scholarly journals Arab Spring, Islamist Ice Age

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdelwahab El-Affendi

Between June 30th, the twenty-fourth anniversary of the Islamist military takeover in Sudan, and July 4th, Independence Day in the United States, something miraculous happened in the Middle East. Suddenly everyone was in agreement, and – almost – everyone was happy. President Bashar al-Assad was ecstatic. In an interview with the Baath Party’s newspaper Al-Thawra shortly after the army deposed Muhammad Morsi, Egypt’s first-ever freely elected civilian president, on July 3, Assad applauded the coup as marking “essentially the fall of political Islam.”1 In his lengthy interview, he categorized his enemies into two groups: those “who completely abandoned their identity and embraced a ‘Western Dream’ even with all its flaws” and those “who went in exactly the opposite direction and abandoned their identity and embraced religious extremism.”2 The latter he alternatively designated as “Wahhabis” or “Takfiris.” In the presumed bastions of Wahhabism in the Gulf, Morsi’s downfall was received with even more elation. Within days, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE pledged an aid package worth USD 12 billion to cash-strapped Egypt, showing how much they appreciated this outcome.3 And while Israel joined its sworn enemy Hamas in maintaining a guarded silence,4 its media (and some politicians) did not hide their glee at Morsi’s political demise.5 As usual, the Obama administration was either unable to make up its mind or was too embarrassed to say what it believed. But that was in itself a clear stance, since the United States was happy to permit its key allies to provide massive cash injections to the new army-backed regime. It also refrained from ...

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 19-32
Author(s):  
Khalid Hashim Mohammed

The Obama administration repeated that its promise to withdraw from Iraq on time was one of its most important achievements in the first presidential term. In fact, this withdrawal was within a broader and broader context that began to emerge in Obama's second term: withdrawal from the Middle East, In the so-called Asia "Rebalance", but the growing international chaos and the explosion of many crises in the face of the US administration such as the Syrian crisis and Iraq, especially after the so-called Arab Spring revolutions, cast a shadow over the region, and turning Iraq from the success story of the Obama administration and a benchmark for its achievements in foreign policy, a story Failure and a standard of confusion in foreign policy, and critics of the Obama administration, the American withdrawal "arbitrary" created a vacuum in Iraq filled by the opponents of the United States and lose control, or at least affect the course of the arena, both at the level of local players or regional.


2022 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 131-161
Author(s):  
G. G. Kosach

The paper examines the evolution of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy in the context of wider changes in the Middle East and in the Arab world triggered by the Arab Spring. The author argues that during this decade the Kingdom’s foreign policy has witnessed a fundamental transformation: the very essence of the Saudi foreign policy course has changed signifi cantly as the political es-tablishment has substantially revised its approaches to the country’s role in the region and in the world. Before 2011, Saudi Arabia — the land of the ‘Two Holy Mosques’ — positioned itself as a representative of the international Muslim community and in pursuing its foreign policy relied primarily on the religious authority and fi nancial capabilities. However, according to Saudi Arabia’s leaders, the Arab Spring has plunged the region into chaos and has bolstered the infl uence of various extremist groups and movements, which required a signifi cant adjustment of traditional political approaches. Saudi Arabia, more explicit than ever before, has declared itself as a nation state, as a regional leader possessing its own interests beyond the abstract ‘Muslim Ummah’. However, the author stresses that these new political ambitions do not imply a complete break with the previous practice. For example, the containment of Iran not only remains the cornerstone of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy, but has become even more severe. The paper shows that it is this opposition to Iran, which is now justifi ed on the basis of protecting the national interests, that predetermines the nature and the specifi c content of contemporary Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy including interaction with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), approaches towards the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict, combating terrorism, and relations with the United States. In that regard, the transformation of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy has, on the one hand, opened up new opportunities for strengthening the Kingdom’s interaction with Israel, but, at the same time, has increased tensions within the framework of strategic partnership with the United States. The author concludes that currently Saudi Arabia is facing a challenge of diversifying its foreign policy in order to increase its international profi le and political subjectivity.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-24
Author(s):  
Richard W. Bulliet

The causes and processes of the Arab Spring movements are less important for current political developments than the responses to those movements by states that were not directly involved. After discussing the Turkish, Israeli, Iranian, and American responses, the focus turns to the recently announced military cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Did the Saudi government conspire with the Egyptian high command to plot the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Cairo? If so, as seems likely, was the United States aware of the conspiracy? More importantly, what does the linkage between the Egyptian army and Saudi and Gulf financial support for President al-Sisi's regime suggest for the future of stability and legitimate rule in the Arab world?


