When Formulas Go Political: The Curious Case of Japan's Financial Index

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 407-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
TAYLOR C. MCMICHAEL
Keyword(s):  
Economic Indicators ◽  
Distributive Politics ◽  
Significant Determinant ◽  
Intergovernmental Transfers ◽  
General Account ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Financial Index ◽  
Geographically Targeted

AbstractScholars of distributive politics in Japan have shifted from large items in the general account budget to more geographically targeted spending known as intergovernmental transfers. However, a portion of the funds sent to prefectural governments are ostensibly determined by the apolitical ‘financial index’. However, even though the financial index is included in most studies of intergovernmental transfers, only slight attention focuses on the financial index and its determination. Using prefectural level data on intergovernmental transfers, economic indicators and electoral support for the LDP, this research shows that the LDP possesses strong incentives to manipulate the index and that politics is a significant determinant of the financial index.

scholarly journals Historical Mob Violence and the 2016 Presidential Election

2021 ◽  
Vol 694 (1) ◽  
pp. 172-188
Author(s):  
Rebecca Abbott ◽  
Amy Kate Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Black People ◽  
Mob Violence ◽  
Presidential Candidates ◽  
Southern States ◽  
Left Behind ◽  
Presidential Primary ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Level Data ◽  
The Social ◽  
White Voters

As a 2016 presidential candidate, Donald J. Trump invoked racially charged rhetoric to galvanize conservative white voters who felt left behind in the “new economy.” In this article, we ask whether Trump’s ability to attract electoral support in that way was linked to local histories of racist mob violence. We use county-level data on threatened and completed lynchings of Black people to predict support for Trump in the 2016 Republican presidential primary and general election across eleven southern states. We find that fewer voters cast their ballots for Trump in counties that had suppressed a comparatively larger share of potentially lethal episodes of racist mob violence. Supplementary analyses suggest that counties’ histories of violence are also related to their electoral support for Republican presidential candidates more broadly. We posit that this correlation points to the durable effects of racist violence on local cultures and the imprint of community histories on the social environment.

Macro Economic Determinants of Electoral Support for Incumbents in Turkey, 1950–1995

1997 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 75-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alı Çarkoğlu
Keyword(s):  
Agricultural Sector ◽  
Electoral Behavior ◽  
Economic Indicators ◽  
Economic Conditions ◽  
Economic Factors ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Economic Determinants ◽  
Electoral Success ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
The Impact

The assertion that economic conditions prevailing during a government's tenure influence the level of electoral support it receives is frequently expressed in Turkey. Despite frequent references to economic dimensions of electoral behavior in Turkish media and academic circles, however, there are only a few systematic analyses of the impact of macro-economic performance on incumbents' electoral success. Bulutay and Yıldırım (1969) and Bulutay (1970) were the first attempts in this direction. These pioneering empirical analyses were mainly descriptive and rely on cross-sectional observations across provinces for the elections between 1950 and 1969. Based solely on developments in the agricultural sector they concluded that economic factors were first among the factors determining election outcomes. Özselçuk (1975) included macro-economic indicators, such as changes in per capita income and prices, in a regression model to explain changes in incumbents' vote share. Özselçuk provided some evidence that incumbents' electoral support was shaped by developments in macro-economic indicators, however, his analyses were technically deficient and his results were poorly documented.

Partisanship, Militarized International Conflict, and Electoral Support for the Incumbent

2017 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 172-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shane P. Singh ◽  
Jaroslav Tir
Keyword(s):  
Political Behavior ◽  
Comparative Politics ◽  
International Conflict ◽  
Vote Choice ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Interstate Disputes ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Level Data ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Militarized Interstate Disputes

Comparative politics scholarship often neglects to consider how militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) shape political behavior. In this project, we advance an argument that considers voter responses to international conflict at the individual level. In particular, we consider how the well-known conditioning effects of partisanship manifest in relation to militarized international conflict. Examining individual- and macro-level data across ninety-seven elections in forty-two countries over the 1996–2011 period, we find consistent evidence of militarized conflict impacting vote choice. This relationship is, however, moderated by partisanship, conflict side (initiator or target), and conflict hostility level. Among non-copartisan voters, the incumbent benefits the most electorally from initiating low-hostility MIDs or when the country is a target of a high-hostility MID; the opposite scenarios (initiator of a high-hostility MID or target of a low-hostility MID) lead to punishment among this voter group. Copartisans, meanwhile, tend to either maintain or intensify their support in most scenarios we examine; when a country is targeted in a low-hostility MID, copartisan support erodes mildly.

scholarly journals Testing Models of Distributive Politics using Exit Polls to Measure Voters’ Preferences and Partisanship

2012 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 845-875 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valentino Larcinese ◽  
James M. Snyder ◽  
Cecilia Testa
Keyword(s):  
Survey Data ◽  
Distributive Politics ◽  
Federal Spending ◽  
Us States ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Strategic Manipulation ◽  
Swing Voters

This article tests several hypotheses about distributive politics by studying the distribution of federal spending across US states over the period 1978–2002. It improves on previous work by using survey data to measure the share of voters in each state that are Democrats, Republicans and Independents, or liberals, conservatives and moderates. No evidence is found that the allocation of federal spending to the states is distorted by strategic manipulation to win electoral support. States with many swing voters are not advantaged compared to states with more loyal voters, and ‘battleground states’ are not advantaged compared to other states. Spending appears to have little or no effect on voters’ choices, while partisanship and ideology have large effects.

