Knowledge which Reached a High Degree of Probability

1967 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-34 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Bein

In the decisions of the Israel Supreme Court delivered since the establishment of the State, one sometimes comes across the express or implied statement of the rule that: “the knowledge possessed by the accused at the time of the act that his conduct would lead to a consequence which the legislature desired to prevent, is by a construction of the law regarded as intention to bring about this consequence. ‘Knowledge’ in this context does not necessarily mean ‘full and certain’ knowledge that this consequence is inevitable but on the other hand it must be knowledge which reached a high degree of probability.”The object of this article is to clarify a few aspects of this rule (which, for the sake of brevity, will be referred to as the rule of “constructive intention”).

2022 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 209-225
Author(s):  
Yu. S. Pestereva ◽  
I. G. Ragozina ◽  
E. I. Chekmezova

The subject. The article considers the role of the Plenum of Russian Supreme in forming judicial practice on the example of giving qualification to the crimes committed against sexual freedom and inviolability, as well as against property and public health.The objective of the article is to conduct a complex analysis of the function of the decisions, taken by the Plenum of Russian Supreme Court, in the formation of a unified vector of judicial practice. The authors dare to refute the hypothesis hat judicial practice can be recognized as a source of law.The methodological basis of the research is the dialectical theory of development and interrelation of phenomena. Historical, formal-logical, systematic methods of knowledge have been identified as relevant to the topic of the study.The main results, scope of application. The authors draw attention to the problem of evaluative features used in the process of law enforcement when interpreting the norms of the Special Part of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. A norm with such signs acquires an unformalized essence from the point of view of the boundaries of criminalization of a particular phenomenon. On the other hand, the nature of crimes is so diverse that without the flexibility of criminal law regulation (allowing the use of evaluative features), the application of the norm taking into account specific circumstances in a particular case may not be possible. The authors also consider issues related to the characteristics of the objective side, the end time of these crimes, the application of the formula of a single ongoing crime and its separation from related compounds. The process of law enforcement is based on such guidelines as the norms of law, judicial discretion, established judicial practice, the position of the Plenum of Russian Supreme Court. Attributing an explanatory role to the decisions of the Plenum of Russian Supreme Court does not completely eliminate the shortcomings inherent in legal technology. Correcting the current situation with the help of judicial discretion is not always justified, since this is possible only if there is a legitimate alternative. Assigning the status of a precedent to a judicial decision may lead to the substitution of the law by decisions taken in a particular case.Conclusions. The judicial practice concerning these issues is completely different. Despite the existence of similar situations, courts, as a rule, qualify an offense using various norms of the law, which negatively affects compliance with the principle of legality. The issue related to the function of the decisions of the Plenum of Russian Supreme Court in the formation of a single vector of judicial practice has been and remains debatable. The continued addition of new articles to criminal legislation, on the one hand, indicates the desire of the legislator to bring it to perfection, but, on the other hand, forms a mechanism for clarifying the rules of its application, which sometimes leads to their contradictory interpretation. At the same time, crime and punishment should be determined only by legislation.


