The Place of the Constitution in the Modern State

1967 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Akzin

Ever since the American and the French revolutions, it was taken for granted that a written, formal, Constitution was essential to the functioning of a modern State. Old-established States, as they moved toward modernization or away from absolutism, hurried to provide themselves with Constitutions. New States enacted Constitutions as a matter of course, as one of the first acts of a newly-found sovereignty, often copying them from available models and without pausing to consider to what extent the provisions copied would suit the particular characteristics and goals of their respective societies. The well-known process of “reception” of laws was followed by a similar trend to “receive” Constitutions. To have a formal Constitution well-nigh became a universal fashion, a symbol of modernism. In the aftermath of the First World War, only two groups of fully independent States remained without Constitutions. One of them comprised countries still in their pre-modern stage, in respect both of their political and of their general social set-up, and without pretensions to modernity: Afghanistan, Ethiopia (then Abyssinia), Saudi Arabia, Thailand (then Siam), Yemen; since then, each of these, bent on modernization, provided itself with some kind of constitutional chart. The other group consisted of the one and only Great Britain, looked upon by everybody as a case apart.

Total War ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 59-77
Author(s):  
Michael Roper

‘Little Ruby’ was the daughter of the head gardener at St Dunstan’s, the voluntary organisation set up in 1915 to support blinded servicemen, whose role as a guide was widely represented in pictures and sculptures during the war and who became an iconic symbol of the charity. This chapter draws on the story of Ruby to explore the role played by children—and young girls in particular—in the care of disabled soldiers after the war. Based on interviews with descendants born in the 1920s and 1930s, and now in their eighties and nineties, it explores the domestic history of caregiving through the eyes of daughters. Their experience of growing up was often at odds with the historical narratives surrounding young women between the wars, who are assumed to have enjoyed more freedom and leisure than their mothers. Many daughters of disabled servicemen experienced strong pressures to remain living at home and help their mothers through domestic and paid work. Their ambitions for education, career and service during the Second World War were often constrained. Looking back now, in an age where the domestic obligations of young women are fewer and their career aspirations are taken more seriously, the women expressed contrary feelings. On the one hand, they continued to regard familial duty as a valued aspect of their identities as daughters. On the other hand, they talked about the emotional pressures of care and their regrets at opportunities lost. Focusing on the life course from girlhood to old age, the chapter reveals the impact of the First World War across the 20th century and through the lives of those born after the conflict’s end.


2007 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-63
Author(s):  
Luc Vandeweyer

In deze bronnenpublicatie ontleedt Luc Vandeweyer de parlementaire loopbaan van de geneesheer-politicus Alfons Van de Perre: hoe hij in 1912 feitelijk  tegen wil en dank  volksvertegenwoordiger werd, zich anderzijds blijkbaar naar behoren kweet van zijn taak en tijdens de eerste verkiezingen na de Eerste Wereldoorlog (1919) zijn mandaat hernieuwd zag maar meteen daarop ontslag nam. Volgens de bekende historiografische lezing was de abdicatie van de progressieve politicus een daad van zelfverloochening die enerzijds werd ingegeven door gezondheidsmotieven en  anderzijds was geïnspireerd door de wil om de eenheid binnen de katholieke partij te herstellen. De auteur komt op basis van nieuw en onontgonnen bronnenmateriaal tot de vaststelling dat Van de Perres spontane beslissing tot ontslag in de eerste plaats een strategische keuze was: in het parlement, waar hij zich overigens niet erg in zijn schik voelde, kon hij minder invloed uitoefenen op de Vlaamse beweging dan via de talrijke engagementen waarvoor hij voortaan de handen vrij had. Eén ervan was die van bestuurder én publicist bij het dagblad De Standaard.________Chronicle of the announcement of a resignation. Two remaekable letters by Alfons Van de Perre concerning his resignation as a Member of Parliament in 1919In this source publication Luc Vandeweyer analyses the parliamentary career of the physician-politician Alfons Van de Perre and he describes how Van de Perre became a Member of Parliament in 1912 actually against the grain, yet how he apparently did a good job carrying out his duties. During the first elections after the First World War (1919) Van de Perre found that his mandate was renewed, but he handed in his resignation immediately afterwards. According to the familiar historiographical interpretation the abdication of the progressive politician was an act of self-denial, which was prompted on the one hand by health reasons and on the other hand inspired by the will to restore unity within the Catholic political party. On the basis of new and so far unexplored source material the author concludes that the spontaneous decision by Van de Perres to hand in his resignation was above all a strategic choice: in the Parliament, which he did not much enjoy anyway, he could exert less influence on the Flemish movement than via his numerous commitments, which he was now free to take on. One of these was the post of director as well as political commentator of the newspaper De Standaard.


