Democracy and Human Dignity: Limits of a Moralized Conception of Rights in German Constitutional Law

2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 416-439 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Möllers

The Parliamentary Council, the constitutional assembly for the German Basic Law, split over the question whether the guarantee of human dignity should be understood as the result of a democratic decision or as the incorporation of a pre-existing universal principle of Christian origin. The subsequent constitutional practice was dominated by a moral understanding of the norm that stressed the contradiction between democracy and human dignity. This Article rejects this interpretation and attempts to show, using the exemplary German case, that a democracy-oriented interpretation of human dignity is not necessarily less effective than a moralized understanding.

2016 ◽  
Vol 44 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-42
Author(s):  
Claus Koggel

AbstractThe Mediation Committee of the Bundestag and Bundesrat – is it “one of the most felicitous innovations in our constitutional activities”, “the most positive institution in the entire Basic Law” or, as some critics assert “a substitute and superordinate parliament” or indeed the “mysterious darkroom of the legislative process”? This article seeks to provide answers to these questions. It is however clear that the Mediation Committee has become an important instrument for attaining political compromises in Germany's legislative procedure. The Committee's purpose is to find a balance between the differing opinions of the Bundestag and Bundesrat concerning the content of legislation, and, through political mediation and mutual concessions, to find solutions that are acceptable to both sides. Thanks to this approach, the Mediation Committee has helped save countless important pieces of legislation from failure since it was established over 65 years ago, thus making a vital contribution to ensure the legislative process works efficiently. The lecture will address the Mediation Committee's status and role within the German legislative process. It will explain the composition of this body as well as its most important procedural principles also against the backdrop of current case law from the Federal Constitutional Court. Finally, the lecture will consider how particular constellations of political power impact on the Mediation Committee's work.


2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 19-26
Author(s):  
Izabela Bratiloveanu

 The Object formula („Objecktformel”) has been designed and developed in the mid century XX by Günter Dürig, starting from the second formula of Kant's categorical imperative. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany took the formula and applied it for the first time in the case of the telephone conversations of December 15, 1970. The Object formula („Objecktformel”) was taken from the German constitutional law and applied in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.


2008 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 2081-2094
Author(s):  
Peter E. Quint

Without much doubt, the two great pillars of American scholarship on the German Basic Law and the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court are (in the order of first appearance) Donald Kommers's monumental casebook, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany and David Currie's magisterial treatise, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. Professor Kommers's comprehensive work was a milestone in a long career that has been very substantially devoted to the study of German constitutional law. In the late 1960s, Kommers spent a research year at the German Constitutional Court and, drawing in part on personal interviews with the justices, he published the first major work in English on that court. Since then, Kommers has produced a steady stream of significant works on German constitutional law.


Author(s):  
Bumke Christian ◽  
Voßkuhle Andreas

This book provides a comprehensive summary of German constitutional law, in particular the case law of the German Federal Constitutional Court. It provides first-hand insight into the complex principles of the Basic Law, or Grundgesetz (GG), and an authoritative introduction to the history of the German constitution, the Basic Law, and the methodology of the Federal Constitutional Court. As well as an analysis of the general principles of German constitutional law, the book covers the salient articles of the German constitution and offers relevant extracts of the Court's most important decisions on the provisions of the Basic Law. It provides notes and discussions of landmark cases to illustrate their legal and historical context and give the reader a clear understanding of the principles governing German constitutional law. The book covers the fundamental rights catalogue of the Basic Law and offers a comprehensive account of its intellectual moorings. It includes landmark jurisprudence on the equal treatment of same-sex couples, life imprisonment, the legal structure of property, the right to assembly, and the right to informational self-presentation. The book also covers the provisions and respective case law governing the state structure of Germany, for instance the recent decisions on the prohibition of the far-right German nationalist party, and the Court's jurisprudence on European integration, including the most recent decisions on the OMT program of the European Central Bank.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malaika Jores

Since 2017, Germany’s Basic Law has allowed anti-constitutional parties to be excluded from state party funding. Such exclusion from funding is at odds with the right to equal political opportunities, which derives from the principle of democracy. This thesis examines whether such exclusion from funding is permissible under German constitutional law. In particular, it takes account of the principle of democracy—guaranteed by the ‘eternity clause’—and the concept of ‘militant democracy’. The thesis also considers the issue in question from a European law perspective and, in addition to conducting a legal analysis, examines whether distorting the competition among political parties is justifiable with respect to democratic theory.


