Distributive Politics in Canada: The Case of Infrastructure Spending in Rural and Suburban Districts

Author(s):  
Olivier Jacques ◽  
Benjamin Ferland

Abstract This article examines the presence of geographically targeted spending in the allocation of infrastructure projects in Canada. Building on formal models of distributive politics, we expect government districts, core government districts and swing districts to be advantaged in terms of infrastructure projects. We also investigate whether characteristics of Members of Parliament (MPs), such as seniority or holding a cabinet position, influence the distribution of infrastructure projects. Empirically, we analyze the amount of funding allocated by Infrastructure Canada across non-urban federal electoral districts between 2006 and 2018. Our results indicate that non-urban governmental districts receive, on average, more money than opposition districts, and that this is even more the case for core government districts. In contrast, we found little evidence that cabinet ministers or senior MPs are able to attract more funding to their constituencies compared to other representatives.

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 407-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
TAYLOR C. MCMICHAEL

AbstractScholars of distributive politics in Japan have shifted from large items in the general account budget to more geographically targeted spending known as intergovernmental transfers. However, a portion of the funds sent to prefectural governments are ostensibly determined by the apolitical ‘financial index’. However, even though the financial index is included in most studies of intergovernmental transfers, only slight attention focuses on the financial index and its determination. Using prefectural level data on intergovernmental transfers, economic indicators and electoral support for the LDP, this research shows that the LDP possesses strong incentives to manipulate the index and that politics is a significant determinant of the financial index.


2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frances E. Lee

The Senate's equal representation of states shapes coalition building in distributive politics. The great variation in state population means that some states have far greater need for federal funds than others, but all senators have equal voting weight. As a result, even though all senators' votes are of equal value to the coalition builder, they are not of equal “price.” Coalition builders can include benefits for small states at considerably less expense to program budgets than comparable benefits for more populous states. Building on formal models of coalition building, two hypotheses are developed and tested. First, coalition builders will seek out less costly members to build supportive coalitions efficiently. Second, the final outcomes of distributive policy will more closely reflect the preferences of small-state senators than large-state senators. The hypotheses are tested by examining the 1991 and 1997–98 reauthorizations of federal surface transportation programs. The findings support both hypotheses.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-44
Author(s):  
Amy Catalinac ◽  
Lucia Motolinia

ABSTRACT Can governments elected under mixed-member majoritarian (mmm) electoral systems use geographically targeted spending to increase their chances of staying in office, and if so, how? Although twenty-eight countries use mmm electoral systems, scant research has addressed this question. The authors explain how mmm’s combination of electoral systems in two unlinked tiers creates a distinct strategic environment in which a large party and a small party can trade votes in one tier for votes in the other tier in a way that increases the number of seats won by both. They then explain how governing parties dependent on vote trading can use geographically targeted spending to cement it. These propositions are tested using original data from Japan (2003–2013) and Mexico (2012–2016). In both cases, municipalities in which the supporters of governing parties split their ballots as instructed were found to have received more money after elections. The findings have broad implications for research on mmm electoral systems, distributive politics, and the politics of Japan and Mexico.


2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Schmitz ◽  
Karsten Manske ◽  
Franzis Preckel ◽  
Oliver Wilhelm

Abstract. The Balloon-Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002 ) is one of the most popular behavioral tasks suggested to assess risk-taking in the laboratory. Previous research has shown that the conventionally computed score is predictive, but neglects available information in the data. We suggest a number of alternative scores that are motivated by theories of risk-taking and that exploit more of the available data. These scores can be grouped around (1) risk-taking, (2) task performance, (3) impulsive decision making, and (4) reinforcement sequence modulation. Their theoretical rationale is detailed and their validity is tested within the nomological network of risk-taking, deviance, and scholastic achievement. Two multivariate studies were conducted with youths (n = 435) and with adolescents/young adults (n = 316). Additionally, we tested formal models suggested for the BART that decompose observed behavior into a set of meaningful parameters. A simulation study with parameter recovery was conducted, and the data from the two studies were reanalyzed using the models. Most scores were reliable and differentially predictive of criterion variables and may be used in basic research. However, task specificity and the generally moderate validity do not warrant use of the experimental paradigm for diagnostic purposes.


Author(s):  
Charles A. Doan ◽  
Ronaldo Vigo

Abstract. Several empirical investigations have explored whether observers prefer to sort sets of multidimensional stimuli into groups by employing one-dimensional or family-resemblance strategies. Although one-dimensional sorting strategies have been the prevalent finding for these unsupervised classification paradigms, several researchers have provided evidence that the choice of strategy may depend on the particular demands of the task. To account for this disparity, we propose that observers extract relational patterns from stimulus sets that facilitate the development of optimal classification strategies for relegating category membership. We conducted a novel constrained categorization experiment to empirically test this hypothesis by instructing participants to either add or remove objects from presented categorical stimuli. We employed generalized representational information theory (GRIT; Vigo, 2011b , 2013a , 2014 ) and its associated formal models to predict and explain how human beings chose to modify these categorical stimuli. Additionally, we compared model performance to predictions made by a leading prototypicality measure in the literature.


2018 ◽  
pp. 114-131
Author(s):  
O. Yu. Bondarenko

his article explores theoretical and experimental approach to modeling social interactions. Communication and exchange of information with other people affect individual’s behavior in numerous areas. Generally, such influence is exerted by leaders, outstanding individuals who have a higher social status or expert knowledge. Social interactions are analyzed in the models of social learning, game theoretic models, conformity models, etc. However, there is a lack of formal models of asymmetric interactions. Such models could help elicit certain qualities characterizing higher social status and perception of status by other individuals, find the presence of leader influence and analyze its mechanism.


2020 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 355-377
Author(s):  
Lydia A. Nkansah ◽  
Delali A. Gawu

There have been seven general elections, under Ghana's Fourth Republic, to elect presidents and members of parliament. There are laws regulating the electoral process and election results have generally been accepted and, in a few cases, challenged through the laid-down process. Elections in Ghana are nonetheless reportedly flawed with irregularities tainting the outcome and creating tensions and sometimes pockets of violence. This article examines the electoral process under Ghana's Fourth Republic, namely the adoption of regulations for each electoral cycle, voters’ registration and the voters’ register, nomination of aspirants, voting, counting of votes and declaration of the results. To ensure the integrity of the electoral process, the laws regulating elections should comply with the dictates of the procedural requirements of the rule of law and the Electoral Commission's actions must be consistent with these laws.


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