Author(s):  
Christopher Phillips

This book provides an analysis of the crucial but underexplored roles the United States and other nations have played in shaping Syria's ongoing civil war. Most accounts of Syria's brutal, long-lasting civil war focus on a domestic contest that began in 2011 and only later drew foreign nations into the escalating violence. The book argues instead that the international dimension was never secondary but that Syria's war was, from the very start, profoundly influenced by regional factors, particularly the vacuum created by a perceived decline of U.S. power in the Middle East. This precipitated a new regional order in which six external protagonists — the United States, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar — have violently competed for influence, with Syria a key battleground. Drawing on a plethora of original interviews, the book constructs a new narrative of Syria's war. Without absolving the brutal Bashar al-Assad regime, the book untangles the key external factors which explain the acceleration and endurance of the conflict, including the West's strategy against ISIS. It concludes with some insights on Syria and the region's future.


2018 ◽  
pp. 3-22
Author(s):  
Mediel Hove ◽  

This article examines the origins of the ‘Islamic State’ or the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham or Levant (ISIS) in light of the contemporary political and security challenges posed by its diffusion of Islamic radicalism. The Arab Spring in 2011 ignited instability in Syria providing an operational base for the terrorist group to pursue its once abandoned Islamic state idea. Its growth and expansion has hitherto proved to be a threat not only to the Middle East but to international security given its thrust on world domination. It concludes that the United States of America’s activities in the Middle East were largely responsible for the rise of the Islamic State.


2007 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Amanda Rudman ◽  
Kevin Schoonover ◽  
Arthur Neron-Bancel ◽  
Israel Barriga

These four nations showcase the state of Islamism as a political force in the Middle East. Because of differing political circumstances in each state, the impact and viability of following Muslim law varies. In order to best explain why this is so, we will explore the political background of each nation, as well as discuss the current political climates of the countries in question. Finally, we will postulate as to what type of impact the ascension of an Islamic government will have on relations with the Western world, whether it be European nations, as is the case with Turkey, or the United States, as with Kuwait, Jordan and Egypt. The implications of this possibility are enormous; therefore, we feel that the importance of understanding the region cannot be overstated.


2019 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Rafil T. Yaqo ◽  
Sana D. Jalal ◽  
Kharaman J. Ghafour ◽  
Hemin A. Hassan ◽  
Michael D. Hughson

PURPOSE In the Middle East, incidence rate ratios (IRRs) of non-Hodgkin lymphoma (NHL) to Hodgkin lymphoma (HL) are more than 50% lower than the United States. MATERIALS AND METHODS Age-specific incidence rates (ASIRs), age-adjusted incidence rates (AAIRs), and IRRs of NHL:HL were compared using the cancer registries of Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and US SEER. RESULTS The NHL AAIR (95% CI) per 100,000 population was 4.4 (4.1 to 4.7) for Iraq, 5.4 (4.6 to 6.2) for Jordan, 4.7 (4.4 to 5.1) for Saudi Arabia, and 13.2 (13.0 to 13.4) for the United States. The HL AAIR was 1.8 (1.6 to 2.0) for Iraq, 1.8 (1.4 to 2.2) for Jordan, 2.1 (1.9 to 2.2) for Saudi Arabia, and 2.3 (2.2 to 2.4) for the United States, with respective NHL:HL IRR of 2.4 (2.2 to 2.7), 3.0 (2.4 to 3.8), 2.2 (2.0 to 2.5), and 5.7 (5.5 to 6.0). NHL ASIRs for the Middle East and the United States were similar until 30 to 39 years of age. Thereafter, ASIR of NHL peaked at 20 to 33 per 100,000 at age 70 years in the Middle East regions, all much lower than the US age 70 years rate of greater than 100 per 100,000. Diffuse large B-cell lymphoma (DLBCL) represented 52% of NHL in Sulaimaniyah Province of Iraq and 51% of NHL in Saudi Arabia. Both regions had AAIR for DLBCL less than 42% of DLBCL in US SEER. Pediatric Epstein-Barr virus–related Burkitt’s lymphoma at 8% was the second most frequent NHL in Sulaimaniyah but made little contribution to overall NHL rates. CONCLUSION The incidence of HL was slightly lower than in the United States, but it was the markedly lower rates of adult NHL with advancing age, including the predominant DLBCL, that accounted for the low NHL:HL IRR in these Middle Eastern countries.


2020 ◽  
pp. 119-156
Author(s):  
Daniel S. Markey

This chapter discusses the intersection of Chinese, Iranian, Saudi (and to a lesser extent, American and Russian) interests in the Middle East. It introduces a brief history of China’s links with the Middle East and explains how Beijing’s regional role has, until recently, tended to be relatively limited. But China’s ties to the region have grown significantly, especially in terms of energy trade and investment. The chapter explores how Iranians perceive economic and strategic value in China as a means to sustain the ruling regime, resist pressure from the United States, and compete with Saudi Arabia. It explores Saudi-China ties as well, finding that the monarchy sees China as essential to its strategy for economic development. The chapter concludes that both Tehran and Riyadh will continue to court Beijing and that the Middle East is primed for greater Chinese involvement, less reform, and more geopolitical competition.


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