North Atlantic Treaty Organization

1953 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 164-168

The Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in Paris, December 15–18, 1952, the first meeting of the Council on a ministerial level since the Lisbon meeting of February 1952. Ministers of foreign affairs, finance and defense of the fourteen NATO members took part in the meeting. Observers agreed that the principal fact conditioning the discussions and decisions of the ministers was the impending change of government in the United States.

1963 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 709-732 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert R. Bowie

The debate over strategy, forces, and nuclear control, which now divides the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), is framed largely in military terms: what is the best way to protect the NATO area and its members from aggression? The military aspects are complex in themselves, but the import of these issues extends far beyond defense. Their handling will greatly affect prospects for a partnership between the United States and a strong, united Europe


1960 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 355-358 ◽  

A short meeting of the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), devoted exclusively to East-West relations, was held on September 4, 1959, following a visit by United States President Dwight D. Eisenhower. United States Secretary of State Christian Herter, opening the session, explained to the Council why Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had been invited to the United States and reviewed the general world situation since the Geneva Conference, including the current state of disarmament negotiations.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 399-401

On December 7, 1950 it was reported that the Council of Deputies of the North Atlantic Pact Organization had resolved the difficulties standing in the way of the creation of integrated military forces for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization by accepting a compromise proposal put forward by the United States representative (Charles M. Spofford). The essence of the plan was reported to be that the twelve treaty countries would proceed with the formation of integrated forces under a supreme command, including German combat teams recruited by German civilian authorities under the supervision of the Allied High Commissioners; in the meantime the French would call a conference to explore the possibilities of forming a European army into which German units would be merged. Despite indications from western Germany that the Federal Republic was dissatisfied with the limitation of 6,000 men per combat unit as compared with units of from 10,000 to 15,000 for the twelve members of NATO, the press reported that the compromise was agreed to by the Council of Deputies and by the Military Committee at a meeting on December 12 and 13, 1950.


1952 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 464-475

On April 2, 1952, in letters to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and to the United States Secretary of Defense (Lovett), the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (Eisenhower) asked that steps be taken to assure his release by June 1, 1952. The appointment of General Matthew Ridgway (Supreme Allied Commander, Far East) to succeed as Supreme Commander in Europe was unanimously approved by the NATO Council on April 28; the nomination had been made by the President of the United States (Truman) at the request of the Council. It was simultaneously announced that Alfred M. Greunther would continue in his capacity as Chief of Staff. The change in Supreme Commanders was effected at Rocquencourt on May 30, 1952.


1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 771-777

The Council established by Article 9 of the North Atlantic treaty held its first session in Washington on Sept. 17, 1949. Representatives of the parties to the treaty attending this first session were:For Belgium — The Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Paul Van Zeeland.For Canada — The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Lester B. Pearson.For Denmark — The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Gustav Rasmussen.For France — The Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Robert Schuman.For Iceland — The Minister to the United States, Mr. Thor Thors.For Italy — The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Sforza.For Luxembourg — The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Josef Bech.For the Netherlands — The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Dirk U. Stikker.For Norway — The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Halvard M. Lange.For Portugal — The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jose Caeiro da Matta.For the United Kingdom — The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ernest Bevin.For the United States — The Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Acheson.


1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 825-832

With the development of certain administrative frictions (concerning coal quotas, occupation costs, and the scrap metal treaty) between the western occupying powers and the German Federal Republic, early indications were that if the talk of “contractual agreements” did materialize it would reserve, for the occupying powers, wide controls over important areas of west Germany's internal and external affairs. In Washington, however, a general modification of approach was noted during the September discussions between the United States Secretary of State (Acheson), the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary (Morrison), and the French Foreign Minister (Schuman), preparatory to the Ottawa meetings of the North Atlantic Council.


1961 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 326-329 ◽  

The Ministerial Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) held its eleventh annual ministerial review at NATO headquarters in Paris from December 16 to 18, 1960. The main topic of discussion at the meeting was the announcement by United States Secretary of State Christian Herter of what he reportedly termed a new concept for the operation of medium-range ballistic missiles. The United States plan included: 1) a proposal that NATO discuss a multilateral system for the political control of the weapons; 2) an offer to place five ballistic missile submarines armed with 80 Polaris missiles under the command of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), by the end of 1963; and 3) a suggestion that the other members of the alliance contribute approximately 100 more medium-range ballistic missiles by purchasing them in the United States. The press reported that Lord Home, Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, welcomed the United States proposal and said that NATO should examine the possibility of a medium-range ballistic missile force under multilateral control, a suggestion in which M. Couve de Murville, the French Foreign Minister, concurred. The West German Defense Minister, Franz Joseph Strauss, told the Ministers, the press announced, that concrete decisions on the United States proposal should be taken in the near future, and that plans for NATO control of the Polaris missile force should be pushed through by military and political authorities early in the spring of 1961. The Council of Ministers decided to pass on to its Permanent Comand other related materials, according to the press.


1992 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 633-680 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steve Weber

At the end of the 1940s, the United States and several West European states allied to defend themselves against invasion by the Soviet Union. Balance-ofpower theory predicts the recurrent formation of such balances among states. But it says little about the precise nature of the balance, the principles on which it will be constructed, or its institutional manifestations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been a peculiar mix. As a formal institution, NATO has through most of its history been distinctly nonmultilateral, with the United States commanding most decision-making power and responsibility. At the same time, NATO provided security to its member states in a way that strongly reflected multilateral principles. Within NATO, security was indivisible. It was based on a general organizing principle, the principle that the external boundaries of alliance territory were completely inviolable and that an attack on any border was an attack on all. Diffuse reciprocity was the norm. In the terms set out by John Ruggie, NATO has generally scored low as a multilateral organization but high as an institution of multilateralism.


Author(s):  
Lars U. Scholl ◽  
Lars U. Scholl ◽  
Lars U. Scholl

This essay analyses the North Atlantic Cotton Trade through records of cotton arrivals at Liverpool, using two sets of data from 1830-1832 and 1853-1855. Using Customs Bills of Entry, Williams presents data of cotton receipts from the United States to Liverpool; quantities of bales exported; numbers of vessels; origin ports of vessels; distinguishes between regular and occasional cotton traders; arrivals at Liverpool by nationality; and vessel tonnage. He determines that the majority of vessels participated in the cotton trade seasonally, and suggests that the cotton trade was not self-contained, but part of a complex interrelationship within the North Atlantic trade system, encompassing commodity dealings, shipping employment levels, and the seasonal characteristics of cargo. The conclusion requests further scholarly research into the pattern of ship movements in the Atlantic. Two appendices provide more data, concerning arrival dates of regular traders in Liverpool, and the month of departure of cotton vessels from Southern states.


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