Summary Procedures in Israel and Abroad

1967 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 210-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ernst Livneh
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Civil Procedure ◽  
European Institutions ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
History Of ◽  
New Israel ◽  
Rules Of The Game ◽  
Summary Procedure

The new Israel Civil Procedure Rules, 1963 re-enact in rr. 269–82, with certain amendments, rr. 241–50 of the Palestinian Civil Procedure Rules, 1938 dealing with “Summary Procedure on Specially Endorsed Statement of Claim”, which in their turn were a colonial version of Order XIV of the English Rules of the Supreme Court. A glance at some recent judgments in Israel shows a surprising number of cases in which doubts have arisen as to the application and scope of the Summary Procedure in general and the defendant's right to be heard in particular. One may wonder whether litigants and lower courts quite understand the rules of the game or whether the game is after all not as easy as might be expected of a summary procedure. And indeed, compared with institutions in continental Europe, where scores of thousands of claims are disposed of without discussion and complaint, our Summary Procedure seems inelegant and burdensome on plaintiff and defendant alike. It is the object of this study to compare it, and the procedure under the English Order XIV, with those European institutions. In view of the gap between Anglo-Israel and Continental notions of civil procedure it may be useful also to sketch the history of the various forms of action, viz. the (summary) trial by documents, the non-litigious executory instruments and the conditional command to pay.

scholarly journals Let's (Not) Make This Work! Why Stare Decisis Workability Should be a Sword but Not a Shield

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Audrey Lynn
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Separation Of Powers ◽  
The United States ◽  
United States Supreme ◽  
Constitutional Interpretation ◽  
Stare Decisis ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
History Of

A factor of the United States Supreme Court’s stare decisis test, workability differentiates precedential rules that have proven easy for lower courts to apply in a consistent and fair manner from those that have not. This note addresses the question of whether workability is a legitimate reason for retaining a given interpretation of a statute. The Note begins by providing an illustration of what this Note will sometimes refer to as the “preservative use” of workability. The Note then lays out the history of workability as a consideration of stare decisis and describes how the factor has changed in recent decades. In so doing, its focus is on workability in the context of statutory interpretation. In order to explain the background and development of the factor, however, it is necessary to discuss specific cases in which the Supreme Court has applied workability in the context of constitutional interpretation. The two contexts must be differentiated for purposes of this Note because the thesis of this Note—i.e., that preserving an incorrect interpretation of a statute because of its relative workability violates separation of powers—has no parallel when a court interprets a constitution because in that case there is no inherent infringement on legislative power. This Note then explains why the change toward using workability to preserve erroneous precedent is not required logically, contravenes the basic purposes of stare decisis, and is constitutionally invalid as a violation of separation of powers. Finally, this Note proposes a new way to articulate the stare decisis test that does not discard workability as a consideration but precludes the preservative use criticized by this Note.

scholarly journals Unification of the Case-law within the Civil Procedure System of Romania

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 87-100
Author(s):  
Laura Cristina Carcia
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
National Level ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Civil Procedure ◽  
Legal Practice ◽  
Legal Norms ◽  
Procedure Code ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
Extraordinary Means

The present article contains the main legal practice unification mechanisms, as regulated by the Romanian legislator in accordance with the current Civil Procedure Code, as well as those partaking to the Supreme Court jurisprudence in conjuncture with the lower courts by granting a uniform settlement on the legal issues comprised by the litigations referred to. The presentation starts off with the referral in the interest of the law, a traditional instrument within the national civil procedure legal sphere of activity, it continues with the notification of the Supreme Court for settling certain legal matters, a novelty at national level and of whose practical utility has already been recognised, and it ends by making reference to the second appeal, as an extraordinary means of challenge, with a relatively reduced efficiency, at present, in settling the different interpretations of the legal norms.

scholarly journals Pennoyer Strikes Back

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-29
Author(s):  
William V. Dorsaneo
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Metal Industry ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Lower Courts ◽  
History Of ◽  
Supreme Court Decisions ◽  
The Law ◽  
Personal Jurisdiction

The primary purpose of this Article is to evaluate the four most recent Supreme Court decisions on personal jurisdiction and situate those decisions within the history of Supreme Court personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. Starting with the seminal case of Pennoyer v. Neff, personal jurisdiction jurisprudence has been remarkably kaleidoscopic, with the Supreme Court intervening at various intervals to redefine the law in broad strokes, while zigzagging from one doctrinal position to another and thereby leaving lower courts to hash out the application of an evolving personal jurisdiction doctrine to varying fact patterns. I will divide this jurisprudential history into two main groups of cases after Pennoyer was superseded by the modern minimum contacts approach. The first group of decisions begins with International Shoe Co. v. Washington and continues through Hanson v. Denckla. The second group begins almost two decades later with Shaffer v. Heitner and continues through Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court and Burnham v. Superior Court.

Video as Text/Archive

2019 ◽  
pp. 778-797
Author(s):  
Bennett Capers
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Court Case ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Surveillance Cameras ◽  
American Law ◽  
Supreme Court Case ◽  
History Of ◽  
Constitutional Protections

This chapter focuses on a few issues related to video evidence and law, especially with respect to American law. The first issue is the history of the use of video evidence in court. The second issue involves constitutional protections regarding the state’s use of surveillance cameras. The chapter then turns to the Supreme Court case Scott v. Harris to raise concerns about the use of video evidence as not just proof but “truth.” These are of course just a sampling of the issues that the topic of video evidence could raise. The hope is that this chapter will spur further inquiry on the part of the reader.

Roe v. Wade and the History of Abortion Regulation

1989 ◽  
Vol 15 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 227-233 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Benjamin Linton
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Personal Privacy ◽  
Personal Liberty ◽  
Personal Rights ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Right Of Privacy ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Right Of Privacy ◽  
The Right ◽  
Roe V Wade

In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court held that “[the] right of privacy … founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty … is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.” The Court acknowledged that “[t]he Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.” Nevertheless, the Court held that a “right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.” However, “only personal rights that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ … are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.”

The tenure of English judges

1913 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-229 ◽  
Author(s):  
C. H. McIlwain
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Theory And Practice ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Subject ◽  
General Object ◽  
William Iii ◽  
Science Association

At the meeting of the Political Science Association last year, in the general discussion, on the subject of the recall, I was surprised and I must admit, a little shocked to hear our recall of judges compared to the English removal of judges on address of the houses of parliament.If we must compare unlike things, rather than place the recall beside the theory or the practice of the joint address, I should even prefer to compare it to a bill of attainder.In history, theory and practice the recall as we have it and the English removal by joint address have hardly anything in common, save the same general object.Though I may not (as I do not) believe in the recall of judges, this paper concerns itself not at all with that opinion, but only with the history and nature of the tenure of English judges, particularly as affected by the possibility of removal on address. I believe a study of that history will show that any attempt to force the address into a close resemblance to the recall, whether for the purpose of furthering or of discrediting the latter, is utterly misleading.In the history of the tenure of English judges the act of 12 and 13 William III, subsequently known as the Act of Settlement, is the greatest landmark. The history of the tenure naturally divides into two parts at the year 1711. In dealing with both parts, for the sake of brevity, I shall confine myself strictly to the judges who compose what since 1873 has been known as the supreme court of judicature.

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