United Nations Technical Assistance: Soviet and East European Participation

1957 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 615-634 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Loring Allen

United Nations technical assistance is unique in many ways. Its popularity is attested by pledges and contributions from eighty-two nations, some of which are not members of the UN. Its success is indicated by increasing contributions from all nations of the world and increasing requests for assistance from underdeveloped countries. Most significant of all, the UN technical assistance program is the only setting where the Soviet Union, its constituent republics, and the eastern European countries in its orbit cooperate widi western powers in economic activities not specifically and directly for their own national purposes. Nowhere else can one find delegates from the United States, Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and many other nations wrestling not with high politics and ways to advance their power position, but, rather, with the practical problems of irrigation in Iran, statistical research in India, and malaria control in Ceylon.

1953 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 798-804
Author(s):  
Walter H. C. Laves

The purpose of this paper is to inquire what contribution American political science can make to the easing of the shortage of competent manpower for assignments abroad.The problem is, of course, not peculiar to the United States except in respect to its magnitude. Nearly every country with major responsibilities involving the assignment of personnel abroad is faced with it. On a world scale the United Nations, especially with respect to the Expanded Technical Assistance Program, is facing difficulties in searching out individuals who are competent, willing, and available. This was forcefully revealed by a study the author recently made for all the specialized agencies on behalf of the Technical Assistance Board. It appears to be a characteristic of our times that not enough men and women have been trained to deal competently with the kinds of problems with which we are faced in intensified intercultural relations. Thus, while this discussion will deal chiefly with the problem of increasing the American personnel potentially available for foreign assignments—something with which American political scientists need to be urgently concerned—we must avoid losing sight of the broader world setting of the problem.


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 73-102 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michelle Denise Getchell

This article reevaluates the U.S.-backed coup in 1954 that overthrew Guatemala's democratically elected president, Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán. The coup is generally portrayed as the opening shot of the Cold War in the Western Hemisphere and a watershed moment for U.S.–Latin American relations, when the United States supplanted its Good Neighbor Policy with a hardline anti-Communist approach. Despite the extensive literature on the coup, the Soviet Union's perspectives on the matter have received scant discussion. Using Soviet-bloc and United Nations (UN) archival sources, this article shows that Latin American Communists and Soviet sympathizers were hugely influential in shaping Moscow's perceptions of hemispheric relations. Although regional Communists petitioned the Soviet Union to provide support to Árbenz, officials in Moscow were unwilling to prop up what they considered a “bourgeois-democratic” revolution tottering under the weight of U.S. military pressure. Soviet leaders were, however, keen to use their position on the UN Security Council to challenge the authority of the Organization of American States and undermine U.S. conceptions of “hemispheric solidarity.” The coup, moreover, revealed the force of anti-U.S. nationalism in Latin America during a period in which Soviet foreign policy was in flux and the Cold War was becoming globalized.


Author(s):  
Justin Morris

This chapter analyzes the transformational journey that plans for the United Nations undertook from summer 1941 to the San Francisco Conference of 1945 at which the UN Charter was agreed. Prior to the conference, the ‘Big Three’ great powers of the day—the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom—often struggled to establish the common ground on which the UN’s success would depend. However, their debates were only the start of the diplomatic travails which would eventually lead to the establishment of the world organization that we know today. Once gathered at San Francisco, the fifty delegations spent the next two months locked in debate over issues such as the role of international law; the relationship between the General Assembly and Security Council; the permanent members’ veto; and Charter amendment. One of modern history’s most important diplomatic events, its outcome continues to resonate through world politics.


1961 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 513-514 ◽  

The second session of the Assembly of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) was held in London from April 5–14, 1961. Mr. W. L. de Vries, Director-General of Shipping in the Netherlands Ministry of Transport, was elected President of the session and Mr. Ove Nielson, Secretary-General of IMCO, acted as secretary. The Assembly elected Argentina, Australia, India, and the Soviet Union to fill out the sixteen-member Council on which Belgium, Canada, France, West Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States were already represented. The Assembly: 1) established a Credentials Committee consisting of Canada, Japan, Liberia, Poland, and Turkey; 2) adopted a budget for 1962–1963 of $892,-350; 3) approved Mauritania's application for membership by a two-thirds vote following the rule that non-members of the United Nations had to be approved by such a vote after recommendation by the Council; and 4) in view of the advisory opinion of June 8, 1960, of the International Court of Justice to the effect that the Maritime Safety Committee was improperly constituted, dissolved the committee and elected Argentina, Canada, France, West Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Liberia, the Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States to the reconstituted committee. The Assembly during its second session also approved an expanded work program submitted by the IMCO Council including new duties connected with international travel and transport, with special reference to the simplification of ship's papers. The Assembly asked IMCO to study the arrangements for the maintenance of certain light beacons used for navigation at the southern end of the Red Sea which were being maintained by the United Kingdom with the help of the Netherlands. Also under consideration was a new convention on the safety of life at sea submitted to the Assembly by a Conference on Safety of Life at Sea and containing a number of recommendations to IMCO on studies relating to such matters as ship construction, navigation, and other technical subjects on safety at sea. The Assembly decided that in conjunction with United Nations programs of technical cooperation the UN should be informed that IMCO was in a position to provide advice and guidance on technical matters affecting shipping engaged in international trade.


