scholarly journals UN PRECEDENTE REMOTO DE LA JUDICIAL REVIEW: EL CONTROL JUDICIAL DE LA LEGISLACI�N DE LAS COLONIAS AMERICANAS

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Francisco Fern�ndez Segado

Los primeros esbozos de la judicial review en Norteam�rica han de situarse en el per�odo colonial. En esa etapa el dictum de Coke en el Bonham�s case se iba a convertir en la fuente m�s importante de la revisi�n judicial de la legislaci�n. La introducci�n de la revisi�n judicial presupon�a la idea de la existencia de un Derecho fundamental, esto es, un Derecho superior que los estatutos de las asambleas legislativas coloniales hab�an de respetar. En el siglo XVIII los colonos iban a encontrar unos s�lidos puntos de apoyo para su idea acerca de la existencia de un Derecho fundamental en esas impresionantes construcciones doctrinales de la Ilustraci�n que son los tratados sistem�ticos sobre el Derecho natural e internacional. Las Cartas coloniales, otorgadas por el Rey, se consideraron por los tribunales vinculantes respecto a las Legislaturas coloniales, aplic�ndose como Derecho superior. En el caso Giddings v. Brown (1657) el dictum de Coke recibi� por primera vez aplicaci�n pr�ctica al otro lado del Atl�ntico. En la decisi�n de este caso el Juez Symonds escrib�a �que donde una ley es contraria a un Derecho fundamental, es nula�. Tambi�n el Privy Council, en el ejercicio de su jurisdicci�n de apelaci�n respecto de los tribunales coloniales, iba a llevar a cabo una revisi�n judicial de la legislaci�n colonial. Su anulaci�n judicial de los estatutos coloniales se ha equiparado a la revisi�n judicial de la legislaci�n. De hecho, en el caso Winthrop v. Lechmere (1727), el Privy Council declar� la nulidad de una ley de Connecticut de 1699, la Ley para la soluci�n de las propiedades intestadas, declar�ndola nula y sin valor a causa de que era �contraria a las leyes de Inglaterra en cuanto que convert�a tierras heredadas en distribuibles como propiedades personales y esto no estaba autorizado por la Carta de la Colonia�. En resumen, la etapa colonial, incluso bastante antes de James Otis y del Writs Assistance Case, nos ofrece algunos ejemplos de aplicaci�n de la doctrina de la revisi�n judicial de la legislaci�n y, sobre todo, nos revela que tal doctrina era muy bien conocida y admitida en amplio sectores del mundo jur�dico colonial. Palabras clave: Cartas coloniales, Constituci�n antigua; Derecho fundamental; Dictum de Coke; Judicial review; Legislaci�n colonial; Privy Council; Tribunales coloniales. ABSTRACT The first sketchs of the judicial review have to place in the colonial period. In this age, the Coke�s dictum in the Bonham�s case became the most important single source of the notion of judicial review. The introduction of the judicial review presupposed the idea of a fundamental law, that is, a superior law that the colonial laws had to respect. In the 18th century the colonists should find firm bases for his idea about the existence of a fundamental law in those impressive doctrinal constructions of the Enlightenment, the systematic treaties on natural and international law. The colonial Charters granted for the King were considered by courts binding for the legislatures and they were applied as a higher law. In the Giddings v. Brown case (1657), for the first time, the Coke�s dictum received practical application in the other side of the Atlantic. In the ruling of this case the Judge Symonds wrote �that where a law is repugnant to fundamental law, it is void�. Likewise, the Privy Council, in the practice of its appeal�s jurisdiction in relation to colonial courts, carried out a judicial review of the colonial legislation. Its judicial annulment of the statutes has been compared to the function of judicial review. In fact, in the Winthrop v. Lechmere case (1727), the Privy Council declared that an Act of Connecticut, the Act for the Settlement of Intestates Estates (1699) was null and void because it was �contrary to the laws of England, in regard it makes lands of inheritance distributables as personal estates, and it is not warranted by the Charter of that Colony�. In short, the colonial epoch, even long before of James Otis and the Writs of Assistance Case, offers us some examples of the application of the judicial review of legislation doctrine and, above all, it reveals us that a such doctrine was very well knew and acknowledged in considerable sectors of the legal colonial world. Key words: Ancient constitution; Coke�s dictum; Colonial courts; Colonial legislation; Charters; Fundamental law; Judicial review; Privy Council.

