ON THE VERY IDEA OF IDEAL THEORY IN POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 55-75
Author(s):  
Alexander Rosenberg
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Relations ◽  
Ideal Gas ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Ideal Gas Law ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The One

Abstract:The essay agues that there is little scope for ideal theory in political philosophy, even under Rawls’s conception of its aims. It begins by identifying features of a standard example of ideal theory in physics — the ideal gas law, PV=NRT and draws attention to the lack of these features in Rawls’s derivation of the principles of justice from the original position. A. John Simmons’s defense of ideal theory against criticisms of Amartya Sen is examined, as are further criticisms of both by David Schmidtz. The essay goes on to develop a conception of the domain of social relations to be characterized by justice that suggests that as a moving target it makes ideal theory otiose. Examination of Rawls’s later views substantiate the conclusion that ideal theory as propounded in A Theory of Justice is a mistaken starting point in the enterprise of political philosophy. Differences between the domains of ideal theory in mathematics, physics, and economics on the one hand, and political philosophy on the other, reinforce this conclusion.

LIBERALISM BEFORE JUSTICE

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 354-371
Author(s):  
Eric MacGilvray
Keyword(s):  
Political Action ◽  
Social Space ◽  
Social Systems ◽  
Two Dimensions ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
The Social ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Just Society ◽  
The One

Abstract:The ideal theory debate rests on two conflicting claims: that justice is “the first virtue of social systems” (justice first), and that a just society is one in which “everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the same principles of justice” (universal consent). Justice first holds that questions about the meaning of justice — and thus about what an ideally just society would look like — must be settled before we can effectively pursue justice. However, universal consent entails a project of justification that can only take place over time. I propose that we avoid this impasse by treating freedom rather than justice as the “first virtue” of a liberal society. Liberal freedom has two distinct and complementary dimensions, which give rise to two distinct and complementary moral aims: on the one hand, to create the social conditions that make responsible agency possible (republican freedom), and on the other hand to carve out a social space within which the demands of responsible agency are relaxed or absent (market freedom). Striking the appropriate balance between these two dimensions of liberal freedom is irreducibly a matter of judgment. A freedom-centered liberalism therefore requires that we treat justice as the endpoint rather than the starting point of political action, thus severing the link between legitimacy and consent.

Utopophobia

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Estlund
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Social Justice ◽  
Political Thought ◽  
Political Action ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Sound Theory ◽  
Theory Versus ◽  
History Of ◽  
Practical Guidance

Throughout the history of political philosophy and politics, there has been continual debate about the roles of idealism versus realism. For contemporary political philosophy, this debate manifests in notions of ideal theory versus nonideal theory. Nonideal thinkers shift their focus from theorizing about full social justice, asking instead which feasible institutional and political changes would make a society more just. Ideal thinkers, on the other hand, question whether full justice is a standard that any society is likely ever to satisfy. And, if social justice is unrealistic, are attempts to understand it without value or importance, and merely utopian? This book argues against thinking that justice must be realistic, or that understanding justice is only valuable if it can be realized. The book does not offer a particular theory of justice, nor does it assert that justice is indeed unrealizable—only that it could be, and this possibility upsets common ways of proceeding in political thought. The book's author engages critically with important strands in traditional and contemporary political philosophy that assume a sound theory of justice has the overriding, defining task of contributing practical guidance toward greater social justice. Along the way, it counters several tempting perspectives, including the view that inquiry in political philosophy could have significant value only as a guide to practical political action, and that understanding true justice would necessarily have practical value, at least as an ideal arrangement to be approximated. Demonstrating that unrealistic standards of justice can be both sound and valuable to understand, the book stands as a trenchant defense of ideal theory in political philosophy.

scholarly journals Jak możliwa (do pomyślenia) jest dobrowolna niewola? O nowożytnych formach rządzenia, ideologii i spektaklu władzy