Author(s):  
Klaus Richter

The First World War led to a radical reshaping of Europe’s political borders like hardly any previous event. Nowhere was this transformation more profound than in East Central Europe, where the collapse of imperial rule led to the emergence of a series of new states. New borders intersected centuries-old networks of commercial, cultural, and social exchange. The new states had to face the challenges posed by territorial fragmentation and at the same time establish durable state structures within an international order that viewed them at best as weak and at worst as provisional entities that would sooner or later be reintegrated into their larger neighbours’ territory. Fragmentation in East Central Europe challenges the traditional view that the emergence of these states was the product of a radical rupture that naturally led from defunct empires to nation states. Using the example of Poland and the Baltic States, it retraces the roots of the interwar states of East Central Europe, of their policies, economic developments, and of their conflicts back to deep in the First World War. At the same time, it shows that these states learned to harness the dynamics caused by territorial fragmentation, thus forever changing our understanding of what modern states can do.


2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valerie Rosoux ◽  
Laurence van Ypersele

This article examines the gradual deconstruction of the Belgian national identity. Is it possible to speak of a de facto differentiation or even ‘federalization’ of the so-called ‘national past’ in Belgium? How do Belgians choose to remember and forget this past? To contribute to an understanding of these issues, the article considers two very different episodes of Belgian history, namely the First World War and the colonization of the Congo. On the one hand, the memory of the First World War appears to provide the template for memory conflicts in Belgium, and thus informs the memories of other tragedies such as the Second World War. On the other hand, the memory of the colonial past remains much more consensual – providing a more nuanced picture of competing views on the past. Beyond the differences between the ways in which these episodes are officially portrayed, the same fundamental trend may be observed: the gradual fragmentation of a supposedly smooth and reliable national version of history.


2018 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 294-298
Author(s):  
Thomas Raithel

Abstract The interwar period was a phase of the formation of new states and of democratic awakening, but also a time of crises and the failure of democracies as well as the establishment of authoritarian and dictatorial systems. Until recently, it was largely overlooked by research and the general public. Given the recent increase of right-wing populist currents and authoritarian tendencies in Europe, interest has once again grown. The second “Contemporary History Podium” is thus dedicated to the question of how akin we are to the interwar period. How is it perceived in different countries which constituted themselves as democracies at the end of the First World War after the fall of the Romanov, Habsburg and Hohenzollern Empires? Also what is the relevance of this history for the present? Ota Konrád (Charles University Prague), Ekaterina Makhotina (University of Bonn), Anton Pelinka (Central European University Budapest), Thomas Raithel (Institute for Contemporary History Munich-Berlin) und Krzysztof Ruchniewicz (Willy Brandt Center, Wrocław University) look into these questions utilising the examples of Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, Austria, Germany and Poland.


Author(s):  
Guy Miron

IN THE WAKE of the First World War Poland and Hungary became independent states. Poland, which for some 130 years had been partitioned between its neighbouring empires—Russia, Austria, and Prussia—now gained independence, including in its territory some predominantly Ukrainian and Belarusian areas which had been part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Hungary, which had enjoyed extensive autonomy since the Ausgleich (Austro-Hungarian Compromise) of 1867, was now severed from the defunct Habsburg empire and became independent, but its boundaries were dramatically reduced as a result of the Treaty of Trianon. The two states, whose independence was part of a new European order based on the principle of national self-determination, were supposed to function as democracies and respect the rights of their minorities. In the immediate aftermath of 'the war to end all wars', there was reason to hope that the recognition of the Jews as equal citizens would lead to a golden age of Jewish integration. In practice, the reality was different. Both Poland and Hungary were established as independent states amidst violent internal and external conflicts over their boundaries and the nature of their regimes. In both states, these struggles, which continued throughout the whole interwar period, increasingly led to the dominance of an exclusionary nationalism. Jews were the central, although not the only, minority targeted by this policy of exclusion. Of course, the anti-Jewish violence that occurred during the struggles for the independence of both Poland and Hungary and the anti-Jewish policies and legislation of the 1920s and especially the 1930s should not be regarded as foreshadowing the Nazi catastrophe—which was primarily the result of actions by an external force—however, there is no doubt that in both countries Jewish integration was seriously endangered during the interwar period....


