‘That Horrid Electorate’ or ‘Ma Patrie germanique’? George III, Hanover, and the Fürstenbund of 1785

1977 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 311-344 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. C. W. Blanning

The League of Princes (Fürstenbund) was founded on 23 July 1785, when the representatives of Prussia, Hanover and Saxony signed at Berlin a main treaty and several secret articles relating to the domestic affairs of the Holy Roman Empire. During the following months a number of other German princes joined the League, notably the elector of Mainz, the landgrave of Hessen-Kassel, the margrave of Baden and the dukes of Brunswick, Saxony-Gotha and Saxony-Weimar.s Its general objective was the preservation of the imperial status quo. More specifically, it was aimed at the Emperor Joseph II and the innumerable schemes of expansion popularly attributed to him, not always without justification. More specifically still, the League was designed to prevent any renewal of Joseph's most cherished ambition - the exchange of the Habsburg possessions in the Netherlands (which embraced the larger part of present-day Belgium) for the Electorate of Bavaria. From the European perspective, the League was soon overshadowed by the reopening of the Eastern Question in 1787, eclipsed by the formation of the Triple Alliance in 1788 and finally extinguished by the Austro-Prussian rapprochement in 1792, but during 1785–6 it assumed great importance. Not the least affected was Great Britain, whose king - albeit in his capacity as elector of Hanover - was a founder-member of the League and one of its most enthusiastic protagonists. Despite the official British view - repeated ad nauseam to sceptical foreign diplomats - that Georg Kurfürst von Hannover and George III King of England were two entirely separate beings and that consequently the actions of the former could have not the least effect on the latter's domains, British policy could not help but be influenced.

Author(s):  
Friedrich Beiderbeck

This chapter examines Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s political vision for Europe, beginning with his views on the Holy Roman Empire and the Peace of Westphalia. It considers how Leibniz viewed Germany’s political and cultural structures and his support for the Reich, along with his thoughts on order, security, and law. It also discusses Leibniz’s modern notion of state and his ideas of territorial power, diplomacy, and international politics; his views on France’s foreign policy under Louis XIV and the War of Spanish Succession (1701–1713/14); and his dispute with Abbé de Saint Pierre over peace and balance of power in Europe. Finally, the chapter looks at Leibniz’s pronouncements on denominational issues and church politics, particularly the presence of Protestants and Catholics in Germany, and his arguments with regards to the House of Hanover and the role played by Great Britain in power politics as a counterbalance to French hegemony.


1916 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 51-76
Author(s):  
G. P. Gooch

During the years immediately preceding the French Revolution Germany presented a curious spectacle of political decrepitude and intellectual rejuvenescence. The Holy Roman Empire, of which Voltaire caustically remarked that it was neither holy nor Roman nor an Empire, was afflicted with creeping paralysis. Its wheels continued to revolve; but the machinery was rusty and the output was small. ‘No Curtius,’ remarked Justus Möser, ‘leaps into the abyss for the preservation of the Imperial system.’ The prolonged duel between Frederick the Great and Maria Theresa destroyed whatever shadowy sentiment of unity had survived the wars of religion, and the short but stormy reign of Joseph II revealed to the world that the Imperial dignity had sunk into the tool and plaything of the house of Hapsburg. The Fürstenbund formally registered the emergence of a rival claimant for the hegemony of central Europe. But the springtime of Prussian greatness was merely the reflection of her ruler's dazzling personality. Mirabeau, who knew them both, described Frederick as all mind and his nephew all body. His death left Germany without a leader or a hero. Among the countless rulers who owed a nominal allegiance to the Emperor a few men of capacity and conscience, such as Ferdinand of Brunswick, Karl August of Weimar and Karl Friedrich of Baden, could be found; but the general level of character and intellect was low, and the scandals of courts and courtiers provoked disgust and indignation. The most docile people in Europe watched with impotent despair the orgies of the last Elector of Bavaria, the capricious tyranny of Karl Eugen of Württemberg, the insanity of Duke Karl of Zweibrücken, and the Byzantine decadence of the ecclesiastical Electors on the Rhine. On the eve of the Revolution the larger part of Germany was poor, ignorant, ill-governed and discontented.