Author(s):  
Anna Maria Barańska

The subject of this article is the resolution of the enlarged composition of the Supreme Court of June 5, 2018, which resolves the issue of acquiring by land easement with the content corresponding to transmission easement together with the acquisition by a state-owned company of transmission facilities developed on State Treasury properties. As a result of granting property rights to state-owned companies of state property in the early 1990s, the ownership of the transmission infrastructure and the property on which they were situated were separated.In the judicature, divergent concepts emerged regarding the solution of the issue of  further use of this land by transmission companies. According to the first one, the transfer of property rights was accompanied by the creation by law of a land easement with the content corresponding to a transmission easement. On the other hand, according to the second concept, obtaining a legal title for further use of the property was possible only through contractual acquisition or prescription of transmission easement. Powstanie z mocy prawa służebności gruntowej o treści odpowiadającej służebności przesyłu w świetle uchwały Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 5 czerwca 2018 roku, sygn. akt III CZP 50/17 Tematem artykułu jest uchwała powiększonego składu Sądu Najwyższego z dnia 5 czerwca 2018 roku, która rozstrzyga kwestię nabycia z mocy prawa służebności gruntowej o treści odpowiadającej służebności przesyłu wraz z nabyciem przez przedsiębiorstwo państwowe własności urządzeń przesyłowych posadowionych na nieruchomościach Skarbu Państwa. W wyniku uwłaszczenia mienia państwowego na początku lat dziewięćdziesiątych ubiegłego wieku doszło do rozdzielenia własności infrastruktury przesyłowej oraz nieruchomości, na której były one posadowione. W judykaturze pojawiły się rozbieżne koncepcje odnośnie do rozwiązania kwestii dalszego korzystania przez przedsiębiorstwa przesyłowe z tych gruntów. Zgodnie z pierwszą z nich przeniesieniu prawa własności towarzyszyło powstanie z mocy prawa służebności gruntowej o treści odpowiadającej służebności przesyłu. Na podstawie drugiej — uzyskanie tytułu prawnego do dalszego korzystania z nieruchomości było możliwe wyłącznie w drodze umownego nabycia albo zasiedzenia służebności przesyłu.


2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 11-28
Author(s):  
Kamil Zaradkiewicz

The second part of the article concerns the interpretation and application in the central parts of Poland of the provisions of the Napoleonic Code on vacant inheritances. The Code does not provide a definition of the vacant inheritance. The key to the interpretation of the provisions on the acquisition of vacant inheritances by the state is the term “is presumed to be” (a vacant inheritance) used in the former Article 811 of the Napoleonic Code (French: est réputée vacante), see the current Article 809 of the French Civil Code which omits the term “is presumed to be”).This indicates that, in the absence of suitable heirs, the law introduced a specific rebuttable presumption of a vacant inheritance, belonging to the state. Only after an appropriate period of time did the presumption turn into certainty, i.e. it resulted in the inability to invoke the inheritance title. In practice, this meant that thirty years after the time necessary to draw up an inventory of the inheritance and to deliberate (ad deliberandum), the inheritance ultimately fell to the State. The mechanism adopted in the Napoleonic Code made it possible, on the one hand, for the heir to acquire the inheritance, which remained under the supervision of a curator for the period when it was presumed vacant, and on the other hand, it prevented the existence of inheritances without a claimant, i.e. inheritances devoid of the persons entitled to take them over. In the post-war period, when the communist authorities passed subsequent legal acts concerning the provisions of the inheritance law, the deadlines for heirs to apply for inheritance changed. Ultimately, the legislator did not adopt the model of vacant inheritances in the regulations harmonising the inheritance law on the Polish lands since 1947; instead, a solution analogous to the one provided for in the German Civil Code of 1986 (BGB) was adopted. The “shortening” of the statute of limitations also influenced the assessment of the admissibility of further application of the provisions of the Napoleonic Code in regard to vacant inheritances during the period of the People’s Republic of Poland regime (despite the existence of different inheritance law solutions).


2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 13-27
Author(s):  
Carmen Adriana DOMOCOȘ

In a case, the court of appeal have interpreted the provisions of the law regarding the enforceable judgments delivered at first instance, with the right of appeal, or those in respect of which the parties agreed to directly exercise the appeal, when those interested or harmed by the enforcement can require the cancellation of the enforcement documents drawn up by violation of the legal provisions. The jurisprudence is not unanimous to consider the enforceability of the final civil decision is, however, a temporary one, until it is confirmed by the court of appeal, and it is removed when the court of appeal gives a contrary approach. One of the roles of the limitation is to provide the security of legal relationships, because after the expiry of the limitation period the debtor is satisfied that it can no longer be enforced, and the creditor knows that he no longer benefits from the coercive force of the state in order to recover his debt. On the other hand, to oblige the creditor to enforce a temporarily enforceable decision, about which he has no certainty that it will be upheld on appeal, means violating the very principle of the security of legal relationships, which the legislator intended to protect.


