Justice as Luck Egalitarian Fairness?

Dialogue ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 58 (4) ◽  
pp. 741-750
Author(s):  
LOUIS-PHILIPPE HODGSON
Keyword(s):  
Original Position ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Right ◽  
Luck Egalitarian

In A Conceptual Investigation of Justice, Kyle Johannsen maintains that the strongest version of John Rawls’s theory of justice is one that incorporates the luck egalitarian conception of fairness developed by G.A. Cohen. He also contends that, once the theory is modified in this way, it becomes clear that the original position doesn’t yield principles of justice but rather what Cohen calls ‘rules of regulation.’ I argue that the minimal conception of fairness that Rawls favours is the right one for his purposes, and that bringing in luck egalitarian fairness would render the outcome of the original position indeterminate.

scholarly journals The Political Meaning of the Right and the Privatization of the Good

2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-25
Author(s):  
Piotr Andryszczak
Keyword(s):  
Original Position ◽  
The Political ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrine ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
The Public ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Just Society ◽  
The Veil ◽  
The Right

The Political Meaning of the Right and the Privatization of the Good In today's philosophical and political world we come across an influential current within liberalism called procedural. It faces the problem of building a just society by proposing a formula: the priority of the right over the good. It can be easily found in Rawls's A Theory of Justice which starts from the original position which means that individuals, behind the veil of ignorance, do not know anything about their social location, talents and their own conceptions of the good. Because of such ignorance they would constitute the just society. It would be regulated by two principles of justice, chosen behind the veil of ignorance and reflecting the priority of the right over the good. Nevertheless Rawls understood that this conception could be accepted only by Liberals because it represents an example of a comprehensive doctrine. Therefore he reinterpreted his conception and presented it as political in his Political Liberalism. It has three features: it is worked out for the basic structure of a constitutional democratic regime; it does not depend for its justification on any particular comprehensive doctrine; and, it is formulated in terms of two fundamental ideas implicit in the public culture of a democratic society (the ideas of society as a fair system of cooperation, and of persons viewed as free and equal). Due to this reinterpretation, the justification of his principles of justice proceeds from what is held in common and leads to an agreement based on "an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines". In this way the good becomes something strictly private and completely absent in the public sphere. Such position is obviously very controversial but a critical approach to it will be a subject of another paper.

Rawlsian Constructivism in Moral Theory

1987 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
David O. Brink
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Decision Procedure ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Political Theories ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Since his article, ‘Outline for a Decision Procedure in Ethics,’ John Rawls has advocated a coherentist moral epistemology according to which moral and political theories are justified on the basis of their coherence with our other beliefs, both moral and nonmoral (1951: 56, 61). A moral theory which is maximally coherent with our other beliefs is in a state which Rawls calls ‘reflective equilibrium’ (1971: 20). In A Theory of Justice Rawls advanced two principles of justice and claimed that they are in reflective equilibrium. He defended this claim by appeal to a hypothetical contract; he argued that parties in a position satisfying certain informational and motivational criteria, which he called ‘the original position,’ would choose the following two principles of justice to govern the basic structure of their society.

ON THE VERY IDEA OF IDEAL THEORY IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 55-75
Author(s):  
Alexander Rosenberg
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Relations ◽  
Ideal Gas ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Ideal Gas Law ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The One

Abstract:The essay agues that there is little scope for ideal theory in political philosophy, even under Rawls’s conception of its aims. It begins by identifying features of a standard example of ideal theory in physics — the ideal gas law, PV=NRT and draws attention to the lack of these features in Rawls’s derivation of the principles of justice from the original position. A. John Simmons’s defense of ideal theory against criticisms of Amartya Sen is examined, as are further criticisms of both by David Schmidtz. The essay goes on to develop a conception of the domain of social relations to be characterized by justice that suggests that as a moving target it makes ideal theory otiose. Examination of Rawls’s later views substantiate the conclusion that ideal theory as propounded in A Theory of Justice is a mistaken starting point in the enterprise of political philosophy. Differences between the domains of ideal theory in mathematics, physics, and economics on the one hand, and political philosophy on the other, reinforce this conclusion.

The Original Position in José Saramago's Blindness

2007 ◽  
Vol 69 (3) ◽  
pp. 447-463 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Keren
Keyword(s):  
Early Modern ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Modern Age ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Following the tradition of social contract theories of the early modern age, John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, renewed the notion of the “original position,” that is, a set of behavioral assumptions from which general principles of justice are deduced. José Saramago's novel Blindness enriches Rawls's normative theory by adding behavioral assumptions that help clarify some of the problems raised by the theory's critics and enhance its application to social and political settings.

Kok-Chor Tan, Justice, Institutions, and Luck: The Site, Ground, and Scope of Equality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. ix + 208.

