Execrabilis in the Common Pleas: Further Studies

1921 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-75
Author(s):  
T. F. T. Plucknett

Under the above title Professor Maitland gave a characteristic study of the relations of the Common Law Courts to the Canon Law in the reign of Edward the Third. His object was to trace the history of an attempt by the temporal authority to “enforce” (for its own ends) the provisions of the papal Extravagant “Execrabilis” by securing its recognition in the Court of Common Pleas and excluding the spiritual Courts from their claim to the sole cognizance of the matters covered by the Bull. To his treatment of the subject it may be objected, with all due deference, that the Bull Execrabilis, interesting as it is, cannot be regarded as an altogether new factor in English law calling into operation an entirely new set of phenomena that can be isolated and studied alone; on the contrary, when the Bull made its first appearance in the English Courts of Common Law it became immediately involved in a fairly old dispute between the spiritual and temporal jurisdictions. This aspect of the subject received no consideration in Maitland's essay, with the result that his treatment of the matter is incomplete and in one important particular incorrect.

1971 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. H. Baker

Slade's Case is of such significance in the history of the common law that it has, quite properly, been the subject of more scrutiny and discussion in recent years than any other case of the same age. The foundation of all this discussion has been Coke's report, which is the only full report in print. The accuracy and completeness of Coke's version have hardly been challenged, and the discussions have assumed that it contains almost all there is to know about the case. This assumption must be discarded if we are to understand the contemporary significance of the case.


2021 ◽  
pp. 307-358
Author(s):  
Robert Merkin ◽  
Séverine Saintier

Poole’s Casebook on Contract Law provides a comprehensive selection of case law that addresses all aspects of the subject encountered on undergraduate courses. This chapter examines privity of contract, its relationship with consideration, and the ability of third parties to enforce contractual provisions for their benefit. The doctrine of privity of contract provides that the benefits of a contract can be enjoyed only by the parties to that contract and only parties can suffer the burdens of the contract. At common law, third party beneficiaries could not enforce a contractual provision in their favour so various devices were employed seeking to avoid privity. Statute now allows for direct third party enforcement but in limited circumstances. This chapter examines the background to privity and the attempted statutory reform in the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 as it has been interpreted in the case law. The chapter also discusses the common law means of avoiding privity as illustrated by the case law, e.g. agency, collateral contracts, and trusts of contractual obligations. Finally, it assesses the remedies available to the contracting party to recover on behalf of the third party beneficiary of the promise, including the narrow and broad grounds in Linden Gardens Trust. It concludes by briefly considering privity and burdens—and the exceptional situations where a burden can be imposed on a person who is not a party to the contract.


Traditio ◽  
1951 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 279-358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephan Kuttner ◽  
Eleanor Rathbone

Among the various aspects of the operation of canon law in medieval England, the history of the Anglo-Norman school of canonists which flourished in the late twelfth and the early thirteenth centuries remains largely unexplored. Modern historians have frequently emphasized, to be sure, the eager interest which English churchmen of the twelfth century took in problems and issues of canon law; and it can now be considered an established fact that the English Church throughout this period was well abreast of the developments which everywhere resulted from the growing centralization of ecclesiastical procedure, from the work of Gratian and his school, and from the ever-increasing number of authoritative responses and appellate decisions rendered by the popes in their decretal letters. The importance of the system of delegate jurisdiction in the cases referred back by Rome to the country of origin has been noted, and so has the conspicuous number of twelfth-century English collections of decretals, which testifies to a particular zeal and tradition, among Anglo-Norman canonists, in supplementing Gratian's work by records of the new papal law. The problem, also, of the influence exercised by Roman and canon law on the early development of the Common Law is being discussed with growing interest among students of English legal and constitutional history.


1969 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 127-144
Author(s):  
Sebastian Poulter

Whereas the reception and operation of English law in West and East Africa have been the subject of much study over the last few years, the introduction and application of Roman-Dutch law in Southern Africa (apart from South Africa itself) have received scant treatment.1 This article deals only with the position in Lesotho and attempts to show the extent to which Lesotho's legal system is tied to that of the Republic of South Africa, and thus strengthens the geographical and economic bonds which link the two countries.


