THE NATURE OF NORMATIVE MORAL JUDGMENTS

Moral judgements have been a crucial subject-matter of a discussion in the domain of normativity. Many thinkers argue moral judgments are necessarily action-guiding, which prescribe what one ought to do and what ought to be the case. The moral statement “killing is wrong” is prescriptive and locates in the purview of first-order ethical questions. Moral realists widely accept that moral judgments represent propositions, therefore they are subject to truth and false conditions. Thus, moral conclusions can be derived logically from valid premises. How to derive the conclusion “killing is wrong”? How to justify the statement? What does “wrong” mean in this context? This kind of philosophical issue has been labeled as the second-order questions, which is in the purview of metaethics. This article is devoted to the subject of normativity and the nature of moral judgments advocated by metaethicists David Copp and Ralph Wedgwood. The purpose of this article is to outline the current debate on the nature of normative moral judgments. In conclusion, I shall agree with both Copp and Wedgwoodon two points. One, normative moral judgment can be subject to cognition. Two, there are true and false beliefs about particular moral facts which constitute the significant part of the reality we live in.

Komparasi Bingkai Peristiwa Bencana di Media Online Indonesia

This paper examines the differences between Tirto.id and Republika.co.id in framing reporting on the causes of the crash of the Lion Air JT-610 plane on October 29, 2018. This research is a qualitative study using Robert M. Entman's four-stage framing analysis, namely define problems, define causes, make moral statement, and treatment recommendation. The results of this study indicate that there are differences in framing between the three online media in reporting a disaster. Tirto.id focuses more on the professionalism of Lion Air's management, while Republika.co.id focuses more on the news about the cause of the crash of the Lion Air JT-610 plane because the Lion Air JT-610 aircraft is the latest release. This proves that every newsroom has a certain standard in applying the principles of disaster journalism. Tulisan ini mengulas perbedaan Tirto.id dan Republika.co.id dalam membingkai pemberitaan penyebab jatuhnya pesawat Lion Air JT-610 pada tanggal 29 Oktober 2018. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian kualitatif dengan menggunakan analisis framing empat tahap Robert M. Entman, yaitu define problems, define causes, make moral statement, dan treatment recommendation. Hasil penelitian ini menyatakan bahwa terdapat perbedaan framing di antara ketiga media online tersebut dalam memberitakan sebuah bencana. Tirto.id lebih menyoroti profesionalisme manajemen Lion Air, sedangkan Republika.co.id lebih mem-framing pemberitaan penyebab jatuhnya pesawat Lion Air JT-610 lantaran jenis pesawat Lion Air JT-610 merupakan keluaran terbaru. Hal ini membuktikan bahwa setiap newsroom memiliki standar tertentu dalam menerapkan prinsip jurnalisme bencana.

A popperian approach to rational argumentation in applied ethics

As a consequence of Hume’s famous is-ought problem, it may seem that no rational justification of a moral statement can ever be inferentially provided, and no argument typically used in applied ethics would ever deserve the title of rational justification. This paper aims to propose a fallibilist, non-foundationalist account of rational justification of a moral standpoint based on rational argumentation. This account will be developed within a noncognitivist theory of morality — a framework that seems to constitute the most challenging context for a similar attempt. First, the paper shows how we can have a good rational justification of a moral claim also if its (necessary) moral premises are neither indubitable nor properly inferentially justified, as long as we adopt what is called a Popperian solution to the “problem of prescriptive basic statements”. Second, it argues that a good rational justification of a moral claim does not need to be deductively valid. Using the idea that implicit presumptions introduced by invalid inferences can be monitored by a number of related critical questions, the article distinguishes between fallacious and non-fallacious invalid arguments, and examines how a use of an invalid non-fallacious argument can count as a rational justification of a moral position in applied ethics. However, applied ethics must do its part, and must be explicitly based on rational argumentation.

Historical Relevance Feedback Detection by Text Re-use Networks

Text re-use has been in the humanist's interest for centuries. Collecting parallel texts implies giving a certain information, e.g. a moral statement or report on wars and conflicts, a kind of witness. The more independent parallel texts are collected, the more feasible the information is. The contribution reported here is on automatic detection of text re-use and the usage of a text re-use network to derive a Cultural Heritage Aware PageRank technique given ancient text re-uses like quotations, paraphrases, and allusions.

Leonardo’s Profezia: Moral Writings of a Hybrid Kind

In the period 1490-99, Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519) wrote nearly three hundred literary writings that were later compiled by scholars into four primary collections: the Bestiario, Favole, Facezie, and Profezia. This article takes Leonardo’s Profezia as its main subject in order to give due recognition to the generic nature of this collection. Specifically, it examines the texts in the Profezia as examples of mixed genre in an attempt to demonstrate how ethos, context, and generic convention yield to the greater moral statement made by Leonardo in the writings themselves. Unlike Leonardo’s other three literary collections, which subscribe to an easily identifiable literary genre, the Profezia texts are hybrid writings that enjoin its readers to consider instead why and how the mixture of forms might be a necessary means of expression to convey a truth and reality.

De la relativité des jugements moraux

ABSTRACT: In the first part of this paper, I criticize the indexical interpretation of meta-ethical relativism. According to the indexical interpretation, the content of a moral statement varies with the context of its utterance. I argue that such an interpretation is not empirically plausible, and that it cannot explain the seriousness of radical moral disagreements. In the constructive part of the paper, I offer an alternative, minimalist interpretation of moral relativism, which is based upon an analogy with the case of the relativity of motion.

Relationship between Locus of Control and Moral Judgments among College Students

This research assessed the importance of locus of control in explaining the moral judgments people make with reference to moral situations. It was hypothesized that an individual whose locus of control was internal, when presented with moral situations, would make different moral judgments with regards to “right” and “wrong” than an external locus of control individual. 185 college students completed a questionnaire consisting of Rotter's I-E Scale and the Rettig and Pasamanick moral judgment scale. A weak relationship between locus of control and moral judgments was noted. Those moral statements for which locus of control appears relevant have four common characteristics: (1) the student can personally relate to the moral statement, (2) the moral statement contains personal accountability, (3) the immediacy of the moral situation, i.e., whether the individual is directly experiencing or being exposed to the moral situation described in the statement is relevant, and (4) no consensus of society on the Tightness or wrongness of the action is apparent.

Perspectives on Harold Frederic's Market-Place

Joel Thorpe of The Market-Place is Harold Frederic's most complex character. Thorpe is portrayed as the psychological product of two worlds, the type of the financial buccaneer, and a moral double. In a full-length portrait, subjective as well as objective, Frederic renders Thorpe's character in dramatic terms and integrates his behavior in public and private life. Most important, he offers a moral probing of Thorpe's type. Frederic judges him morally both through the remarks of reliable characters and through his own ironic implications. Yet both plots, the terms in which the economic battle is defined, and certain sympathetic aspects of characterization all work against the assumption that Frederic wholly condemns Thorpe. If Thorpe is shown to sin according to traditional moralities by fulfilling his impulses, he is likewise shown to sin according to his own understanding when he ceases to exercise his own peculiar impulse to power. The ambiguity of Thorpe's portrait deepens his characterization but obscures the moral statement of the novel. This ambiguity may be explained in part by autobiographical factors and in part by an ambivalence toward the tycoon that Frederic shared with other nineteenth- century American writers. Specifically, Frederic's preoccupation with the type, his questioning whether self-interest and the public weal may both be served by such a figure, and his failure either to damn Thorpe wholly or to show how coexistence between the buccaneer and society might actually occur may all point to an imaginative source for The Market-Place in Emerson's essay on Napoleon.