2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (102) ◽  
pp. 79 ◽  
Author(s):  
José María Lafuente Balle

Resumen:El art. 155 de la Constitución regula la coerción federal (federal coercion) con un texto inspirado en el art. 37 de la Ley Fundamental de Bonn, si bien presenta alguna importante diferencia, particularmente por la distinta configuración electoral del Senado y el Bundesrat. Su redacción es un ejemplo característico de la ambigüedad propia de los preceptos constitucionales; y su interpretación padece de que carece de desarrollo legislativo y precedentes históricos. Con su Resolución de 27 de octubre de 2017, el Senado ha aplicado por vez primera el art. 155 por entender que la Generalitat había incurrido en desobediencia a la Constitución. La autorización al Gobierno central conllevó el cese del Gobierno de Cataluña y la posterior disolución del Parlamento autonómico. Dos han sido los recursos de inconstitucionalidad instados, respectivamente, por el grupo parlamentario de Unidos-Podemos y por la Diputación Permanente del Parlamento de Cataluña. En este trabajo se aborda su análisis jurídico y se arriesga el vaticinio de Sentencia que habrá de dictar el Tribunal Constitucional.Summary:1. Introduction: A highly political, ambiguous and vague rule; 2. Section 155 and regional tenseness. Examples of Comparative Law; 3. The unavoidable reference to the federal coercion in Germany. Section 155 and its comparison with section 37 of the Fundamental Law of Bonn; 4. The STGC of 5th of March, 1936; 5. The state coercion of section 155; 6. The former formal procedures to the state coercion of section 155; 7. The supposed facts in which section 155 is applicable; 8. The procedure of the state coercion; 9. The measures covered by section 155; 10. The exceptional political and legal application of section 155; 11. The injuction of the Spanish Government and the Order of the Spanish Senate of 27th of October, 2017; 12. The application of the state coercion of section 155 in Catalonia; 13. The procedural question of the judicial review of the Order of the Senate; 14. The motion filed by the political party UNIDOS-PODEMOS claiming that the application of section 155 is against the Spanish Constitution; 15. The Opinion 14/2017 of the Catalan Consell de Garanties Estatutarias. The motion filed by the Catalan Parliament for judicial review against the Order of the Spanish Senate; 16. The material question: Does the bloque de constitucionalidad entails a limit before section 155?Abstract:Section 155 of the Spanish Constitution regulates federal coercion by means of a text inspired in section 37 of the Fundamental Law of Bonn, although the former presents some important differences, especially due to the different electoral configuration of the Spanish Senate and the Bundesrat. The wording of section 155 is a good example of the characteristic ambiguity of constitutional texts. Its interpretation suffers from a lack of legislative development and former precedents. By means of the Order of 27th of October, 2017, the Spanish Senate has applied for the first time section 155, understanding that the Catalan Generalitat had violated the Constitution. The authorization given to the Spanish Government entailed the dismissal of the Autonomous Government of Catalonia and the dissolution of the Autonomous Parliament. Two motions have been filed,one by the parliamentary group Unidos-Podemos, and another by the DiputaciónPermanente of the Parliament of Catalonia. This paper tackles the legal analysis of section 155, and risks predicting the future ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court.