‘Make the Economy Scream’? Economic, Ideological and Social Determinants of Support for Salvador Allende in Chile, 1970–3

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (4) ◽  
pp. 771-797 ◽  
Author(s):  
PATRICIO NAVIA ◽  
RODRIGO OSORIO
Keyword(s):  
Social Class ◽  
Economic Performance ◽  
Demographic Variables ◽  
Economic Conditions ◽  
Presidential Approval ◽  
Salvador Allende ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Popular Unity ◽  
Municipal Level

AbstractWith polling and municipal level data, we analyse the determinants of Salvador Allende's presidential election victory in 1970 and the change in political and electoral support for his government (1970–3). Support for Allende is explained by ideology more than by social class, socio-demographic variables or the economic performance of the country. Allende won in 1970 as an opposition candidate when the outgoing Frei administration enjoyed high approval and the country was experiencing favourable economic conditions. In 1973, when Allende had 49.7% approval, ideology remained the strongest determinant of presidential approval. Economic variables and social class are less important in explaining electoral support for Allende and for his Popular Unity coalition.

Electoral Institutions, Hometowns, and Favored Minorities: Evidence from Japanese Electoral Reforms

2006 ◽  
Vol 59 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shigeo Hirano
Keyword(s):  
Democratic Party ◽  
Liberal Democratic Party ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Data Sets ◽  
Electoral Institutions ◽  
Intergovernmental Transfers ◽  
Liberal Democratic ◽  
Geographic Patterns ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Electoral Reforms

This article presents evidence that electoral institutions affect the geographic distribution of both candidate electoral support and government resources. The author exploits two electoral reforms in Japan to identify the effect of institutional incentives: (1) the 1994 electoral reform from a multimember single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system to a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system with a single-member district (SMD) component and a proportional representation component; and (2) the 1925 electoral reform from a predominantly SMD system to a multimember SNTV system. Using several new data sets, the two main findings of this article are that (1) Japanese representatives competing in multimember SNTV districts had more geographically concentrated electoral support than those competing in SMDs and that (2) intergovernmental transfers appear to be more concentrated around Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) incumbents' home offices under the multimember SNTV system than under the MMM system. The findings in this article highlight the connection between institutions and geographic patterns of representation.

Distributive Politics in Canada: The Case of Infrastructure Spending in Rural and Suburban Districts

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Olivier Jacques ◽  
Benjamin Ferland
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Politics ◽  
Formal Models ◽  
Infrastructure Projects ◽  
Members Of Parliament ◽  
Geographically Targeted

Abstract This article examines the presence of geographically targeted spending in the allocation of infrastructure projects in Canada. Building on formal models of distributive politics, we expect government districts, core government districts and swing districts to be advantaged in terms of infrastructure projects. We also investigate whether characteristics of Members of Parliament (MPs), such as seniority or holding a cabinet position, influence the distribution of infrastructure projects. Empirically, we analyze the amount of funding allocated by Infrastructure Canada across non-urban federal electoral districts between 2006 and 2018. Our results indicate that non-urban governmental districts receive, on average, more money than opposition districts, and that this is even more the case for core government districts. In contrast, we found little evidence that cabinet ministers or senior MPs are able to attract more funding to their constituencies compared to other representatives.

The Political Economy of Intergovernmental Transfers—Evidence from Indian Disaster Relief

2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-275
Author(s):  
Nakul Kumar
Keyword(s):  
Disaster Relief ◽  
Distributive Politics ◽  
The Political ◽  
Intergovernmental Transfers ◽  
Federal Grant ◽  
Indian States ◽  
Coalition Governments ◽  
National Coalition ◽  
National Governments ◽  
Relief Efforts

India’s National Calamity Contingency Fund (NCCF) is a discretionary federal grant that supports the sub-national governments with their disaster relief efforts. Evidence suggests that discretionary intergovernmental transfers in countries with national coalition governments contribute to distributive politics. Coalition formateur(s) use these transfers to form or hold together fractious coalitions. We use data on the NCCF from 1997 to 2013 for 23 Indian states to test for distributive politics. Our results show no evidence of NCCF contributing to distributive politics. We argue instead that the NCCF contributes to a different political phenomenon— tactical redistribution.

Theory and Methods in the Study of Distributive Politics

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 629-639 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Albertus
Keyword(s):  
Data Collection ◽  
Land Reform ◽  
Complete Picture ◽  
Distributive Politics ◽  
Levels Of Analysis ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Voter Preferences ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Collection Strategies ◽  
Different Levels

While many scholars have moved toward using individual-level data to test theories of distributive politics, no studies have ever explicitly examined differences between individual and aggregate analyses of a distributive program. By leveraging nationwide individual-level data on both revealed voter preferences and the actual receipt of particularistic benefits through a contemporary Venezuelan land reform initiative, this article demonstrates that scholars can most effectively test and refine individual-level theories of distributive politics by combining both individual- and macro-level data. There are at least two advantages to doing so. First, comparing and contrasting findings from data at different levels of analysis can enable researchers to paint a more complete picture of distributive targeting. Second, when distributive benefits can be impacted or redirected by subnational politicians, as is common with many distributive programs, individual-level data alone can generate mistaken inferences that are an artifact of competing targeting attempts at different levels of government instead of initial targeting strategies. I demonstrate both of these points and discuss practical and simple recommendations regarding data collection strategies for the purposes of effectively testing theories of distributive politics.

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