The Australian High Court's Use of the Western Sahara Case in Mabo

1996 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 923-927
Author(s):  
Shirley Scott

Recent cases before the High Court of Australia have raised the question as to the appropriate degree to which international law should influence Australian law and politics.1 Crucial to the reasoning in the leading judgment of the landmark 1992 Mabo case,2 by which the Australian judiciary recognised for the first time a native title to land, was the finding that Australia had not been terra nullius at the time of colonisation. The leading judgment accepted the categorisation of Australia as a settled colony which had been established by the Privy Council in Cooper v. Stuart.3 In this judgment Lord Watson had held that Australia, as a “settled” colony, had received transplanted British law “except where explicitly changed or considered irrelevant”.4 This had given rise to the assumption, confirmed by Milurrpum v. Nabalco Ltd (the Gove Land Rights case of 1971) that, since no legal rights to land of indigenous people existed in British law and none had been explicitly acknowledged in relation to Australia, no basis existed for their later recognition.5 The leading judgment in Mabo went on to declare, however, that the notion that British law had been transplanted into a settled colony had been based on the assumption that the “indigenous people of a settled colony were … without laws, without a sovereign and primitive in their social organisation”.6 Since “the facts as we know them today” do not “fit this theory” the leading judgment asserted there to be “no warrant for applying in these times rules of the English common law which were a product of that theory”.7

2017 ◽  
Vol 76 (01) ◽  
pp. 7-11
Author(s):  
Beatrice Krebs

IN Miller v The Queen [2016] HCA 30, the High Court of Australia (HCA) declined to follow the Privy Council and UK Supreme Court (UKSC) in abolishing the doctrine of extended joint criminal enterprise, as PAL is known in South Australia. Under the Australian doctrine, liability for murder is imposed where an individual “is a party to an agreement to commit a crime and foresees that death or really serious bodily injury might be occasioned by a co-venturer acting with murderous intention and he or she, with that awareness, continues to participate in the agreed criminal enterprise” (at [1]). This reflects the very position that was abandoned in Jogee [2016] UKSC 8; [2016] 2 W.L.R. 681 Ruddock v The Queen UKPC 7 as a “wrong turn” of the English common law.