Author(s):  
Henrique Augusto Figueiredo Fulgêncio ◽  
Alexandre Araújo Costa

Resumo: O artigo versa sobre o mandado de injunção (MI), ação instituída para combater a inconstitucionalidade por omissão do Estado. Objetivou-se avaliar os resultados produzidos pelos MIs julgados procedentes pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) até 05/10/2019, de modo a identificar quantas e quais normas constitucionais foram regulamentadas em cumprimento às decisões neles proferidas e averiguar se o instituto é especialmente efetivo para os servidores públicos. O estudo considera, ainda, a modificação jurisprudencial que permitiu ao STF suprir omissões legislativas, apontada como responsável por solucionar a situação de inefetividade até então observada acerca do instituto. Trata-se de pesquisa quantitativa, censitária e observacional, desenvolvida mediante coleta de dados primários disponibilizados pelo STF. A análise dos dados relativos aos MIs envolveu seu cruzamento com informações concernentes às normas editadas em cumprimento às decisões proferidas nesses processos. Como resultado, observou-se a baixa efetividade do MI tanto em relação aos direitos de servidores, quanto aos demais direitos, situação que persistiu após a alteração jurisprudencial mencionada, a qual ensejou, por outro lado, o desempenho de um ativismo judicial bastante seletivo pelo STF.Palavras-chave: Mandado de Injunção, Supremo Tribunal Federal, análise estatística, decisões de procedência, servidores públicos. Abstract: The article deals with the writ of injunction (WI), an action instituted to combat unconstitutionality by omission of the State. Its objective was to evaluate the results produced by the WIs whose requests were granted by the Federal Supreme Court (FSC) until 10/05/2019, in order to identify how many and which constitutional norms were regulated in compliance with the decisions handed down and to verify if the institute is especially effective for public servants. The study also considers the jurisprudential modification that allowed the FSC to remedy legislative omissions, which was identified as responsible for resolving the situation of ineffectiveness hitherto observed regarding the institute. It is a quantitative, census-based and observational research developed through the collection of primary data provided by the FSC. The analysis of the data related to the WIs involved their crossing with information concerning the rules issued in compliance with the decisions rendered in these processes. As a result, the low effectiveness of the WI was observed both in relation to the rights of servants and other rights, a situation that persisted after the mentioned jurisprudential change, which, on the other hand, resulted in the performance of a very selective judicial activism by the FSC.Keywords: Writ of Injunction, Federal Supreme Court, statistical analysis, decisions of granting the requests, public servants.


1980 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 372-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Weisman

The Trust Law, 1979, came into force at the beginning of February, 1980, resolving the debate of many years as to whether the institution of private trusts is recognized in the Israeli legal system. The debate was carried on in the cases, and in scholarly articles, but despite all the ink that was spilt, the law remained uncertain. Two views recently expressed on the question, one by Cohn J. in the case ofInzelv.Kugelmas, and the other by experts in the Ministry of Justice in their preamble to the Trust Bill, are clear evidence of the uncertainty. Cohn J. wrote:The learned advocate was not aware that this Court has already recognized the existence of private trusts in Israeli Law several times, and will not turn the clock back now…The experts in the Ministry of Justice, on the other hand, stated that—The courts in Israel ruled, both in the time of the Mandate and after the establishment of the State, that the institution of private trusts has not been incorporated into Israeli law.


