DEFAMATION, THE JURY AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE

2001 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-492
Author(s):  
Richard Mullender
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Criminal Trials ◽  
Constitutional Tribunal ◽  
The Common ◽  
English Law ◽  
The Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
The Ideal

In the law of defamation, the jury is “the constitutional tribunal” of fact (J.C.C. Gatley, Libel and Slander, 9th ed. (London 1998), pp. 889-890). The jury’s occupation of this position is usually traced back to Fox’s Libel Act 1792. While confined in terms to criminal trials, the 1792 Act is regarded as declaratory of the common law (see Sir Martin Nourse, “The English Law of Defamation-Is Trial by Jury Still the Best?”, in B.S. Markesinis (ed.), The Clifford Chance Lectures, vol. I, Bridging the Channel (Oxford 1996), ch. 4). One way in which to explain the jury’s role in defamation trials can be found in the ideal of institutional justice. This ideal specifies that institutions should, in order to be legitimate, adequately accommodate the views of those in the society where they operate (G. Cupit, Justice As Fittingness (Oxford 1996), ch. 5). There is, however, reason to regard defamation law’s commitment to institutional justice as qualified. Support for this view can be found in Grobbelaar v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2001] 2 All E.R. 437. In Grobbelaar, a unanimous Court of Appeal overturned a jury’s findings of fact on the ground that they were perverse and unreasonable. This decision appears ground-breaking since the Court was unable to point to domestic authorities in which the same step had been taken.

Contract variation in the common law

2018 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 196-207
Author(s):  
James C Fisher
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Contract Law ◽  
The Common ◽  
Appeal Decision ◽  
English Law ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Business Exchange ◽  
Court Of Appeal

This note analyses the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Rock Advertising Ltd v MWB Business Exchange Centres Ltd, a case that confirms the long uncertain ability of ‘No Oral Modification’ clauses to exclude informal variations in English law. This note argues that, while the Court was correct to reject the putative oral variation in question, the majority’s description of the law is unsatisfactory because of its detachment from wider contract law principle, and compares unfavourably with the alternative ratio by which Lord Briggs reached a concurring outcome. This note also comments on the Supreme Court’s (cursory) treatment of the portentous Court of Appeal decision in Williams v Roffey Bros, which has reformulated the law on contract variation across common law jurisdictions. The Court acknowledged, but declined to resolve, the tensions Roffey introduced in to the law on part payment of debts. While it is unfortunate that the opportunity to resolve these tensions was missed, this note endorses the Court’s ( obiter) rejection of the analysis by which the Court of Appeal below sought to extend Roffey to the part payment of debts.

Sovereignty and Common Law Judicial Office in Taylor's Case (1675)

2019 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 397-429 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kearns
Keyword(s):  
Church Of England ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Ecclesiastical Law ◽  
Chief Justice ◽  
Spiritual Nature ◽  
The Common ◽  
English Law ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Church ◽  
Law Making

This essay argues that the 1675 conviction of John Taylor by the Court of King's Bench for slandering God reveals Chief Justice Matthew Hale implementing a model of conjoint law-making between courts, Parliament, and crown that gave pre-eminent power to the common lawyers, and none to the Church of England. In doing so, it counters the prevailing literature on Restoration English law, which has treated the law as hierarchical, with the common lawyers subordinate to the sovereign. Rather than following statute or ecclesiastical law, which emphasised the spiritual nature of crimes like Taylor's, Hale located Taylor's offence in the exclusively temporal common law jurisdiction of defamation, which existed largely outside of monarchical purview. Hale's judgment reflected his rhetoric of judicial office outside the courtroom, where he argued the judiciary worked alongside King and Parliament in making law, but were not subservient to these institutions, for common lawyers relied on sources of law beyond sovereign-made statute. The language of sovereignty as hierarchical was thus a factional attack on an independent common law, an attempt to subordinate the common lawyers to the crown that was resisted by the lawyers like Hale in his rhetoric and exercise of office, and should not ground accounts of the Restoration regime.

Unjustified Enrichment in Comparative Perspective

2006 ◽  
pp. 968-1002
Author(s):  
Daniel Visser
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Comparative Perspective ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Common ◽  
English Law ◽  
The Law ◽  
Level Of Understanding ◽  
Unjustified Enrichment

Unjustified enrichment confronted both civil and common lawyers with thinking which was often completely outside the paradigm to which they had become accustomed. The recognition of unjustified enrichment as a cause of action in its own right in English law created a new arena of uncertainty between the systems. This article argues that comparative lawyers can make an important contribution to the future of the fractured and fractious world of unjustified enrichment. It may help to uncover the enormous wealth of learning of which both the common law and the civil law are the repositories, and so bring the same level of understanding to the law of unjustified enrichment which has, over the years, been achieved between the systems in regard to contract and tort.

scholarly journals THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE TESTAMENT IN THE ENGLISH LEGISLATION

2018 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-20
Author(s):  
Laura-Dumitrana Rath Boșca ◽  
Bogdan Bodea
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Judicial System ◽  
Social Solidarity ◽  
Historical Process ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Creation ◽  
English Law ◽  
The Law

Common Law represents the second biggest contemporary judicial system. Immanent to a historical process which led to the creation of a community, common law represents a form of social solidarity. It is not the result of any social consent to obey a law as much as it is the participation of the society, through its exceptions, to the process of elaborating the law by which it functions. So, society itself is through a sort of syncretism the common law.One the elementary concepts of common law is the doctrine of precedent which functions in parallel with organic laws in order to enhance both the results of judicial cases and the efficiency of the cases. In the English law, the testament is a representation of the wishes of a defunct person and the declaration of that persons wishes in relation to the belongings he wished to pass on after his death.