2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Fern�ndez Segado

Los primeros esbozos de la judicial review en Norteam�rica han de situarse en el per�odo colonial. En esa etapa el dictum de Coke en el Bonham�s case se iba a convertir en la fuente m�s importante de la revisi�n judicial de la legislaci�n. La introducci�n de la revisi�n judicial presupon�a la idea de la existencia de un Derecho fundamental, esto es, un Derecho superior que los estatutos de las asambleas legislativas coloniales hab�an de respetar. En el siglo XVIII los colonos iban a encontrar unos s�lidos puntos de apoyo para su idea acerca de la existencia de un Derecho fundamental en esas impresionantes construcciones doctrinales de la Ilustraci�n que son los tratados sistem�ticos sobre el Derecho natural e internacional. Las Cartas coloniales, otorgadas por el Rey, se consideraron por los tribunales vinculantes respecto a las Legislaturas coloniales, aplic�ndose como Derecho superior. En el caso Giddings v. Brown (1657) el dictum de Coke recibi� por primera vez aplicaci�n pr�ctica al otro lado del Atl�ntico. En la decisi�n de este caso el Juez Symonds escrib�a �que donde una ley es contraria a un Derecho fundamental, es nula�. Tambi�n el Privy Council, en el ejercicio de su jurisdicci�n de apelaci�n respecto de los tribunales coloniales, iba a llevar a cabo una revisi�n judicial de la legislaci�n colonial. Su anulaci�n judicial de los estatutos coloniales se ha equiparado a la revisi�n judicial de la legislaci�n. De hecho, en el caso Winthrop v. Lechmere (1727), el Privy Council declar� la nulidad de una ley de Connecticut de 1699, la Ley para la soluci�n de las propiedades intestadas, declar�ndola nula y sin valor a causa de que era �contraria a las leyes de Inglaterra en cuanto que convert�a tierras heredadas en distribuibles como propiedades personales y esto no estaba autorizado por la Carta de la Colonia�. En resumen, la etapa colonial, incluso bastante antes de James Otis y del Writs Assistance Case, nos ofrece algunos ejemplos de aplicaci�n de la doctrina de la revisi�n judicial de la legislaci�n y, sobre todo, nos revela que tal doctrina era muy bien conocida y admitida en amplio sectores del mundo jur�dico colonial. Palabras clave: Cartas coloniales, Constituci�n antigua; Derecho fundamental; Dictum de Coke; Judicial review; Legislaci�n colonial; Privy Council; Tribunales coloniales. ABSTRACT The first sketchs of the judicial review have to place in the colonial period. In this age, the Coke�s dictum in the Bonham�s case became the most important single source of the notion of judicial review. The introduction of the judicial review presupposed the idea of a fundamental law, that is, a superior law that the colonial laws had to respect. In the 18th century the colonists should find firm bases for his idea about the existence of a fundamental law in those impressive doctrinal constructions of the Enlightenment, the systematic treaties on natural and international law. The colonial Charters granted for the King were considered by courts binding for the legislatures and they were applied as a higher law. In the Giddings v. Brown case (1657), for the first time, the Coke�s dictum received practical application in the other side of the Atlantic. In the ruling of this case the Judge Symonds wrote �that where a law is repugnant to fundamental law, it is void�. Likewise, the Privy Council, in the practice of its appeal�s jurisdiction in relation to colonial courts, carried out a judicial review of the colonial legislation. Its judicial annulment of the statutes has been compared to the function of judicial review. In fact, in the Winthrop v. Lechmere case (1727), the Privy Council declared that an Act of Connecticut, the Act for the Settlement of Intestates Estates (1699) was null and void because it was �contrary to the laws of England, in regard it makes lands of inheritance distributables as personal estates, and it is not warranted by the Charter of that Colony�. In short, the colonial epoch, even long before of James Otis and the Writs of Assistance Case, offers us some examples of the application of the judicial review of legislation doctrine and, above all, it reveals us that a such doctrine was very well knew and acknowledged in considerable sectors of the legal colonial world. Key words: Ancient constitution; Coke�s dictum; Colonial courts; Colonial legislation; Charters; Fundamental law; Judicial review; Privy Council.


2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 403-423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Tully

AbstractThe judgment of the High Court of Australia in R v. Tang is a significant contribution to jurisprudence on the definition of slavery under international law. This case considered whether the intention of the perpetrator was a necessary element for the prosecution of that offence under Australian law. The High Court also preserved the conceptual integrity of slavery, evaluated the decisions in Kunarac and Siliadin, identified the powers attaching to the right of ownership as that expression appears in the 1926 and 1956 Slavery Conventions and employed a human rights orientation to contemporary manifestations of slavery. Although considerable practical challenges remain for enforcing the prohibition against slavery in Australia, R v. Tang marks a significant precedent likely to influence future international jurisprudence on the topic.


2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-323
Author(s):  
Rayner Thwaites ◽  
Helen Irving

In 2017, in Re Canavan, the High Court of Australia found five sitting Members of the Commonwealth Parliament to be citizens of a ‘foreign power’ and thus ineligible, under s 44(i) of the Constitution, to hold their seats. In 2018, in Re Gallagher, the High Court found that a Senator who had attempted unsuccessfully to renounce her British citizenship prior to her Senate candidature was similarly ineligible. In this article, we argue that the conclusion in Re Canavan was incorrect: that both the Court’s reasoning about the purpose of s 44(i)—to avoid ‘split allegiance’—and its methodology for determining foreign citizenship were inconsistent in their own right and also against its reasoning in Re Gallagher. We challenge the Court’s conflation of citizenship and allegiance with obedience to a state. We examine the rules of international law for identifying a person’s citizenship, as well as exceptions to these rules, including what came to be known as the ‘constitutional imperative’, which the Court held will exempt a foreign citizen from s 44(i) disqualification under certain circumstances. We conclude that the Court, in seeking to avoid ‘uncertainty and instability’ in its interpretation of s 44(i), did the opposite. Had it looked, instead, to the relevant foreign state for an authoritative determination of a person’s citizenship, confusion and uncertainty surrounding s 44(i) could have been avoided, and a democratic understanding of Australian citizenship could have been prioritised.