Author(s):  
Virginia Zanón

Resumen: El presente artículo pretende mostrar los primeros pasos de La Casa de las Luces, un proyecto cultural que nace con el objetivo de poner en valor el rico patrimonio cultural y natural del pueblo de Titaguas y su entorno. El impulso a la iniciativa por parte del Ayuntamiento busca enriquecer la vida cultural del pueblo, así como revitalizar un turismo de calidad que redunde en el desarrollo y bienestar de toda la comarca de La Serranía. La sede que ha de albergar el centro –la tradicionalmente conocida como “Casa del Tío Florencio”- es una construcción de mediados del siglo XVIII, de gran valor histórico y etnológico. El edificio se encuentra en pleno proceso de rehabilitación, y con el avance del proyecto ve garantizada su conservación y apertura al público. El discurso de su contenido otorgará un especial protagonismo a Simón de Rojas Clemente (1777-1827), personaje clave de la Ilustración y el primer liberalismo valencianos, y célebre vecino titagüeño. A través de la biografía del botánico se revisarán tanto los valores universales de la Ilustración como la cultura local y la riqueza natural que plasmó en sus escritos, así como los avatares históricos y políticos de su tiempo, de los que fue testigo de excepción. En clave de experiencia, mostramos aquí las particularidades del proyecto, los objetivos que persigue su diseño y las ventajas e inconvenientes que surgen durante el establecimiento de un centro de nueva creación como este.  Palabras clave: Simón de Rojas Clemente, Titaguas, La Casa de las Luces, patrimonio, rural, cultura.  Abstract: This paper aims to summarize the first steps of “La Casa de las Luces” (The House of Lights), a cultural project intended to emphasize the rich heritage, both cultural and natural, of Titaguas and its environment. The impulse of this initiative by the town hall, is to enrich the cultural life of the village, while also revitalizing a quality tourism that would benefit the development and welfare of the region of La Serranía. The headquarters of the center –traditionally known as “Casa del Tío Florencio” – is a  construction from the mid-18th century, of great historical and ethnological value. The building is currently in the process of rehabilitation, and this project guarantees its conservation and opening to the public. The information in its interior will give a special role to Simón de Rojas Clemente (1777-1827), a key figure of the Enlightenment and first Liberalism in Valencia, and notorious citizen of Titaguas. Through the biography of this remarkable botanist, the universal values of the Enlightenment and the local culture and natural wealth described in his works will be revisited, along with the historical and political events of his time, of which he was an exceptional witness. In terms of experience, we show here the peculiarities of the project, the objectives of its design and the advantages and disadvantages that arise during the establishment of a newly created center like this.  Keywords: Simón de Rojas Clemente, Titaguas, La Casa de las Luces, heritage, rural, culture.


Author(s):  
Elena Zheltova

The first flight of a hot-air balloon was demonstrated in France in 1783. On the wave of the Enlightenment, French society saw this flight as a great and promising scientific invention. However, in 18th century Russia’s culture, the hot-air balloon ascents were only regarded as entertainment. Seeing no practical benefit in hot-air balloons, and apprehensive of the fires they could cause, neither Catherine the Great nor Paul I encouraged any interest in aerostation. After Alexander I became Emperor of Russia (1801), the attitude towards hot-air balloon flights in Russia began to change. In this paper we show that it was the famous Russian historian and author Nikolai Mikhailovich Karamzin who was the first to introduce the educated part of Russian society to how aerostation was seen in Europe, to the experience and scientific knowledge gained as a result of such flights. This significant fact has eluded both the historians and Karamzin’s biographers. Karamzin’s publications concerned with balloon flights are reviewed in this article for the first time, and analyzed in the context of the history of aerostation, which allows to better understand Karamzin’s contribution to changes in the attitude of Russian society towards hot-air ballooning. It is demonstrated, that Karamzin’s thoughts, implicitly reflected in his choice of texts about hot-air balloon flights, which Karamzin adapted, translated, and published in his famous journal Vestnik Evropy (Herald of Europe), were in line with the overall shift in the attitude towards aerostation in Russia during the first years of the reign of Alexander I.


2005 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 711-715 ◽  
Author(s):  
THOMAS MERTENS

In his well-written and well-argued paper ‘International Toleration: Rawlsian versus Cosmopolitan’, Kok-Chor Tan raises the important question as to where the limits of toleration are to be drawn. This is an important issue not only from the perspective of international law, but also for any domestic society. Toleration is never an automatic element or quality of any society, but has to be defended against the ever present danger of intolerance and repression. This is especially the case in the post-9/II era with regard to Islam, as it is not always easy to separate serious analysis of this religion from outright prejudices against its believers. With regard to Islamic minorities, the present attitude of some ‘Western’ majorities does not always reflect an attitude of respect, although this is not often admitted. It is not argued that Islamic minorities and other immigrants should adapt to the culture of the majorities because minorities have to give in to majorities on the basis of democracy; instead, it is claimed that Western majorities live in accordance with universal values. As Western societies have incorporated universal values formulated for the first time in the age of Enlightenment, they can rightly require from immigrants and minorities that they give up part of their values and identities without any real loss on their side. In forcing immigrants to adapt to Western values, majorities are merely liberating them from outdated particularistic codes and worldviews, thus enabling them to be free in accordance with truly universal values. This, obviously, is a peculiar way of understanding the Enlightenment, not with Kant as a perpetual challenge (‘we do not live in an enlightened age, but in an age of enlightenment’), but as something that is achieved and stably embodied in ‘our’ Western societies. Immigrants and minority members can reasonably be asked to identify with such societies. Although such a demand to assimilate might at first glance be seen as testifying to intolerance, in reality this is not the case. Why should we allow others to live in error? In the face of truth, toleration is a superfluous virtue. It goes almost without saying that this view, which is deemed by some as Enlightenment fundamentalism, contradicts the spirit with which Locke and Spinoza in the seventeenth century proclaimed the superior value of tolerance. They argued that all religions claim for themselves to be the one and only true religion and that the best attitude among the contenders of different beliefs would be one of tolerance: nobody can prove convincingly to the other side of the religious divide the truth of his own religion and the falseness of all other religions; and since ‘no man can conform his faith to the dictates of another (since) all the life and the power of true religion consists in the inward and full persuasion of the mind’ (Locke), the use of earthly powers is inappropriate and unjust.


