E Pluribus Unum

1977 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 49-70
Author(s):  
D. A. Lloyd Thomas
Keyword(s):  
Original Position ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Primary Goods ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Conception Of The Good ◽  
Recent Version ◽  
Liberal Thought

One tradition of liberal thought is committed to showing on the basis of an individualistic conception of what is good that it is reasonable for all persons to accept certain common principles. The most recent version of this enterprise is to be found in Professor John Rawls's A Theory of Justice. Rawls has to show that persons in the ‘original position’, with plans of life which will turn out to be different, though equally rational, when the ‘veil of ignorance’ has been lifted, nevertheless have reason to accept common principles of justice. One might have expected divergent views about the best principles of justice to adopt, considering that the rationality of choices is related to desires, and that parties in the original position may have different desires. Rawls meets this problem by introducing the ‘primary goods’: those things it is rational to want whatever else one wants. By employing this ‘thin’ theory of the good in the original position, Rawls attempts to show that the choices of all parties will converge upon his two principles of justice. Each individual's ‘full’ conception of the good may then be developed within the constraints imposed by the principles of justice.

scholarly journals The Political Meaning of the Right and the Privatization of the Good

2011 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-25
Author(s):  
Piotr Andryszczak
Keyword(s):  
Original Position ◽  
The Political ◽  
Comprehensive Doctrine ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
The Public ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Just Society ◽  
The Veil ◽  
The Right

The Political Meaning of the Right and the Privatization of the Good In today's philosophical and political world we come across an influential current within liberalism called procedural. It faces the problem of building a just society by proposing a formula: the priority of the right over the good. It can be easily found in Rawls's A Theory of Justice which starts from the original position which means that individuals, behind the veil of ignorance, do not know anything about their social location, talents and their own conceptions of the good. Because of such ignorance they would constitute the just society. It would be regulated by two principles of justice, chosen behind the veil of ignorance and reflecting the priority of the right over the good. Nevertheless Rawls understood that this conception could be accepted only by Liberals because it represents an example of a comprehensive doctrine. Therefore he reinterpreted his conception and presented it as political in his Political Liberalism. It has three features: it is worked out for the basic structure of a constitutional democratic regime; it does not depend for its justification on any particular comprehensive doctrine; and, it is formulated in terms of two fundamental ideas implicit in the public culture of a democratic society (the ideas of society as a fair system of cooperation, and of persons viewed as free and equal). Due to this reinterpretation, the justification of his principles of justice proceeds from what is held in common and leads to an agreement based on "an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines". In this way the good becomes something strictly private and completely absent in the public sphere. Such position is obviously very controversial but a critical approach to it will be a subject of another paper.

The Irreconcilable Conflict between Islam and Liberalism

2021 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 247-265
Author(s):  
Muhammad Zahid Siddique
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Religious Faith ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Pluralistic Society ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Veil

John Rawls used an apparently neutral apparatus to derive the principles of justice that all “rational” people ought to agree with because they provide the basis of coexistence in a pluralistic society. He believes that religious faith is consistent with the commitment to liberalism. The paper shows that the Rawlsian liberal “self” modelled in the original position is not consistent with the original position recognized by religion in general and Islam in particular. According to Islam, the human self is mukallaf (subject of God) while Rawls treats it non-mukallaf. This is so because Rawlsian original position presumes an atheist self behind the veil of ignorance. This conceptualization of self is not only inconsistent with but also hostile to religion. The claims about liberalism’s tolerance towards religion are superficial. The liberal self can express itself in various religious forms provided these are aligned with the system of rights acknowledged by the liberal atheist self.

scholarly journals John Rawls’s Concept of Justice as Fairness

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 179
Author(s):  
Edor J. Edor
Keyword(s):  
Original Position ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Traditional Conception ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
The Veil

John Rawls's theory of Justice is one of the most influential conceptions of justice. Scholars have continued to study it to understand the principles in the formation and to further frame it in the context of contemporary situations. This paper contributes to the ongoing discussion by presenting Rawls’ concept of “justice as fairness” as it evolved from the traditional conception of justice to the modern-shift in the concept. The paper also examines Rawls’s concept of justice as fairness, and it focuses on analyzing or studying the concept of justice as fairness in terms of the principles used in its formulations. Several criticisms developed by political philosophers to critique the idea were examined. In conclusion, it was argued that Rawls's invention of the veil-of-ignorance for the original position has affected the theory negatively.

Sprawiedliwość jako racjonalność

Etyka ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 111-132
Author(s):  
Hanna Buczyńska-Garewicz
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Veil

The article deals with John Rawls’ theory of justice. The principal categories of Rawls’ book are analysed; especially the “veil of ignorance” and the principles of justice. Author’s attention is focused on some philosophical aspects of the concept of justice. The question of grounding of the idea of justice is analysed. Rawls’ theory is criticized for its lack of explanation in which way the idea of justice is given: is it a primordial experience or a result of the rational calculus?

Rawls, Risk, and the Maximin Principle

2020 ◽  
pp. 149-154
Author(s):  
Barbara H. Fried
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Utility Functions ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Uncertainty Aversion ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Individual Preferences ◽  
Maximin Principle ◽  
The Veil

In A Theory of Justice, Rawls acknowledged that rational choice behind the veil of ignorance would generally yield average utilitarianism—John Harsanyi’s conclusion fifteen years earlier. The question is, why would it yield a different conclusion in the Original Position? If, as Rawls assumed, the representative person would be infinitely risk averse in those unique circumstances, utility functions would reflect that preference in the relative weights assigned to different outcomes, yielding Rawls’s maximin solution. In short, Rawls’s disagreement with utilitarians is an empirical dispute about individual preferences and nothing more. Rawls believed the disagreement was more fundamental, because of two erroneous assumptions about standard utility functions: that they reflect peoples’ psychological attitudes toward risk-taking rather than their preferences over a range of outcomes, that they would ignore the transitory disutility of uncertainty aversion in calculating expected utilities.