1992 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 377-391 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan James

Whatever else the twentieth century is remembered for, one development which will assuredly rank high on the international list is the huge change which has occurred in the world's political configuration. In one quick but limited burst immediately after the First World War, the multinational empires which lay within Europe were largely recast in the shape of about a dozen successor states. And in the decades following the Second World War a series of more wide-ranging happenings on the other four continents saw the dismantling of colonial empires in a manner and on a scale which was truly heroic. Within one life span, the great European-based imperial edifices, which had hitherto seemed so permanent a part of the firmament, either collapsed or were abandoned. In their wake came getting on for 100 new states, leaving the map makers hard put to keep up with the tumble of events. Only now, as the century enters its final years, is the pace of this historical process relaxing.


1943 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-25
Author(s):  
Edwin E. Witte

There is by this time quite a literature on the war economy. With the one exception of the recent symposium by Professor Steiner and his associates, most of whom are connected with the University of Indiana, all of the longer treatises on the subject discuss the war economy in abstract terms or on the basis of the experience of the First World War. These treatises served a useful purpose and were the only books on the economies of war which could be written at the time; but they now seem unreal, because this war differs so greatly from the prior struggle. The University of Indiana book, dealing as it does with concrete problems of present war, is up-to-the-minute and excellently done in all respects. It does not attempt, however, to do what I am venturing: a brief, overall picture of what the war has been doing to the United States.


1980 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 381-398 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. I. Hamilton

The word hero cannot be defined simply. According to time and speaker, it can imply anything from the bravery of a moment to the courage and statesmanship of a lifetime. We do not enjoy the distinction in English which La Bruyère drew in French: to him un héros was a young, dauntless and venturesome man, one like Alexander; but against him had to be set the truly great man, the grand homme, the one with judgement, foresight, experience and considerable ability - a man like Caesar. As we shall see, hero can be used to describe both kinds of men. But if it has no very specific meaning, it is an important word for any study of the Victorian era - an era that for our purposes is taken to cover the years from the 1830s to the outbreak of the First World War. For the Victorians loved a hero, and the word often came to their lips. Carlyle, whose Heroes and hero-worship was first published in 1841, thought that a nation's whole history could be told in terms of its heroes, and he and Kingsley and Froude, to name three of the important literary figures of the age, regarded heroes as being vital to any society. They thought it particularly important that the new burgeoning industrial society should have heroes of its own, and that these should act as beacons and as examples. As Froude said in Representative men (1850), ‘the only education worth anything is the education of character, and we cannot educate a character unless we have some notion of what we would form’.


1971 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 133-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. Thompson

A difficulty which faces students of American thought about foreign affairs is the relation between general principles and views of the world on the one hand and attitudes to specific issues of policy on the other. Since the pioneering work of Robert E. Osgood, historians have emphasized the important distinction between those whose primary concern is the protection of American national interests within the existing system of power politics, and those who seek above all to reform the international order in accordance with American liberal ideals. In recent years much attention has been paid to the influence of economic considerations, particularly the desire to promote American foreign trade. However, the relative weight attached to national security, liberal idealism and American economic interests overseas by individual Americans does not entirely account for their differing attitudes to particular questions. For in crucial debates, such as those over the Philippines and the League of Nations, each of these considerations was invoked by some on both sides of the argument. To some extent, the older and more superficial distinction between ‘isolationism’ and ‘anti-isolationism’, while concealing the variety of premises upon which either position could be founded, provides a better basis for predicting the readiness of Americans to favour particular foreign enterprises or commitments. Yet adherence even to these broad traditions has been far from consistent. Thus, while it would be natural to assume that the imperialists of 1898–1900 were more likely than their opponents to favour American intervention in the First World War, it is not clear that this was the case.


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