1996 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 923-927
Author(s):  
Shirley Scott

Recent cases before the High Court of Australia have raised the question as to the appropriate degree to which international law should influence Australian law and politics.1 Crucial to the reasoning in the leading judgment of the landmark 1992 Mabo case,2 by which the Australian judiciary recognised for the first time a native title to land, was the finding that Australia had not been terra nullius at the time of colonisation. The leading judgment accepted the categorisation of Australia as a settled colony which had been established by the Privy Council in Cooper v. Stuart.3 In this judgment Lord Watson had held that Australia, as a “settled” colony, had received transplanted British law “except where explicitly changed or considered irrelevant”.4 This had given rise to the assumption, confirmed by Milurrpum v. Nabalco Ltd (the Gove Land Rights case of 1971) that, since no legal rights to land of indigenous people existed in British law and none had been explicitly acknowledged in relation to Australia, no basis existed for their later recognition.5 The leading judgment in Mabo went on to declare, however, that the notion that British law had been transplanted into a settled colony had been based on the assumption that the “indigenous people of a settled colony were … without laws, without a sovereign and primitive in their social organisation”.6 Since “the facts as we know them today” do not “fit this theory” the leading judgment asserted there to be “no warrant for applying in these times rules of the English common law which were a product of that theory”.7


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (103) ◽  
pp. 77
Author(s):  
José María Lafuente Balle

Resumen:El art. 155 de la Constitución regula la coerción federal (federal coercion) con un texto inspirado en el art. 37 de la Ley Fundamental de Bonn, si bien presenta alguna importante diferencia, particularmente por la distinta configuración electoral del Senado y el Bundesrat. Su redacción es un ejemplo característico de la ambigüedad propia de los preceptos constitucionales; y su interpretación padece de que carece de desarrollo legislativo y precedentes históricos. Con su Resolución de 27 de octubre de 2017, el Senado ha aplicado por vez primera el art. 155 por entender que la Generalitat había incurrido en desobediencia a la Constitución. La autorización al Gobierno central conllevó el cese del Gobierno de Cataluña y la posterior disolución del Parlamento autonómico. Dos han sido los recursos de inconstitucionalidad instados, respectivamente, por el grupo parlamentario de Unidos-Podemos y por la Diputación Permanente del Parlamento de Cataluña. En este trabajo se aborda su análisis jurídico y se arriesga el vaticinio de Sentencia que habrá de dictar el Tribunal Constitucional. Summary:1. The injuction of the Spanish Government and the Order of the Spanish Senate of 27th of October, 2017; 2. The application of the state coercion of section 155 in Catalonia; 3. The procedural question of the judicial review of the Order of the Senate; 4. The motion filed by the political party Unidos-Podemos claiming that the application of section 155 is against the Spanish Constitution; 5. The Opinion 14/2017 of the Catalan Consell de Garanties Estatutáries. The motion filed by the Catalan Parliament for judicial review against the Order of the Spanish Senate; 6. The material question: Does the bloque de constitucionalidad entails a limit beforesection 155?Abstract:Section 155 of the Spanish Constitution regulates federal coercion by means of a text inspired in section 37 of the Fundamental Law of Bonn, although the former presents some important differences, especially due to the different electoral configuration of the Spanish Senate and the Bundesrat. The wording of section 155 is a good example of the characteristic ambiguity of constitutional texts. Its interpretation suffers from a lack of legislative development and former  precedents. By means of the Order of 27th of October, 2017, the Spanish Senate has applied for the first time section 155, understanding that the Catalan Generalitat had violated the Constitution. The authorization given to the Spanish Government entailed the dismissal of the Autonomous Government of Catalonia and the dissolution of the Autonomous Parliament. Two motions have been filed,one by the parliamentary group Unidos-Podemos, and another by the DiputaciónPermanenteof the Parliament of Catalonia. This paper tackles the legal analysis of section 155, and risks predicting the future ruling of the Spanish Constitutional Court. 


