Between June 30th, the twenty-fourth anniversary of the Islamist military takeover
in Sudan, and July 4th, Independence Day in the United States, something
miraculous happened in the Middle East. Suddenly everyone was in agreement,
and – almost – everyone was happy. President Bashar al-Assad was ecstatic.
In an interview with the Baath Party’s newspaper Al-Thawra shortly after the
army deposed Muhammad Morsi, Egypt’s first-ever freely elected civilian president,
on July 3, Assad applauded the coup as marking “essentially the fall of
political Islam.”1 In his lengthy interview, he categorized his enemies into two
groups: those “who completely abandoned their identity and embraced a ‘Western
Dream’ even with all its flaws” and those “who went in exactly the opposite
direction and abandoned their identity and embraced religious extremism.”2
The latter he alternatively designated as “Wahhabis” or “Takfiris.”
In the presumed bastions of Wahhabism in the Gulf, Morsi’s downfall
was received with even more elation. Within days, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and
the UAE pledged an aid package worth USD 12 billion to cash-strapped
Egypt, showing how much they appreciated this outcome.3 And while Israel
joined its sworn enemy Hamas in maintaining a guarded silence,4 its media
(and some politicians) did not hide their glee at Morsi’s political demise.5
As usual, the Obama administration was either unable to make up its mind
or was too embarrassed to say what it believed. But that was in itself a clear
stance, since the United States was happy to permit its key allies to provide
massive cash injections to the new army-backed regime. It also refrained from ...
Political Islam and the United States, A Study of US Policy Towards Islamist Movements in the Middle East (cf. Arch. supra. Malika Zeghal)