The Regulator's Dilemma: Regulation of Pulp Mill Effluents in the Canadian Federal State
AbstractThe disclosure in 1987 that dioxins were present in pulp mill effluents prompted governments throughout the world to revise their environmental standards for the pulp and paper industry. This article uses the pulp and paper case to examine the dynamics of environmental standard setting within the Canadian federal state. Provincial regulatory incentives are analyzed using two-player games as a heuristic. The article then considers the federal government's role in establishing national standards. Many authors have emphasized the importance of federal involvement to overcome provincial reluctance to regulate unilaterally, lest jobs be lost to jurisdictions with weaker environmental standards. However, few have considered whether the federal government has incentives to do just that. It is argued that those incentives are weak at best, in light of resistance from both the regulated industry and jurisdictionally defensive provinces. In environmental regulation of the Canadian pulp and paper industry, federal reluctance resulted in a two-tier system of environmental standards with strict standards for the largest provinces, and weaker ones for smaller provinces that rely more on the federal government.