2014 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 166-182
Author(s):  
Iryna Tsiborovska-Rymarovych

The article has as its object the elucidation of the history of the Vyshnivetsky Castle Library, definition of the content of its fund, its historical and cultural significance, correlation of the founder of the Library Mychailo Servaty Vyshnivetsky with the Book.The Vyshnivetsky Castle Library was formed in the Ukrainian historical region of Volyn’, in the Vyshnivets town – “family nest” of the old Ukrainian noble family of the Vyshnivetskies under the “Korybut” coat of arm. The founder of the Library was Prince Mychailo Servaty Vyshnivetsky (1680–1744) – Grand Hetman and Grand Chancellor of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Vilno Voievoda. He was a politician, an erudite and great bibliophile. In the 30th–40th of the 18th century the main Prince’s residence Vyshnivets became an important centre of magnate’s culture in Rich Pospolyta. M. S. Vyshnivetsky’s contemporaries from the noble class and clergy knew quite well about his library and really appreciated it. According to historical documents 5 periods are defined in the Library’s history. In the historical sources the first place is occupied by old-printed books of Library collection and 7 Library manuscript catalogues dating from 1745 up to the 1835 which give information about quantity and topical structures of Library collection.The Library is a historical and cultural symbol of the Enlightenment epoch. The Enlightenment and those particular concepts and cultural images pertaining to that epoch had their effect on the formation of Library’s fund. Its main features are as follow: comprehensive nature of the stock, predominance of French eighteenth century editions, presence of academic books and editions on orientalistics as well as works of the ideologues of the Enlightenment and new kinds of literature, which generated as a result of this movement – encyclopaedias, encyclopaedian dictionaries, almanacs, etc. Besides the universal nature of its stock books on history, social and political thought, fiction were dominating.The reconstruction of the history of Vyshnivetsky’s Library, the historical analysis of the provenances in its editions give us better understanding of the personality of its owners and in some cases their philanthropic activities, and a better ability to identify the role of this Library in the culture life of society in a certain epoch.


Author(s):  
Joshua M. White

This book offers a comprehensive examination of the shape and impact of piracy in the eastern half of the Mediterranean and the Ottoman Empire’s administrative, legal, and diplomatic response. In the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, piracy had a tremendous effect on the formation of international law, the conduct of diplomacy, the articulation of Ottoman imperial and Islamic law, and their application in Ottoman courts. Piracy and Law draws on research in archives and libraries in Istanbul, Venice, Crete, London, and Paris to bring the Ottoman state and Ottoman victims into the story for the first time. It explains why piracy exploded after the 1570s and why the Ottoman state was largely unable to marshal an effective military solution even as it responded dynamically in the spheres of law and diplomacy. By focusing on the Ottoman victims, jurists, and officials who had to contend most with the consequences of piracy, Piracy and Law reveals a broader range of piratical practitioners than the Muslim and Catholic corsairs who have typically been the focus of study and considers their consequences for the Ottoman state and those who traveled through Ottoman waters. This book argues that what made the eastern half of the Mediterranean basin the Ottoman Mediterranean, more than sovereignty or naval supremacy—which was ephemeral—was that it was a legal space. The challenge of piracy helped to define its contours.


Author(s):  
John Linarelli ◽  
Margot E Salomon ◽  
Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah

This chapter is a study of the themes of the New International Economic Order (NIEO). It begins with the notion of justice that had been constructed in imperial law to justify empire and colonialism. The NIEO was the first time a prescription was made for justice in a global context not based on domination of one people over another. In its consideration of the emergence of a new notion of justice in international law, the chapter discusses the reasons for the origins of the NIEO, and goes on to describe the principles of the NIEO and the extent to which they came into conflict with dominant international law as accepted by the United States and European states. Next the chapter deals with the rise of the neoliberal ideology that led to the displacement of the NIEO and examines the issue of whether the NIEO and its ideals have passed or whether they continue to be or should be influential in international law. Finally, the chapter turns to the ideas of the NIEO alongside new efforts at promoting a fuller account of justice by which to justify and evaluate international law.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document