The English Law of Sanctuary

1990 ◽  
Vol 2 (6) ◽  
pp. 8-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. H. Baker
Keyword(s):  
Canon Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Early Date ◽  
Administration Of Justice ◽  
Holy Places ◽  
Royal Courts ◽  
The Common ◽  
English Law ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Church

Although the protection of churches and holy places was embodied froman early date in Canon law, the law of sanctuary as it applied in England was necessarily part of the secular common law. The Church never had the physical power to resist the secular authorities in the administration of justice, and although those who violated sanctuary were liable to excommunication the Church could not in cases of conflict prevent the removal from sanctuary of someone to whom the privilege was not allowed by the law of the land. The control of the common law judges was, indeed, tighter than in the case of benefit of clergy. The question whether an accused person was or was not a clerk in Holy Orders was ultimately a question for the ordinary, however much pressure might be put upon him by the judges; but the question of sanctuary or no sanctuary was always a question for the royal courts to decide, upon the application of a person who claimed to have been wrongly arrested in a privileged place. The present summary is confined to the position under English law.

Common mistake in English law: the proposed merger of common law and equity

Legal Studies ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 9 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-306 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew B.L. Phang
Keyword(s):  
Present Article ◽  
Systematic Approach ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Common Mistake ◽  
The Common ◽  
English Law ◽  
The Law

Although the law relating to common mistake has engendered a plethora of conundrums, many problem areas have in fact been well-traversed in the literature. The present article does not seek to re-cover such welltrodden ground, but attempts, instead, to suggest a different and more systematic approach that would effect a merger of the common law and equitable branches of common mistake into one coherent, doctrine.

scholarly journals The Common Law Choice of Law Rules for Resulting and Constructive Trusts

2005 ◽  
Vol 54 (4) ◽  
pp. 855-883 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adeline Chong
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Hague Convention ◽  
Choice Of Law ◽  
Foreign Law ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Hague ◽  
English Law ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Hague Convention ◽  
Rules Set

There is a dearth of authority and in-depth discussion concerning what the choice of law rules are for claims involving the assertion that property is held on a resulting or constructive trust. It is usually thought that the choice of law rules set out by the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition (hereafter the ‘Hague Trusts Convention’), as enacted into English law by the Recognition of Trusts Act 1987, apply. However, it is arguable that this is not so for some types of resulting and constructive trusts, namely those governed by a foreign law; or, at the very least, that some doubt exists as to whether the Hague choice of lawrules apply to all resulting and constructive trusts. It is therefore important that the common law choice of law rules for such trusts is clearly elucidated. Unfortunately, this is an area of the law that is distinctly undeveloped. The aim of this article is to consider what are or should be the common law choice of law rules for resulting and constructive trusts.

The Right to Indemnity between Master and Servant

1956 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. Jolowicz
Keyword(s):  
Cold Storage ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Married Women ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
Recent Case ◽  
Legal Principle ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The proposition that a master, who has become liable for an injury caused by a servant acting in the course of his employment, can recover an indemnity from the servant is one which has been stated on a number of occasions, but until the recent case of Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Lister no clear authority could be cited in support. It is true that the master's rights against his servant have been canvassed in at least three modern cases, but in all of them the common law position has been obscured by the application of the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935. In Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Lister, however, by what those interested in legal principle can only regard as a happy chance, it was necessary for the Court of Appeal to deal with the matter independently of the Act.

Discretion and Security: Excluding Evidence under Section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984

1990 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
C.J.W. Allen
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
The Other ◽  
Rule Of Thumb ◽  
The Common ◽  
Political Compromise ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Of Evidence ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
The Way

Among rules of law Karl Llewellyn noted at one extreme the “rule-of-thumb, in which the flat result is articulated, leaving behind and unexpressed all indication of its reason”. At the other extreme was “the way of principle, in which the reason is clearly and effectively articulated, and that articulation is made part of the very rule”. The vice of principle, he observed, “can be a vaporish vagueness, and the techniques of its effective formulation are not easy to isolate for communication and use”. Partly for this reason, partly perhaps because of its origin in a last-minute political compromise, section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 at first confounded attempts to predict the manner of its application. One commentary suggested that it was “of no practical use”; there were dicta in the Court of Appeal to the effect that it did “no more than to re-state the power which judges had at common law before the Act of 1984 was passed”. A leading work on the law of evidence expressed the view that the sub-section was “cast in terms of such vagueness and generality as to furnish little guidance to the court”. There has been some development since those early days. It now seems clear that the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is to be regarded as a codifying Act which has to be looked at on its own wording. Section 78(1), therefore, does not merely re-state the position at common law. It is also clear that in its operation it overlaps section 76 and, through section 82(3), some of the common law. Section 78(1) may be applied in a variety of situations, with or without the presence of some element of impropriety in the way in which the evidence was obtained. Basic questions about its operation nevertheless remain.

Reforming the Law of Unfitness to Plead in England and Wales

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miranda Bevan ◽  
David Ormerod
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Criminal Trial ◽  
Law Reform ◽  
Criminal Trials ◽  
Significant Development ◽  
England And Wales ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Draft Bill

This chapter reviews the legal framework in England and Wales for dealing with defendants in criminal trials who are ‘unfit to plead’, and considers efforts to reform the legal test and procedures. The chapter offers a critique of the present law governing fitness to plead and its failure to reflect modern-day trial processes and psychiatric understanding. It examines law reform proposals made over recent decades and how these have failed to produce significant development in the common law. It focuses in particular on the Law Commission’s recent report and draft Bill in 2016. That report seeks to provide a fair and effective process for those who are unable to participate effectively in their criminal trial and to ensure that defendants’ rights are respected.

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