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-68 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yehiel S. Kaplan

In the State of Israel, Rabbinical courts are granted sole jurisdiction in the adjudication of marriage and divorce of Jews. In these courts, the husband presents the divorce writ of Jews, the get, to his wife on the occasion of their divorce at the end of the adjudication process. When Jews sue for divorce in Rabbinical courts, the courts occasionally determine that the man should grant his wife a get or that the wife should accept the get granted by her husband. Sometimes one spouse disobeys the ruling. Although the Rabbinical courts occasionally impose sanctions in an attempt to enforce divorce judgments, they are generally reluctant to do so. The implementation of inappropriate measures can lead to the conclusion that a given divorce is in fact a legally ineffectual coerced divorce. Consequently, the Jewish courts occasionally delay the imposition of these sanctions out of concern that inappropriate coercive measures invalidate the get, rendering the couple still legally married. The Supreme Court of Israel has ruled, though, that the Rabbinical courts in Israel should act in light of the constitutional principles in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom. However, the Supreme Court of Israel has not clearly or specifically addressed the balance between the rights and obligations of the husband and wife in the process of enforcing divorce judgments, neither before nor after the enactment of the of the two important constitutional Basic Laws enacted in 1992. A detailed policy analysis of the sanctions against recalcitrant spouses in Rabbinical courts in Israel—in light of the principles of Jewish and constitutional law in the country—has not yet been undertaken. The aim of this essay is therefore to present the appropriate formula pertaining to the imposition of sanctions against recalcitrant spouses given the principles of Jewish and constitutional law. The formula is presented in light of constitutional law in Israel. However, it is also applicable in other countries with similar constitutional legislation, such as Canada, where legislation sometimes allows for the civil enforcement of Jewish divorce.


1993 ◽  
Vol 27 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 84-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mordechai Kremnitzer

The enactment of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom marks the beginning of a new era in Israeli law. This is a fitting opportunity to sketch an initial outline for the relationship between the constitution and the substantive criminal law, and the effect of constitutional principles on penal law. The truth be told, the constitutional principles already existed prior to the enactment of the Basic Law. And if, for example, we examine Prof. Feller's approach to criminal law, we cannot but be impressed by the highly developed constitutional element. Nevertheless, Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom does provide an excellent excuse for addressing the subject. Moreover, its enactment paves the way for certain interpretive changes in Israeli penal law, and because it allows for judicial review of the legislature of the future, some clarification is called for as to the limits of legislative power in the field of criminal law in light of fundamental constitutional principles.Basic to constitutional law and criminal law is a shared image of human beings. It is a conception of human beings as “morally” autonomous, with the basic faculty to understand reality and distinguish right from wrong, able to contribute to developing social norms and to understand and internalize them, competent to decide how to act and capable of realizing that decision.


1996 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 173-183 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Kretzmer

In 1992 the Israeli Knesset enacted the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation and the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Freedom. These basic laws, as chapters in Israel's emerging formal Constitution, have opened the way for judicial review of parliamentary legislation that violates human rights. Opposition from some political quarters prevented inclusion in the basic laws of some rights protected under modern constitutions and human rights treaties. However, the rights protected include ‘human dignity’, a term that can be broadened by judicial interpretation so as to include violations of rights not specifically mentioned in the basic laws. The basic laws lay down a balancing test for deciding whether restrictions on protected rights are legitimate. All restrictions must be prescribed by a law that befits Israel as a Jewish and democratic State, that was enacted for a worthy purpose and that meets the proportionality test.


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