De la relativité des jugements moraux
ABSTRACT: In the first part of this paper, I criticize the indexical interpretation of meta-ethical relativism. According to the indexical interpretation, the content of a moral statement varies with the context of its utterance. I argue that such an interpretation is not empirically plausible, and that it cannot explain the seriousness of radical moral disagreements. In the constructive part of the paper, I offer an alternative, minimalist interpretation of moral relativism, which is based upon an analogy with the case of the relativity of motion.
2016 ◽
Vol 115
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pp. 419-443
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2015 ◽
Vol 8
(2)
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pp. 112-135
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2012 ◽
Vol 50
(4)
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pp. 538-556
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