1990 ◽  
Vol 2 (6) ◽  
pp. 8-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. H. Baker

Although the protection of churches and holy places was embodied froman early date in Canon law, the law of sanctuary as it applied in England was necessarily part of the secular common law. The Church never had the physical power to resist the secular authorities in the administration of justice, and although those who violated sanctuary were liable to excommunication the Church could not in cases of conflict prevent the removal from sanctuary of someone to whom the privilege was not allowed by the law of the land. The control of the common law judges was, indeed, tighter than in the case of benefit of clergy. The question whether an accused person was or was not a clerk in Holy Orders was ultimately a question for the ordinary, however much pressure might be put upon him by the judges; but the question of sanctuary or no sanctuary was always a question for the royal courts to decide, upon the application of a person who claimed to have been wrongly arrested in a privileged place. The present summary is confined to the position under English law.


1979 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 295-322 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. H. Baker

In 1845 a master of English commercial law wrote that there was “no part of the history of English law more obscure than that connected with the maxim that the law merchant is part of the law of the land.” Since then there have been detailed studies of the medieval law merchant and of the later development of English mercantile law, but the precise status of the law merchant in England and the nature of the process by which it supposedly became fused with the common law remain as obscure as they were in 1845. The obscurity begins with the very concept of the “law merchant,” which has been differently understood by different writers and continues to be used in widely divergent senses. Some have regarded it as a distinct and independent system of legal doctrine, akin in status to Civil or Canon law, and perhaps derived from Roman law. Others have supposed it to be a particular aspect of natural law, or the universal ius gentium, and as such akin to international law.


Author(s):  
John W Cairns

This chapter assesses the work of Sir Robert Chambers by comparing it with that of other professors of English law. It focuses on the analytical structure Chambers gave to English law. The first part briefly discusses the early history of university lectures and, in particular, the adoption of the structure of Justinian’s Institutes. This is followed by an account of the problems encountered by professors of English law in setting forth their subject, and of the solutions they adopted. The third section provides a detailed analysis of the structure Chambers used for his lectures in comparison with that used by Blackstone. This is followed by some general conclusions and observations.


Author(s):  
Robert Merkin ◽  
Séverine Saintier

The Casebook series provides a comprehensive selection of case law that addresses all aspects of the subject encountered on undergraduate courses. This chapter examines privity of contract, its relationship with consideration, and the ability of third parties to enforce contractual provisions for their benefit. The doctrine of privity of contract provides that the benefits of a contract can be enjoyed only by the parties to that contract and only parties can suffer the burdens of the contract. At common law, third party beneficiaries could not enforce a contractual provision in their favour so various devices were employed seeking to avoid privity. Statute now allows for direct third party enforcement but in limited circumstances. This chapter examines the background to privity and the attempted statutory reform in the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 as it has been interpreted in the case law. The chapter also discusses the common law means of avoiding privity as illustrated by the case law, e.g. agency, collateral contracts, and trusts of contractual obligations. Finally it assesses the remedies available to the contracting party to recover on behalf of the third party beneficiary of the promise, including the narrow and broad grounds in Linden Gardens Trust. It concludes by briefly considering privity and burdens—and the exceptional situations where a burden can be imposed on a person who is not a party to the contract.


Author(s):  
Janet O’Sullivan

Titles in the Core Text series take the reader straight to the heart of the subject, providing focused, concise, and reliable guides for students at all levels. This chapter explores and defends the consideration requirement in the enforceability of contractual obligations, both when the contract is formed and if it is varied, refuting some of the criticisms calling for the requirement of consideration to be reformed or abolished in English law. It defines consideration as the ‘price of the promise’ and clarifies that an act or promise must have been requested by the promisor to count as consideration. It explores issues such as past consideration, performance of an existing contractual duty, part payment of a debt, for which latter issue the common law rule is ameliorated by the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel.


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