2020 ◽  
Vol 26 ◽  
pp. 101-110
Author(s):  
Mateusz Falkowski
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
Early Modern ◽  
The Other ◽  
The Political ◽  
Historical Evolution ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Etienne De La Boetie ◽  
The One ◽  
Voluntary Servitude

The article is devoted to the famous The Discourse of Voluntary Servitude by Étienne de La Boétie. The author considers the theoretical premises underlying the concept of “voluntary servitude”, juxtaposing them with two modern concepts of will developed by Descartes and Pascal. An important feature of La Boétie’s project is the political and therefore intersubjective – as opposed to the individualistic perspective of Descartes and Pascal – starting point. It is therefore situated against the background of, on the one hand, the historical evolution of early modern states (from feudal monarchies, through so-called Renaissance monarchies up to European absolutisms) and, on the other hand – of the political philosophy of Machiavelli and Hobbes.

Ideal, Nonideal, and Empirical Theories of Social Justice

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Naomi Zack
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Social Justice ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Direct Approach ◽  
Nonideal Theory ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Ideals of justice may do little toward the correction of injustice in real life. The influence of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice has led some philosophers of race to focus on “nonideal theory” as a way to bring conditions in unjust societies closer to conditions of justice described by ideal theory. However, a more direct approach to injustice may be needed to address unfair public policy and existing conditions for minorities in racist societies. Applicative justice describes the applications of principles of justice that are now “good enough” for whites to nonwhites (based on prior comparisons of how whites and nonwhites are treated).

A Case of Non-Ideal Guidance: Tackling Tax Competition

2017 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 141-171
Author(s):  
Alexandre Gajevic Sayegh
Keyword(s):  
Conceptual Framework ◽  
Tax Competition ◽  
Global Justice ◽  
Path Dependence ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Ideal World ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Guiding Principles ◽  
Principles Of Justice

AbstractIn the global justice literature, growing attention has been given to problems particular to a globalised economy such as tax competition. Political philosophers have started to reflect on how these problems intersect with theories of global justice. This paper explores the idea according to which action-guiding principles of justice can only be formulated at such intersections. This is the starting point from which I develop a ‘non-ideal theory’ of global justice. The methodology of this theory posits that principles of justice are formulated according to the practice they are intended to regulate. Individual practices provide insights about the formulation of principles, for the non-ideal circumstances that prevent the realisation of justice are only revealed through the interpretation of each practice. With regard to the content of principles, I reject the notion that non-ideal theory is applied ideal theory. I offer instead an overview of the main features of a conception of justice for a non-ideal world based on the ideas of compliance, fact-sensitivity, feasibility and path-dependence. The contribution of this paper is twofold: to provide the conceptual framework for an action-guiding non-ideal theory of global justice and to show why this theory is well-suited to address problems of a globalised economy, such as tax competition.

The Legal and Political Philosophy of Leonard Nelson

1941 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-453
Author(s):  
Levi D. Gresh
Keyword(s):  
Political Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
Legal Philosophy ◽  
Human History ◽  
Judicial Decision ◽  
Human Reason ◽  
Historical School ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The Moment ◽  
The One

The legal philosophy of Nelson is fundamentally a liberal doctrine. It is, on the one hand, opposed to the philosophy which places a supreme trust in human reason and which believes that man can sit down and codify a system of laws in which there will be no gaps; and, on the other, it is opposed to a belief in the necessary rationality of existing institutions in the onward sweep of human history, the idea which was so dear to the Historical School of jurisprudence.Nelson is a Naturrechtlehrer in the sense that he believes in the existence of metajuristic criteria of justice. That there are elemental principles of justice which are universal, and according to which laws are either just or unjust, decisions either right or wrong, Nelson believes cannot be denied. The moment we admit the injustice of a statute, or a judicial decision, we admit that we have used a criterion on which to base our opinion. The mistake we make, however, is to suppose that we can discover criteria, either empirically or logically.