1952 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-119

The Council held a post-assembly session June 21 to 29, 1951 in which air navigation problems figured most prominently. The Council established universal radio telephony procedures recommended by the Airworthiness and the Communications Divisions during their fourth sessions and incorporated them into Amendment 4 to Annex 10 (Aeronautical Telecommunications) of Standards and Recommended Practices for implementation November 1, 1951. The Air Navigation Commission was authorized to establish a small standing committee, proposed by the Airworthiness and Operations Divisions, to make tentative amendment to Annexes 6 and 8 (Operation of Aircraft, Airworthiness of Aircraft). The Council also approved the implementation January 1, 1952 of the Revised Supplementary Regional Procedures in Meteorology. On the advice of the Air Navigation Commission, the Council approved the proposal by the United States and France to include the New York-Paris circuit in the Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunications Network of the European and the Mediterranean Region, subject to review by the European and Mediterranean Regional Air Navigation Meeting in February. Amendments 23 to 28 to Annex 4 (Aeronautical Charts) were adopted; and unless disapproved by a majority of contracting states they would become effective November 1, 1951 and implemented January 1, 1952. The Council endorsed the establishment of regional training centers and directed the Secretary-General to encourage such development and particularly to urge the governments of India, Pakistan, and Egypt to consider further development of centers of Allahabad, Nawabshar or Karachi, and Cairo, not only for the benefit of their own nations, but also for that of neighboring states. Noting the development of prohibited, restricted, and danger areas along international air routes, the Council asked all contracting states to issue communications prior to boundary changes. Mohammed El Hakeem (Egypt) and A. C. Carter (United Kingdom) were appointed to the Air Navigation Commission. In conclusion, the third report of the Organization's technical assistance program was approved with its estimated $900,000 budget for 1952 for transferral to the United Nations. The retirement of the Secretary-General, Albert Roper, was deferred until December 31, 1951.


1954 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans J. Morgenthau

The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union has prevented the United Nations from becoming the international government of the great powers which the Charter intended it to be. That conflict has paralyzed the Security Council as an agency of international government. In the few instances when it has been able to act as an agency of international government, it has been able to do so either, as in the beginning of the Korean War, by the accidental and temporary absence of the Soviet Union or, as on the Indonesian issue, by a fortuitous and exceptional coincidence of interests.


Author(s):  
Michelle Getchell

The United States was heavily involved in creating the United Nations in 1945 and drafting its charter. The United States continued to exert substantial clout in the organization after its founding, though there have been periods during which U.S. officials have met with significant opposition inside the United Nations, in Congress, and in American electoral politics, all of which produced struggles to gain support for America’s international policy goals. U.S. influence in the international organization has thus waxed and waned. The early postwar years witnessed the zenith of American prestige on the global stage. Starting in the mid- to late 1950s, as decolonization and the establishment of newly independent nations quickened, the United States began to lose influence in the United Nations owing to the spreading perception that its alliances with the European colonial powers placed it on the wrong side of history. As U.N. membership skyrocketed, the organization became more responsive to the needs and interests of the decolonizing states. During the 1970s and early 1980s, the American public responded to declining U.S. influence in the United Nations with calls to defund the organization and to pursue a unilateral approach to international challenges. The role of the United States in the United Nations was shaped by the politics of the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union. Throughout the nearly five decades of the Cold War, the United Nations served as a forum for the political and ideological rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, which frequently inhibited the organization from fulfilling what most considered to be its primary mission: the maintenance of global security and stability. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the peaceful end of the Cold War, the United States enjoyed a brief period of unrivaled global hegemony. During this period, U.S. officials pursued a closer relationship with the United Nations and sought to use the organization to build support for its international policy agenda and military interventionism.


Author(s):  
Brandon Wolfe-Hunnicutt

Oil played a central role in shaping US policy toward Iraq over the course of the 20th century. The United States first became involved in Iraq in the 1920s as part of an effort secure a role for American companies in Iraq’s emerging oil industry. As a result of State Department efforts, American companies gained a 23.75 percent ownership share of the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1928. In the 1940s, US interest in the country increased as a result of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. To defend against a perceived Soviet threat to Middle East oil, the US supported British efforts to “secure” the region. After nationalist officers overthrew Iraq’s British-supported Hashemite monarchy in 1958 and established friendly relations with the Soviet Union, the United States cultivated an alliance with the Iraqi Baath Party as an alternative to the Soviet-backed regime. The effort to cultivate an alliance with the Baath foundered as a result the Baath’s perceived support for Arab claims against Israel. The breakdown of US-Baath relations led the Baath to forge an alliance with the Soviet Union. With Soviet support, the Baath nationalized the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1972. Rather than resulting in a “supply cutoff,” Soviet economic and technical assistance allowed for a rapid expansion of the Iraqi oil industry and an increase in Iraqi oil flowing to world markets. As Iraq experienced a dramatic oil boom in the 1970s, the United States looked to the country as a lucrative market for US exports goods and adopted a policy of accommodation with regard to Baath. This policy of accommodation gave rise to close strategic and military cooperation throughout the 1980s as Iraq waged war against Iran. When Iraq invaded Kuwait and seized control of its oil fields in 1990, the United States shifted to a policy of Iraqi containment. The United States organized an international coalition that quickly ejected Iraqi forces from Kuwait, but chose not to pursue regime change for fear of destabilizing the country and wider region. Throughout the 1990s, the United States adhered to a policy of Iraqi containment but came under increasing pressure to overthrow the Baath and dismantle its control over the Iraqi oil industry. In 2003, the United States seized upon the 9/11 terrorist attacks as an opportunity to implement this policy of regime change and oil reprivatization.


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