposition of criminal sanctions against the perpetrators of morality in children in Indonesia has not been balanced by its impact. As for the child as a victim of crime decency certainly traumatized prolonged until adulthood even a lifetime. One effort that can be taken in dealing with the problem of law enforcement is to reform the legal system. By because it is necessary to reform criminal sanctions for the perpetrators of decency as part of the legal system. These reforms need to be done because there is a criminal sanction which does not currently provide a deterrent effect on perpetrators. Efforts to reform the criminal law relating to criminal sanctions in cases of crimes of morality in children can be traced by the formulation of criminal sanctions under the penal law, Law No. 23 of 2002 on Child Protection, Law No. 35 of 2014 on the First Amendment of Law No. 23 of 2002 on Child Protection, and Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perppu) Number 1 Year 2016 Concerning Second Amendment Act No. 23 of 2002 about Child Protection. So this paper examines the urgency updates operating focus criminal law, especially criminal law substantive about criminal sanctions for dader of sexual crimes in order to provide protection for child victims of sexual crimes.</em></p><p> </p>


Author(s):  
Hamish Stewart

Limits on consent in penal law flow not just from traditional criminal law problems such as consensual harms in the law of assault, but also from the way that regulatory offenses limit individuals’ ability to contract out of or to consent to departures from their requirements. For a Kantian who understands the justification of public power as connected only to the task of providing a rightful condition for free and purposive agents, these limits, and the police power from which they flow, are puzzling. It is not obvious, for example, how a fully consensual departure from a safety regulation or the mere possession of a firearm is inconsistent with the freedom and purposiveness of all. The possibility of penally enforced regulatory law, of Kantian police, can be explained as follows. The task of a legal order in a rightful condition includes the enactment of those public laws that are required for the creation or maintenance of a rightful condition but that cannot be understood purely in terms of protecting one private person’s purposiveness from the intrusion of other private persons. The regulatory law that is justified by these public tasks will frequently have a paternalistic appearance and therefore will frequently disregard the consent of the persons to whom it applies. But these limits on consent are characteristically by-products of its necessarily public nature rather than part of its justification.


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