Heat Transfer and Pressure Drop Through Nano-Fin Arrays in the Free-Molecular Flow Regime

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael James Martin
Keyword(s):  
Heat Transfer ◽  
Pressure Drop ◽  
Gas Flow ◽  
Ideal Gas ◽  
Molecular Flow ◽  
Ideal Gas Law ◽  
Transfer Equations ◽  
Flow Through ◽  
The One ◽  
The Ideal

Gas flow through arrays of rectangular nano-fins is modeled using the linearized free-molecular drag and heat transfer equations. These are combined with the one-dimensional equations for conservation of mass, momentum, and energy, and the ideal gas law, to find the governing equations for flow through the array. The results show that the pressure gradient, temperature, and local velocity of the gas are governed by coupled ordinary differential equations. The system of equations is solved for representative arrays of nano-fins to find the total heat transfer and pressure drop across a 1 cm chip.

The “Focusing Illusion” of Rawlsian Ideal Theory

John Rawls ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 61-72
Author(s):  
Colin Farrelly
Keyword(s):  
Distributive Justice ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Ideal Theory ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Original Theory ◽  
Equality Of Opportunities ◽  
Focusing Illusion

In A Theory of Justice John Rawls constructed and defended an abstract account of distributive justice founded upon hypothetical theoretical devices like the original position and veil of ignorance, the principle of maximin, and conceptual analyses of equality of opportunities. Such a methodology places a premium on abstract hypotheticals (vs. the actual history of injustice), and idealizations that involve making claims that are actually false, in order to simplify an argument. This chapter critically examines the idealizations employed by Rawls’s original theory of justice. It argues that Rawlsian ideal theory is inherently flawed because Rawls’s idealizations make our normative theorizing prone to the valuation distortions that arise in what psychologists call a “focusing illusion.”

Rawlsian Constructivism in Moral Theory

1987 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
David O. Brink
Keyword(s):  
John Rawls ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Decision Procedure ◽  
Reflective Equilibrium ◽  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Basic Structure ◽  
Original Position ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Political Theories ◽  
Principles Of Justice

Since his article, ‘Outline for a Decision Procedure in Ethics,’ John Rawls has advocated a coherentist moral epistemology according to which moral and political theories are justified on the basis of their coherence with our other beliefs, both moral and nonmoral (1951: 56, 61). A moral theory which is maximally coherent with our other beliefs is in a state which Rawls calls ‘reflective equilibrium’ (1971: 20). In A Theory of Justice Rawls advanced two principles of justice and claimed that they are in reflective equilibrium. He defended this claim by appeal to a hypothetical contract; he argued that parties in a position satisfying certain informational and motivational criteria, which he called ‘the original position,’ would choose the following two principles of justice to govern the basic structure of their society.

Cohen’s community

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-50
Author(s):  
Louis-Philippe Hodgson
Keyword(s):  
Significant Role ◽  
Social Relations ◽  
The Other ◽  
International Level ◽  
Liberal State ◽  
Full Strength ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
The One ◽  
Independent Work ◽  
Domestic Level

Does the kind of socialist ideal articulated by G. A. Cohen in Why Not Socialism? add anything substantial to the Rawlsian conception of justice? Is it an ideal that Rawlsians should want to take on board, or is it ultimately foreign to their outlook? I defend a mixed answer to these questions. On the one hand, we shouldn’t underestimate the extent to which Rawls's theory already addresses the concerns that motivate Cohen’s appeal to the socialist ideal. Within the bounds of a society living up to Rawls’s two principles of justice, I maintain, there would be little room left for an ideal of social relations to do any independent work. On the other hand, Cohen’s ideal may still have an important role to play within Rawlsian theory – not within the confines of a given society but on the international stage, beyond the liberal state as we know it. This asymmetry between the domestic and the international case stems from the fact that Rawls's principles of justice apply in full strength only at the domestic level. Because the principles of justice that hold at the international level are less demanding, I contend, they leave space for the socialist ideal to play a significant role.

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