الشيخ ناصر الدين الألباني ومكانته العلمية في مجال علم الحديث

Islam is the Deen that fits to the man's nature. Allah Almighty sent his various messengers to convey His Commandments to the mankind. For His final Command-ments, Allah Almighty sent Prophet Muhammad (SWA).He also introduced His personalityas a explanatory status in Quran, This act has been mentioned on several occasion in Holy Quran which is fully agreed by the whole Umaah. For this, Holy Quran and hadith share the same importance for the guidance of Muslims. The companions of Rasool (SAW), Tabi’ in, Tabi al- Tabi’in and Muhdseen tried their level best to collect and do rearrangement of the Hadith., according to their potentialMohedseen compiled the collection of Hadith at different places during different time periods. This collection of Hadith is known as Sihah, Sitta in Islamic history. With the passage of time, there are so many controversial personalities who tried to damage the importance of this Islamic castle. Moreover, there came some personalities who didn’t have the command on Hadith and its sciences. They even brought their own changes in this regard. Among such names, Al- Sheikh Nasir ur Din Albani is the one, who challenged the authenticity of SihahSitta and other books of Hadith such as Al- AdabulMufrid and Al TarghebwaTerhaib etc. But Allah Almighty always sent such people who defended the matters related to the authenticity of Haidth. In this very article, Sheikh Al bani , his knowledge, his research and his challenges related to the authenticity of Haidth will be analyzed.

Classification of Disjunctivism about the Phenomenology of Visual Experience

This paper proposes a classificatory framework for disjunctivism about the phenomenology of visual perceptual experience. Disjunctivism of this sort is typically divided into positive and negative disjunctivism. This distinction successfully reflects the disagreement amongst disjunctivists regarding the explanatory status of the introspective indiscriminability of veridical perception and hallucination. However, it is unsatisfactory in two respects. First, it cannot accommodate eliminativism about the phenomenology of hallucination. Second, the class of positive disjunctivism is too coarse-grained to provide an informative overview of the current dialectical landscape. Given this, I propose a classificatory framework which preserves the positive-negative distinction, but which also includes the distinction between eliminativism and non-eliminativism, as well as a distinction between two subclasses of positive disjunctivism. In describing each class in detail, I specify who takes up each position in the existing literature, and demonstrate that this classificatory framework can disambiguate some existing disjunctivist views.

The causal power of securitisation: an inquiry into the explanatory status of securitisation theory illustrated by the case of Somali piracy

This article joins the nascent debate on the causal status of securitisation theory. Relying on critical realist’s efforts to deepen and broaden the concept of cause – defined as ‘causal complex’ – and its insights to integrate discourse and constitutive relations into a non-positivist framework for causal explanation, the article aims to explore the explanatory status of securitisation theory, without downgrading its discursive core. To illustrate this argument, the article uses the securitisation of Somali piracy as an example of how the causal analysis of securitisation can contribute to explain some of the dynamics involved in security governance. From this perspective, securitisation works within a broader empirical framework of security, significantly implicated in causal relations, going beyond the Copenhagen School’s conception of securitisation as a non-causal constitutive theory merely defined as a formal framework for analysis. The article discusses, finally, the relevance and implications of introducing causal analysis in the study of securitisation.