Utilitas ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-132
Author(s):  
DANIEL HALLIDAY
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Luck Egalitarian ◽  
Oxford University Press

Political liberals very often appeal to a so-called division of moral labour that separates the regulation of institutions from that of personal conduct. Probably the most famous statement of this idea is found in these remarks from John Rawls: The principles of justice for institutions must not be confused with the principles which apply to individuals and their actions in particular circumstances. These two kinds of principles apply to different subjects and must be discussed separately. (A Theory of Justice, rev. edn. (1999), p. 47) Kok-Chor Tan's excellent new book renews and extends the case for accepting some version of Rawls's view, which Tan calls the ‘institutional focus’ in distributive justice. If Tan is right, then the liberal focus on institutions is not only defensible in its own right, but also helps support further elements of egalitarian theorizing, including some that Rawlsians often reject. In particular, Tan believes that a focus on institutions helps secure a more plausible ‘luck egalitarian’ approach to distributive justice, and that it also supports a version of cosmopolitanism about global justice.

E Pluribus Unum

1977 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 49-70
Author(s):  
D. A. Lloyd Thomas
Keyword(s):  
Original Position ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Primary Goods ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Conception Of The Good ◽  
Recent Version ◽  
Liberal Thought

One tradition of liberal thought is committed to showing on the basis of an individualistic conception of what is good that it is reasonable for all persons to accept certain common principles. The most recent version of this enterprise is to be found in Professor John Rawls's A Theory of Justice. Rawls has to show that persons in the ‘original position’, with plans of life which will turn out to be different, though equally rational, when the ‘veil of ignorance’ has been lifted, nevertheless have reason to accept common principles of justice. One might have expected divergent views about the best principles of justice to adopt, considering that the rationality of choices is related to desires, and that parties in the original position may have different desires. Rawls meets this problem by introducing the ‘primary goods’: those things it is rational to want whatever else one wants. By employing this ‘thin’ theory of the good in the original position, Rawls attempts to show that the choices of all parties will converge upon his two principles of justice. Each individual's ‘full’ conception of the good may then be developed within the constraints imposed by the principles of justice.

A Rawlsian Perspective on Justice for the Disabled

2008 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Cureton ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Original Position ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
The Disabled ◽  
Small Set ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Favorable Conditions

I aim to identify and describe some basic elements of a Rawlsian approach that may help us to think conscientiously about how, from the standpoint of justice, we should treat the disabled. Rawls has been criticized for largely ignoring issues of this sort. These criticisms lose their appeal, I suggest, when we distinguish between a Rawlsian standpoint and the limited project Rawls mainly undertakes in A Theory of Justice. There his explicit aim is to find principles of justice, which are to govern the basic structures of a closed, well-ordered society that exists under reasonably favorable conditions, that would be chosen by parties in the original position from among a small set of traditional conceptions of justice. Once we develop a conception of justice for a society like that, Rawlsians hope we can make certain revisions to find principles of justice for a society like ours. Finally, I sketch what seems to me a plausible way for a Rawlsian to begin thinking about how a society like ours should provide justice for its disabled citizens.

Rawls and the Contract Theory of Civil Disobedience*

1977 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 1-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. W. Sumner
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Contract Theory ◽  
Civil Disobedience ◽  
Political Obligation ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Critical Attention ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Way

Since its appearance in 1971, John Rawls’ A Theory of justice has attracted much critical attention. Most of this attention has inevitably centred on the two principles of justice for institutions and on their derivation from the original position. This paper will examine a part of the system which has not yet received such close scrutiny — Rawls’ theory of political obligation in general and civil disobedience in particular. My main aim is to understand this theory, since there are crucial respects in which it is undeveloped. But I shall also along the way comment on its possibilities; these comments will for the most part take the form of comparisons with its utilitarian rival.In what follows I shall not confine myself to the material in Rawls’ book, but rather use the appearance of the book as an opportunity to review the development of the theory of political obligation since “Justice as Fairness”. When one surveys the period bounded by that initial paper and by the book, certain patterns form.

Rational Choice Contractualism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Moehler
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Correct Choice ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Decision Situation ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Theories Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Traditional Understanding

This chapter discusses contractualist theories of justice that, although they rely explicitly on moral assumptions in the traditional understanding of morality, employ rational choice theory for the justification of principles of justice. In particular, the chapter focuses on the dispute between Rawls and Harsanyi about the correct choice of principles of justice in the original position. The chapter shows that there is no winner in the Rawls–Harsanyi dispute and, ultimately, formal methods alone cannot justify moral principles. This finding is significant for the development of the rational decision situation that serves for the derivation of the weak principle of universalization for the domain of pure instrumental morality.

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