Methodenfragen der Gerechtigkeitstheorie

1979 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Arend Kulenkampff
Keyword(s):  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Empirical Knowledge ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Methodological Problems ◽  
The Veil ◽  
To Come

AbstractThe purpose of this paper is the clarification of some methodological problems concerning Rawls’ theory of justice. The first part seeks to make more precise Tugendhat’s distinction between 1st-person-theory and 3rd-person-theory. Rawls’ theory fulfills all criteria for 1st-person-theories. In the second part Rawl’s coherence model for the justification of norms („reflective equilibrium“) is critically analyzed and opposed to the hypothetical decision which individuals are to make in the original position (contract model). It is shown that the conception of reflective equilibrium is in various aspects mistaken. In conclusion a problem is indicated which Rawls has not satisfactorily resolved: The veil of ignorance is supposed to guarantee that the decision for the basic principles of social justice is unanimous. Nevertheless it would appear that the individuals in the original position either have too little empirical knowledge in order to make a rational decision, or they have too much knowledge in order to come to an unanimous decision. The veil of ignorance is either too fine or not fine enough.

How to Justify Principles of Justice

2020 ◽  
Vol 2019 (4) ◽  
pp. 163-192
Author(s):  
Zhang Guoqing
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
The Core ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Veil

AbstractJohn Rawls assumes that in the original position, under the veil of ignorance, after bargaining amongst each other, free, equal, moral and rational persons would make a rational decision to accept the principles of justice as fairness and thus the principles are established. Critics, however, question the authenticity and validity of this justification strategy. When rational individuals take the principles of justice as an original agreement, it is not a real contract. Rawls’s conception of justice as fairness is just a personal notion, some individuals may accept it, but it is impossible to be accepted by all human beings in a real world. Therefore there is a justification/acceptance paradox of those principles which are the core of his political philosophy. So how should we justify those principles? Its answers may be provided not in the light of a philosophical justification but of a scientific one.

What is Arbitrary about Moral Arbitrariness?

2021 ◽  
pp. 202-233
Author(s):  
Gerald Lang
Keyword(s):  
Original Position ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Central Source ◽  
Justice As Fairness ◽  
Brute Luck ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Selection Of ◽  
Refined Version

John Rawls’s ‘justice as fairness’ is often cited as a central source of inspiration for luck egalitarianism, which is, correlatively, often characterized as a more refined version of justice as fairness. Rawls’s distributive hostility to morally arbitrary endowments is standardly interpreted as betraying hostility to distributions that are skewed by brute luck. This chapter argues otherwise. It has two main aims. First, it replaces the standard ‘Neutralization Interpretation’ of Rawls’s main arguments with the ‘Irrelevance Interpretation’. According to the Irrelevance Interpretation, morally arbitrary person endowments ought to play no role in the selection of principles of justice in the original position. According to the Neutralization Interpretation, by contrast, principles of justice ought to expunge the influence of any inequalities that are due to luck. The Irrelevance Interpretation is more permissive of inequalities, just as long as they serve some other purpose, such as improving the position of the worst-off. The Irrelevance Interpretation is also more congenial to Rawls’s investment in the contractarian machinery of the original position and the veil of ignorance.

scholarly journals Comprender la pobreza: debate entre John Rawls y Amartya Sen

2011 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eguzki Urteaga
Keyword(s):  
Social Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Amartya Sen ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Basic Goods ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Veil

RESUMENReconstrucción teórica de nuestras intuiciones a propósito de la justicia social, la Teoría de la justicia de John Rawls debía tomar en consideración a los más desfavorecidos a través del principio de diferencia que reparte los bienes de manera equitativa. Para Rawls, la objetividad moral está garantizada por la experiencia del posicionamiento original, caracterizada por el velo de ignorancia. Amartya Sen cuestiona ese planteamiento criticando el índice de los bienes básicos. Este artículo explicita lo que está en juego en este debate y desarrolla las aportaciones de la teoría de las capacidades a la reflexión contemporánea sobre las desigualdades socioeconómicas.PALABRAS CLAVERawls – Sen – teoría – pobreza – capacidadABSTRACTIn his theoretical reconstruction of our intuitions about social justice, John Rawls’s Theory of justice intended to take into consideration the worst-off due to the difference principle that distributes the goods in an equal way. For Rawls, the moral objectivity is guaranteed by the experience of the original position, characterized by the veil of ignorance that conceals particular interests. But, Amartya Sen has criticized this theory and specially the index of basic goods. This article states explicitly what is at stake in this debate and develops the contributions of the theory of capabilities to the contemporary reflection on the economic and social inequalities.KEYWORDSRawls - Sen - theory - poverty - capability

Rawlsian Affirmative Action

1998 ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Robert Allen
Keyword(s):  
Affirmative Action ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Remedial Measures ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Rational Person ◽  
Social Contracts ◽  
Primary Goods ◽  
Just Society

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls presents a method of determining how a just society would allocate its "primary goods"-that is, those things any rational person would desire, such as opportunities, liberties, rights, wealth, and the bases of self-respect. Rawls' method of adopting the "original position" is supposed to yield a "fair" way of distributing such goods. A just society would also have the need (unmet in the above work) to determine how the victims of injustice ought to be compensated, since history suggests that social contracts are likely to be violated. This paper is an attempt to determine the remedial measures that would be selected using Rawls' method. I contend that only two of the three most widely used "affirmative action" policies would be selected from the original position. I also sketch another compensatory policy that would pass Rawls' fairness test.

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