Holismus und Perspektivismus in Hegels Auffassung der Willensfreiheit

ZUSAMMENFASSUNGHegelsche Philosophie wird oft als eine metaphysische Konstruktion angesehen.Demgegenüber wird in dem Beitrag eine Position eingenommen, laut der Hegel,innerhalb seines holistischen philosophischen Rahmens, eine perspektivistischeVorgehensweise verwendet, um immer neue, immer konkretere, weil begrifflichimmer mehr vermittelte, Einsichten zu erreichen. Die perspektivistische Methode Hegels wird anhand des Phänomens des freien Willens gezeigt. Hegel glaubt, dass es sich nicht auf einen Schlag erklären lässt, ob und in welchem Sinne der Wille frei ist. Der Beweis, der diese Versicherung begründen soll, wird erst auf dem Weg der vielschichtigen philosophischen Deduktion geliefert. Einer neuen Auffassung des Trägers der Willensfreiheit entspricht dabei immer ein neues Konzept des Gegenstandbereiches. So impliziert etwa das moralische Konzept des Willens eine völlig neue begriffliche Konstellation, mit welcher der Wille und seine Welt aufgefasst wird, als das rechtliche Konzept des Willens. Im letzten Teil des Beitrags wird analysiert, welche Schlüsse aus Hegelscher Rekonstruktion des freien Willens für heutige Debatten zu ziehen wären. Demgemäß sollte ein hegelianisch gesinnter Denker nicht das von dem Naturalisten entworfene Bild des empirisch determinierten Willens, sondern dessen absoluten Anspruch auf Erklärung desavouieren. Es wird klar, dass empiristische Vorgehensweise im Fall der Willensfreiheit einen gewaltigen Teil unserer sozialen Erfahrung und unseres Diskurses gar nicht erklären kann. Mann sollte die theoretische Ebene vertiefen (sie um moralische, rechtliche, so ziale Perspektiven bereichern), auf der die Polemik mit den naturalistischen Gegnernder Willensfreiheit aufzunehmen ist.SCHLÜSSELBEGRIFFE:FREIHEIT, WILLE, PERSPEKTIVE, HOLISMUS, MORALITÄTABSTRACTHegel's Philosophy is often seen as a metaphysical construction. Contrary to that, the author of the paper tries to show that Hegel uses - in the context of his holistic philosophy - a perspectivist strategy which allows him to present newer and more and more detailed insights, which are conceptually richer. This perspectivist strategy of Hegel is demonstrated using the example of the problem of the freedom of will. According to Hegel there is no possibility to show at one blow that, and in what sense, the will is free. The argument that vindicates this assumption can only be given in the context of multi-layered philosophical deduction. A new concept of the subject of the free will always implicates a new concept of the objective sphere. For example, the moral understanding of the will implies a wholly new configuration of concepts to grasp the will and its world than the legal understanding of it. At the end of the paper an analysis is given of what kind of conclusions may be drawn from Hegel's reconstruction of the free will that could bring new insights in the actual debates on the free will. According to this analysis a hegelian thinker should not disavow the naturalist’s picture of the empirically determined will, but should instead disavow the claim of this picture to have an absolute explanatory status. It is suggested that the empirical strategy of the denial of the free will is not able to explain a huge range of our social experience and our social discourse. The theoretical level on which the discussion with a naturalistic opponent to the freedom of will is being undertaken should be deepen, i.e. enriched with moral, legal and social perspectives.KEYWORDSFREEDOM, WILL, PERSPECTIVE, HOLISM, MORALITY

Psyche as the Principle and Cause of Life in Aristotle

Biology is the most extensive field in the Corpus Aristotelicum. In his fundamental work De anima, Aristotle tries to fix the borders of this life science. The term ψυχή has a twofold explanatory status. On the one hand, ψυχή is understood as a principle of all living beings. On the other hand, it is understood as a cause of the fact that all living beings are alive. The paper is divided into three sections. (1) The first part shows why Aristotle discusses these issues in a work entitled Περὶ ψυχῆς. Since Pythagoras and Heraclitus, ψυχή was understood as a life principle: Pythagoras believed that men, animals and plants share the same nature: they are all ἔμψυχα and they are homogenous qua ψυχή. (2) The second part of this article deals with Aristotle’s definition of the soul in DA II: ψυχή is the principle of all living things. This establishes (i) the external criteria to divide living and non-living beings and (ii) the internal criteria to divide living beings. (3) The third part of this paper is concerned with the methodological consequences of this definition: the life functions (δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς) are the central explanandum in Aristotle’s biology. De anima II defines such various life-functions as nourishment, sense-perception and locomotion. These capacities contour the main fields of the philosopher’s biological investigation. For Aristotle, the faculty of reproduction is a subtype of nourishment. Reproduction is the most important and most natural function of all living beings. Genetics is, therefore, the most important field in Aristotle’s biology.

The logic of small samples in interview-based qualitative research

In a qualitative framework, research based on interviews often seeks to penetrate social life beyond appearance and manifest meanings. This requires the researcher to be immersed in the research field, to establish continuing, fruitful relationships with respondents and through theoretical contemplation to address the research problem in depth. Therefore a small number of cases (less than 20, say) will facilitate the researcher’s close association with the respondents, and enhance the validity of fine-grained, in-depth inquiry in naturalistic settings. Epistemologically prior to these considerations, however, is the explanatory status of such research. From a realist standpoint, here concept formation through induction and analysis aims to clarify the nature of some specific situations in the social world, to discover what features there are in them and to account, however partially, for those features being as they are. Since such a research project scrutinizes the dynamic qualities of a situation (rather than elucidating the proportionate relationships among its constituents), the issue of sample size - as well as representativeness - has little bearing on the project’s basic logic. This article presents this argument in detail, with an example drawn from a study of persons with a past history of cancer diagnosis and treatment.

Power, Knowledge and Social Process in Technology Analysis: The Case of CAD/CAM

“Social process’ analyses of technology implementation have had a major influence on research carried out over the last 15 years. Technology implementation is now widely regarded as a ‘socially negotiated’ process the outcome of which is likely to be shaped by different interests and constituencies within the innovating firm. However, the explanatory status accorded to questions of power and political process remains problematic. This paper combines an empirical investigation of the political processes associated with the implementation of CAD/CAM with a cross-disciplinary treatment of the underlying theoretical issues. The concluding part of the paper focuses on ‘political’ and ‘learning’ aspects of technical change. ‘Power’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘control’ rationalities are included in a revised theorization of the technical change process.