The Applicability of the Laws of War to Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) and to the Gaza Strip

1990 ◽  
Vol 24 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 485-506 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nissim Bar-Yaacov
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Gaza Strip ◽  
Geneva Convention ◽  
Laws Of War ◽  
The West ◽  
Full Agreement ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Hague ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Gaza Strip

In her instructive article, Professor Lapidoth discussed, inter alia, the applicability of the laws of war to the territories administered by the Israel Defence Forces since the Six Day War of 1967. Being in full agreement with Professor Lapidoth that from the legal standpoint the situation is in need of improvement, I wish to deal more extensively with two questions: (1) What is the position of the Government of Israel regarding the applicability to Judea and Samaria and to the Gaza Strip of the Hague Regulations of 1907 respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War? (2) What is the position of the Supreme Court with regard to the applicability of the Regulations and the Convention to these territories.

The Practice and Case Law of Israel in Matters Related to International Law

1995 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 506-543 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rotem M. Giladi
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
General Framework ◽  
West Bank ◽  
Gaza Strip ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The West ◽  
Political Issues ◽  
Palestine Liberation Organization ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Gaza Strip

The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (“the Interim Agreement”) represents another stage in the implementation of the framework established in the Declaration of Principles signed between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (the “PLO”), commonly known as the “Oslo process”. In essence, the Interim Agreement provides for the establishment of self-government arrangements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as envisaged in the Declaration of Principles, while explicitly superseding the arrangements which applied in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area since May 1994. In addition, the Interim Agreement provides for “direct, free and general political elections” to be held in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.The aim of this section is to acquaint lawyers with the general framework of the Agreement, and the primary legal and political issues dealt with by the Interim Agreement, rather than to describe the specifics of each of its many provisions. Where required, reference will be made to the Declaration of Principles and to previous Agreements concluded between the Parties. At times, reference will also be made to the Camp David Framework of 1978.

Disengagement from the Gaza Strip and Post-Occupation Duties

2009 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 528-563 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Rubin
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Prime Minister ◽  
Gaza Strip ◽  
Self Determination ◽  
Humanitarian Law ◽  
Human Rights Organizations ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Gaza Strip ◽  
Israeli Occupation

Israel's disengagement from the Gaza Strip has created a situation in which this territory is dependent on the supply of various necessities by Israel, in particular the supply of electricity, In 2008 Israel decided to withhold 5% of the supply of electricity to the Gaza Strip, prompting several Gaza residents as well as human rights organizations to petition the Supreme Court of Israel against this decision. In Jaber Al-Bassiouni Ahmed v. The Prime Minister the Court assumed that the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip had ended with the disengagement and treated this issue on the basis of general humanitarian law. The basic questions of whether the occupation had ended, and whether certain duties remained with Israel, even assuming that Gaza is no longer occupied, have not been explored. This Article addresses these two questions.It is the conclusion of this Article that regardless of the terms imposed by Israel after disengagement and other reservations that have been raised in this regard, occupation ended following the complete withdrawal of any Israeli presence in the Gaza Strip. Israel's disengagement raised difficulties that are not only unique to the Gaza Strip; these difficulties emerge in most cases when occupation is replaced by a process of self-determination rather than the return of the former sovereign. The contention presented herein is that Israel continues to have certain post-occupation duties even after the occupation of Gaza. These duties correspond to the occupant's duties to care for order and civil life in the territory during the occupation. These obligations will end once the new regime in the area is able to perform the duties that fell upon the shoulders of the occupant during the occupation, or until the non-performance of the new regime is attributable to its own failures and not to the ending of the occupation. In light of these contentions, Israel is still under certain obligations regarding the Gaza Strip, among them the regular supply of electricity to that area.

Jeffersonian and Jacksonian Democracy

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Crowe
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Institution Building ◽  
Judicial Reform ◽  
The West ◽  
Territorial Expansion ◽  
Federal Judiciary ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
History Of ◽  
Jacksonian Democracy ◽  
The Government

This chapter examines the reorganization of the federal judiciary from the beginning of Thomas Jefferson's second term as president in 1805 until just prior to the Compromise of 1850. During the first half of the nineteenth century, the government faced a new set of challenges, many of which were the result of the vast territorial expansion. Territorial expansion and the politics of statehood admission intertwined with judicial reform attempts focused primarily on arranging states in circuits and ensuring regional geographic representation on the Supreme Court. The chapter considers the four stages in which the history of judicial institution building unfolded in the eras of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democracy: the Judiciary Act of 1807, the stalemate over the National Republicans' attempts to extend the circuit system to the West in the mid-1820s, the Whigs' failed consolidation plan of 1835, and the triumph of reform in the Judiciary Act of 1837.

Part 2 National and Regional Reports, Part 2.2 Asia: Coordinated by Yuko Nishitani and Béligh Elbalti, 33 Palestine: Palestinian Perspectives on the Hague Principles

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dawwas Amin
Keyword(s):  
West Bank ◽  
Gaza Strip ◽  
Palestinian Authority ◽  
The West ◽  
Conflict Of Laws ◽  
Party Autonomy ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
The Hague ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Gaza Strip

This chapter assesses Palestinian perspectives on the Hague Principles. In Palestine, the Mejella (ie the Ottoman Civil Code), is still applicable to the West Bank; it does not include rules on conflict of laws. In 2003, the Palestinian Authority published a draft civil law (PDCL), accompanied by a memorandum. In 2012, this draft was enacted as law in the Gaza Strip (GCL). Both PDCL and GCL include an identical rule on conflict of laws that clearly allows the parties to choose the law applicable to international commercial contracts. Likewise, the 2000 Palestinian Arbitration Law, applicable in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, recognizes the party autonomy principle. Currently, there is no indication on the enactment of the PDCL in the West Bank. Once this moment comes, the Hague Principles would play a role in revising the conflict of laws rules as they reflect the recent developments in the field. Besides, Article 35 of the PDCL/GCL orders the application of the principles of private international law in the absence of a relevant provision in this law concerning the conflict of laws. Thus, the Hague Principles could be used to supplement the Palestinian rules on the law applicable to contracts.