Author(s):  
Mamuka Natsvaladze

Studying the external policy of the king Erekle II is a topical issue for the modern historiography. The information maintained in the archives of various European cities, namely of Vienna, Vatican and Venice, convey to us the fact that while exercising pragmatic attitude toward relations with the European countries the King of Kartli and Kakheti considered the interests of both his own country and of those European countries as well. Over the years 1781-82 Erekle II sends his ambassadors to Europe twice: first he sends a Capuchin monk Domenique who dies in Constantinople in uncertain circumstances not having reached the destination; after him Erekle II sends another Capuchin Mauro the Veronese who also dies for unknown reasons while still on his way. It is a very important fact that the letters sent by the King Erekle, unlike the ambassadors, reach their destination which is the Emperor’s Court in Austria.The present article shows the international political background that the king Erekle II had at that time and that he attempted to use for the interests of his country.The plan of dividing Europe anew, officially developed by the relevant imperial authorities of Saint Petersburg and Vienna, aimed at neutralizing the Ottoman Empire and dividing its territories. According to the Greek Project, it was supposed to resurrect the Byzantine Empire that would be formally independent from Russia but factually acting as a marionette with the Romanov dynasty ruling in it and build Dacia Kingdom as a buffer between the Ottoman and the Austrian Empires.This project was topical for Erekle II who was trying to get involved in the international political processes to the maximum level as the king of a sovereign and independent country, as in the result of implementation of the Greek Project Georgia would obtain an environment of Christian countries instead of the previous encirclement by Muslim countries. Thus, Georgia would find herself in an absolutely different qualitative dimension that had been a sacred dream of the Georgian Kings at all times. This was why the Greek Plan held such a great importance for Erekle II. This international project was made secret by the empress Catherine the Great and Joseph II, therefore, the official pragmatic reason that Erekle II referred to when sending ambassadors to Austria which was obtaining financial support for two regiments was merely a mask behind which in reality the ambassadorial mission served the purpose of active involvement and participation in the implementation of the Greek Project. The Austrian Emperor’s Court, on its part, was going to use this intension of the Georgian king for its own pragmatic goals which implied strengthening of the Holy Roman Empire that had been actually made fictitious by that time. The widely acknowledged and reputed international level diplomats of the Austrian Empire Kaunitz and Kobenzl were involved in the process.


Author(s):  
Caleb Karges

The War of the Spanish Succession was a large military conflict that encompassed most of western and central Europe spawning additional fighting in the Americas and the world’s oceans. Hostilities began with the invasion of Lombardy by imperial forces in 1701 and were concluded be the treaties of Utrecht (1713), Rastatt, and Baden (1714). The trigger for the war was the long-anticipated death of the childless King Charles II of Spain in 1700 and his will, which ignored several partition treaties signed by other powers and passed the entirety of the Spanish monarchy to Louis XIV of France’s grandson, Philip, Duke of Anjou (Philip V of Spain). The Austrian Habsburgs under Emperor Leopold I contested the will on the behalf of his second son the Archduke Charles (Charles VI of the Holy Roman Empire). With the European balance of power jeopardized by the prospect of a Bourbon succession in Spain, the Kingdom of England (Great Britain after 1707) and the United Provinces joined the Holy Roman Emperor in forming the Grand Alliance in 1702. The Grand Alliance, heretofore referred to as the Allies, expanded to consist ultimately of the emperor of and the states of the Holy Roman Empire (with a few notable exceptions), Great Britain, the United Provinces, Portugal, and the Duchy of Savoy-Piedmont. The pro-Bourbon alliance opposing the Grand Alliance consisted of France, Spain, the Electorate of Bavaria, and the Archbishopric of Cologne. The main military operations largely occurred along the frontiers of France and in the Spanish possessions in Europe such as the Spanish Netherlands, Italy, and the Iberian Peninsula. Of notable exception were the Bavarian campaigns in 1703 and 1704. Throughout the war, each side tried to exploit real and potential revolts/insurgencies in the other’s territory. The Allies maintained a large military presence in Catalonia and set up a rival court in Barcelona under the Archduke Charles as “Charles III of Spain.” The land war in Europe was characterized by the military victories of the Allied commanders, the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene of Savoy in Flanders, Germany, and Italy. However, the Bourbons maintained their supremacy in Spain itself. As the war protracted, financial and political exhaustion beset all sides. Despite sustained losses bringing France to the brink of collapse, Louis XIV continued to resist until Allied resolve softened with the events of 1710 and 1711 (the Tory victory in the British elections, the battle of Brihuega, and the death of Emperor Joseph I). The war ended with the signing of the treaties of Utrecht, Rastatt, and Baden (collectively known as the Peace of Utrecht) in 1713 and 1714. The British gained significant colonial possessions and concessions from the Bourbon powers as well as the territories of Gibraltar and Minorca. The Dutch received a reinforced barrier in the Low Countries. The Austrians received Spain’s possessions in Italy and the Low Countries. Philip V retained Spain and its colonial possessions.


2012 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
pp. 141-164 ◽  
Author(s):  
Madalina-Valeria Veres

After touring Transylvania in 1773, Joseph II, emperor of the Holy Roman Empire and co-regent of the Habsburg monarchy, wrote to Empress Maria Theresa complaining about the state of the province's economy and its administrative corruption. Such problems required urgent reform of the sort that could be carried out only by a strong, centralized government acting in the spirit of Enlightened Absolutism. However, success in these endeavors required something more. In Joseph II's words: “We have to remember that the best intentions fail often and the lack of knowledge of local realities makes such a real difference in governance, that what is often considered the best and wisest decisions, cannot be applied locally efficiently; the total ignorance of Your Majesty's advisers at the court and the Transylvanian Chancellery is a real hindrance and harm for the administration.”


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