Obiter ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
CJ Pretorius ◽  
R Ismail

The matter of Gerolomou Constructions (Pty) Ltd v Van Wyk (2011 (4) SA 500 (GNP)) alludes to two rather problematic aspects of the law of contract: on the one hand it demonstrates that practically speaking the question of what constitutes an enforceable agreement of compromise is still no easy matter, and despite the sound judgment delivered recently by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Be Bop A Lula Manufacturing & Printing CC v Kingtex Marketing (Pty) Ltd (2008 (3) SA 327 (SCA)), it seems that the judiciary’s interpretation as to when an offer of compromise exists remains difficult to predict. On the other hand the Gerolomou decision deals with improperly obtained consensus by way of undue influence, whereas the facts actually fit more comfortably into the niche of so-called economic duress, a form of procedural impropriety that has yet to be recognized as an independent ground for setting aside a contract in our law. This case note examines these issues against the backdrop of the manner in which the case was pleaded.


2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
James W. Muir

In a recent issue I raised the question of whether Canada has developed a distinctive law of its own. With two recent publications it is possible to focus that question more narrowly and ask if there is such a thing as a distinctive Albertan law that has developed over the twentieth century. In the introduction to their book Forging Alberta's Constitutional Framework (Forging), Richard Connors and John Law declare that "Alberta has, in part, forged its own Constitution and its place within Canada's Constitution." This statement perfectly balances the issue: on the one hand, Alberta has its own Constitution that it has made itself; on the other hand, it exists as an entity within the wider Canadian constitutional framework. In his introduction to The Alberta Supreme Court at 100: History and Authority, Jonathan Swainger strikes a similar balance: "In those areas where the Court did act, the weight of evidence suggests that while some aspects of Alberta's jurisprudential path have been creative and forward looking, in others they were less inclined to strike out in new directions.... And if the Court's jurisprudence in a given area might appear tentative or tightly prescribed, in others we find indications of a distinctive "made in Alberta" flavour that did not necessarily tread expected paths."Reading these books introduces us to many interesting parts of Alberta's legal past, but in the end these sometimes unique events do not lead us to conclude that there is much distinct about the law in Alberta, whether in its constitutional framework or in its courts.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 237-250
Author(s):  
Bernadette M Waluyo

The Indonesian Supreme Court, in response to the information era, modernizes the civil procedural rules at the district court level.  This is done by issuing Supreme Court Regulation no. 1 of 2019 re. Administration of Justice at Civil Law Courts and Electronic-Court Proceedings. Undoubtedly, modernization of existing rules on the administration of justice is much needed.  On the other hand, these changes may violate a number of procedural civil law principles.  The author argues, from a civil procedural law perspective, that the above Supreme Court regulation violates the basic principle of transparency of court proceedings and physical attendance at court proceedings. 


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sipho Stephen Nkosi

The note is about the appeal lodged by the late Mrs Winnie Madikizela-Mandela to the SCA against the decision of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha, dismissing her application for review in 2014. In that application, she sought to have reviewed the decision of the Minister of Land Affairs, to transfer the now extended and renovated Qunu property to Mr Mandela and to register it in his name. Because her application was out of time, she also applied for condonation of her delay in making the application. The court a quo dismissed both applications with costs, holding that there had been an undue delay on her part. Mrs Mandela then approached the Supreme Court of Appeal, for special leave to appeal the decision of the court a quo. Two questions fell for decision by the SCA: whether there was an unreasonable and undue delay on Mrs Mandela’s part in instituting review proceedings; and whether the order for costs was appropriate in the circumstances of the case. The SCA held that there was indeed an unreasonable delay (of seventeen years). Shongwe AP (with Swain, Mathopo JJA, Mokgothloa and Rodgers AJJA concurring) held that the fact that there had been an undue delay does not necessarily mean that an order for costs should, of necessity, particularly where, as in this case, the other litigant is the state. It is the writer’s view that two other ancillary points needed to be raised by counsel and pronounced on by the Court: (a) the lawfulness and regularity of the transfer of the Qunu property to Mr Mandela; and (b) Mrs Mandela’s status as a customary-law widow—in relation to Mr Mandela.


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