2019 ◽  
Vol 47 (4) ◽  
pp. 551-582
Author(s):  
Evelyn Douek

In 2015, a majority of the High Court of Australia incorporated structured proportionality testing into Australian constitutional law for the first time, but the test’s suitability for Australian law has been contested ever since. The recent case of Clubb is an ambivalent result for the test’s advocates: while structured proportionality testing now seems to have the support of a solid majority of current members of the High Court, the dissentients seem as strongly opposed as ever and continue to be vocal about the test’s unsuitability for Australian law. This article surveys the three main criticisms levelled against structured proportionality in Australia: that it is too indeterminate, that it involves judges transgressing the separation of powers, and that it is inappropriate in the unique context of the implied freedom of political communication (‘the freedom’). There are reasons why these critiques of structured proportionality carry particular weight and resonance in Australia’s constitutional culture, marked as it is by legalism and deference to the legislature. But these reasons are also why adoption of structured proportionality is consistent with Australia’s constitutional commitments and jurisprudence. The question of whether structured proportionality is beneficial needs to start with the question of ‘ compared to what?’ Many of the criticisms levelled against structured proportionality apply all the more forcefully against the prior test of whether the legislative measure is ‘appropriate and adapted’ to serve a legitimate end. And the inherent commitments of proportionality make it better suited to Australian law than the increasingly proposed alternative of a categorical approach. The particular method of judicial reasoning in cases concerning the freedom might seem like a highly abstract and theoretical question, especially when the justices applying differing methods largely agree on the merits in the relevant cases. But this continuing uncertainty and divergence on the Court has tangible costs. The project of making reasoning more transparent and constrained is significantly undermined by uncertainty as to whether and how the test will be applied at all. There are also second-order effects in the form of institutional costs. In the context of the freedom, where judicial review has long been controversial, the division of the Court into pro- and anti-structured proportionality factions has particularly high costs to institutional integrity and legitimacy. At some point there will be a question of whether the damage of warring judgments over method outweighs the damage done by choosing even the ‘worst’ of the available options. This article argues that structured proportionality is not that ‘worst’ option.


1999 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  

AbstractAn earlier article addressed recent developments in Australia concerning indigen-ous land rights and outlined political and legal aspects of the debate surrounding that. This is a more specifically comparative study that seeks to compare the legal aspects of the land rights of Australian indigenous people with the legal aspects of the land rights of the Sami people in Scandinavia. The paper recognises from the outset that these two parts of the world possess different legal histories, but argues that in the modern international context, comparisons can be drawn with respect to indigenous human rights. Further, the paper contends that in both these societies, there have been advances and retreats and that only full governmental commitment to the principles of international law will ensure that the human rights of the respective indigenous people advance.In looking at comparative indigenous rights, or the failure to achieve rights, the focus is on property, including consideration of inclusion/exclusion of native people as citizens, the effects of colonization and relative access to goods and services, language recognition, rights of cultural development and protection of heritage, as well as practical implications in controlling other forms of development and fostering sustainable growth. We broaden the consideration of indigenous human rights to include matters of compensation and costs. Our overall contention is that it remains one of the principal challenges for both Australian and Scandinavian law to identify and translate co-existence and human rights for the indigenous people of those nations. In framing any such legal measures, governments will have to confront wider political issues of tolerance, sovereignty and citizenship. The dilemma for Australian Aboriginals is that the chance to remain Aboriginal may have to involve an appeal to the prin-ciples of international law whereas in Scandinavia the recognition of Sami reindeer herding has generally failed to foster broader rights to land and natural resources although there are some signs that this is emerging in Norway.


1978 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 427-456
Author(s):  
Robert S. Geddes

During 1978, the High Court of Australia and the New South Wales Court of Appeal handed down decisions which announce a departure from the longstanding rule that decisions of the Privy Council bind all Australian Courts. In this article, Mr Geddes analyses these decisions and considers their future impact on the authority of Privy Council decisions in the various courts which make up the Australian judicial hierarchy.


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