International Law of Belligerent Occupation

2021 ◽  
pp. 55-82
Author(s):  
David Kretzmer ◽  
Yaël Ronen
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
West Bank ◽  
Geneva Convention ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
The West ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Occupied Territories ◽  
The Hague ◽  
The Government ◽  
Open Question

This chapter examines the Court’s decisions on the applicability of the belligerent law of occupation to the Occupied Territories and the enforcement of that body of law by the Court. It explains the distinction the Court has drawn between customary international law and treaty law. The chapter shows that the Court regards the Hague Regulations as customary law but has not taken the same approach to the Fourth Geneva Convention. The Government of Israel adopted the view that the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the West Bank is questionable, but undertook to respect the Convention’s humanitarian provisions. The chapter shows how the Court has neither accepted nor rejected the government’s view and has left the Convention’s formal applicability as an open question. Nevertheless the Court regularly relies on the Convention and interprets is provisions. The chapter maintains that in interpreting the Convention the Court has vacillated between different theories of interpretation but has consistently adopted the interpretation that favours the government’s position in the particular cases before it.

Internal Displacement in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: Politics and the Loss of Livelihood

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maher Anawati Bitar
Keyword(s):  
West Bank ◽  
Gaza Strip ◽  
Forced Migration ◽  
Internal Displacement ◽  
The West ◽  
Internally Displaced ◽  
Palestinian Territories ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Gaza Strip ◽  
East Jerusalem

Between December 2008 to January 2009, the Israel militaries assaulted the Gaza Strip displacing over 50,000 people. This assault accentuated the already long history of Palestinian forced migration. It created ‘internally stuck persons’ (ISPs) who were no longer able to flee conflict areas to safer grounds. For the ISPs, the Gaza Strip has become a prison which is controlled by outside force. Within the context of open-air prison, the ISPs have become ‘internally displaced persons’ because they are compelled to remain within this circumscribed boundary. IDPs receive less assistance and protection than refugees. This chapter discusses the scope, extent and repercussions of the involuntary migratory movements within the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. It focuses on the physical barrier created by the Government of Israel (GoI) within the oPt. Although the displacement in Gaza, the East Jerusalem, and the West Bank is often triggered by similar and indirect factors, the latter two areas face a distinct set of triggers. A review of the preliminary displacement patterns have shown that forced displacement is both a result of and a means by which the GoI has expanded its hold of East Jerusalem and the prime areas of the West Bank. This review thus asserts that displacement cannot be simply viewed as a humanitarian crisis or a consequence of conflict or Israel’s security needs.

scholarly journals ILLEGAL LAND GRAB: ISRAEL'S SEIZURE OF LAND IN PALESTINE

Jurnal Akta ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
Saleh Raed Shatat ◽  
Ong Argo Victoria
Keyword(s):  
West Bank ◽  
Gaza Strip ◽  
Political Process ◽  
Jordan Valley ◽  
The West ◽  
Land Grab ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Gaza Strip ◽  
Palestinian Population ◽  
East Jerusalem

Since 1967, each Israeli government has invested significant resources in establishing and expanding the settlements in the Occupied Territories, both in terms of the area of land they occupy and in terms of population. As a result of this policy, approximately 380,000 Israeli citizens now live on the settlements on the West Bank, including those established in East Jerusalem (this report does not relate to the settlements in the Gaza Strip). During the first decade following the occupation, the Ma'arach governments operated on the basis of the Alon Plan, which advocated the establishment of settlements in areas perceived as having "security importance," and where the Palestinian population was sparse (the Jordan Valley, parts of the Hebron Mountains and Greater Jerusalem). After the Likud came to power in 1977, the government began to establish settlements throughout the West Bank, particularly in areas close to the main Palestinian population centers along the central mountain ridge and in western Samaria. This policy was based on both security and ideological considerations. The political process between Israel and the Palestinians did not impede settlement activities, which continued under the Labor government of Yitzhak Rabin (1992-1996) and all subsequent governments. These governments built thousands of new housing units, claiming that this was necessary to meet the "natural growth" of the existing population. As a result, between 1993 and 2000 the number of settlers on the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) increased by almost 100 percent.

DEKADENSI PEMILIHAN HAKIM AGUNG OLEH DPR RI

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-104
Author(s):  
Rustam Magun Pikahulan
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
House Of Representatives ◽  
Good Governance ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Due Diligence ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Institutional Status ◽  
The Government

Abstract: The Plato's conception of the rule of law states that good governance is based on good law. The organization also spreads to the world of Supreme Court justices, the election caused a decadence to the institutional status of the House of Representatives as a people's representative in the government whose implementation was not in line with the decision of the Constitutional Court. Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court No.27/PUU-XI/2013 explains that the House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only approve or disapprove candidates for Supreme Court Justices that have been submitted by the Judicial Commission. In addition, the proportion of proposed Supreme Court Justices from the judicial commission to the House of Representatives (DPR) has changed, whereas previously the Judicial Commission had to propose 3 (three) of each vacancy for the Justices, now it is only one of each vacant for Supreme Court Judges. by the Supreme Court. The House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only "approve" or "disagree" the Supreme Judge candidates nominated by the Judicial Commission.

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