Conditional Return Smoothing in the Hedge Fund Industry

2008 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 267-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas P. B. Bollen ◽  
Veronika K. Pool
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Serial Correlation ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Capital Flight ◽  
Present Evidence ◽  
Large Sample ◽  
Leading Indicator ◽  
Return Smoothing ◽  
Fund Industry

AbstractWe show that if true returns are independently distributed and a manager fully reports gains but delays reporting losses, then reported returns will feature conditional serial correlation. We use conditional serial correlation as a measure of conditional return smoothing. We estimate conditional serial correlation in a large sample of hedge funds. We find that the probability of observing conditional serial correlation is related to the volatility and magnitude of investor cash flows, consistent with conditional return smoothing in response to the risk of capital flight. We also present evidence that conditional serial correlation is a leading indicator of fraud.

Derivatives Use and Risk Taking: Evidence from the Hedge Fund Industry

2011 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 1073-1106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yong Chen
Keyword(s):  
Risk Reduction ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Market Risk ◽  
Risk Shifting ◽  
Large Sample ◽  
Event Risk ◽  
Market State ◽  
Fund Industry

AbstractThis paper examines the use of derivatives and its relation with risk taking in the hedge fund industry. In a large sample of hedge funds, 71% of the funds trade derivatives. After controlling for fund strategies and characteristics, derivatives users on average exhibit lower fund risks (e.g., market risk, downside risk, and event risk), such risk reduction is especially pronounced for directional-style funds. Further, derivatives users engage less in risk shifting and are less likely to liquidate in a poor market state. However, the flow-performance relation suggests that investors do not differentiate derivatives users when making investing decisions.

Portraits of five hedge fund fraud cases

2008 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 179-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Majed R. Muhtaseb ◽  
Chun Chun “Sylvia” Yang
Keyword(s):  
Asset Management ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Investment Fund ◽  
Good Opportunity ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Management Group ◽  
Fund Industry ◽  
Asset Managers

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is two fold: educate investors about hedge fund managers' activities prior to the fraud recognition by the authorities and to help investors and other stakeholders in the hedge fund industry identify red flags before fraud is actually committed.Design/methodology/approachThe paper investigates fraud committed by the Bayou Funds, Beacon Hill Asset Management, Lancer Management Group (LMG), Lipper & Company and Maricopa investment fund. The fraud activities took place during 2000 and 2005.FindingsThe five cases alone cost the hedge fund investors more than $1.5 billion. Investors may have had a good opportunity for avoiding the irrecoverable costs of the fraud had they carefully vetted the backgrounds of the hedge fund managers and/or continuously monitored the funds activities, especially during turbulent market environments.Originality/valueThis is the first research paper to identify and extensively investigate fraud committed by hedge funds. In spite of the size of the hedge fund industry and relatively substantial level and inevitably recurring fraud, academic journals are to yet address this issue. The paper is of great value to hedge funds and their individual and institutional investors, asset managers, financial advisers and regulators.

Hedge Fund Activism vs Other Activist Investors

2021 ◽  
pp. 252-282
Author(s):  
Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal ◽  
Jan Schnitzler
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Comparative Approach ◽  
Large Sample ◽  
Shareholder Proposals ◽  
Target Firms ◽  
Hedge Fund Activism ◽  
The Impact

This chapter reviews the growing empirical literature on shareholder activism by hedge funds. The aim is a comparative approach contrasting the impact of hedge fund activism on target firms with outcomes for other types of activist investors. Following recent research, the chapter provides an empirical analysis based on the disclosure of equity blockholdings by activist investors in a large sample of all US listed companies. In addition, it summarizes which types of investors engage in other events linked to activism, such as takeovers, proxy contests, or shareholder proposals. Overall, there is evidence that not only hedge funds but also other types of investors can be effective monitors, but there are nuanced differences with respect to targeting decisions and payout policies.

PONZI FINANCE AND THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY

2012 ◽  
Vol 15 (supp02) ◽  
pp. 1250037
Author(s):  
WILLI SEMMLER ◽  
RAPHAELE CHAPPE
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Dynamic Model ◽  
Asset Management ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Stochastic Dynamic ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Obama Administration ◽  
Regulatory Frameworks ◽  
Fund Industry

This paper presents a stochastic dynamic model that can be used to describe situations in asset management where hedge funds may inadvertently find themselves running a Ponzi financing scheme. Greater transparency is necessary to reduce such opportunities, such as audited financials, and disclosure of valuation methodologies. In that respect, new regulatory frameworks enacted by the Obama administration and the European Union are welcome developments.

scholarly journals Hedge Fund Flows and Performance Streaks: How Investors Weigh Information

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guillermo Baquero ◽  
Marno Verbeek
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Fund Flows ◽  
Hot Hand ◽  
Highly Sensitive ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Processing Abilities ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Types Of Information

Cash flows to hedge funds are highly sensitive to performance streaks, a streak being defined as subsequent quarters during which a fund performs above or below a benchmark, even after controlling for a wide range of common performance measures. At the same time, streaks have limited predictive power regarding future fund performance. This suggests investors weigh information suboptimally, and their decisions are driven too strongly by a belief in continuation of good performance, consistent with the “hot hand fallacy.” The hedge funds that investors choose to invest in do not perform significantly better than those they divest from. These findings are consistent with overreaction to certain types of information and do not support the notion that sophisticated investors have superior information or superior information processing abilities. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, finance.

Conditional Return Smoothing in the Hedge Fund Industry

CFA Digest ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-7
Author(s):  
James H. Gilkeson
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Return Smoothing ◽  
Fund Industry

Hedge Fund Regulation

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wulf A. Kaal ◽  
Dale A. Oesterle
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Private Investment ◽  
The United States ◽  
Regulatory Framework ◽  
Securities Regulation ◽  
Investment Fund ◽  
Investment Funds ◽  
Fund Industry

The hedge fund industry in the United States has evolved from a niche market participant in the early 1950s to a major industry operating in international financial markets today. Hedge funds in the United States began as privately held and privately managed investment funds, unregistered and exempt from federal securities regulation. An increasing investor demand for hedge funds and substantial growth of the hedge fund industry resulted in a tectonic shift in the regulatory framework applicable to the industry via the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act. This chapter summarizes the evolution of the regulatory framework governing the hedge fund industry. It focuses on the registration and disclosure provisions added by the Dodd-Frank Act and several other regulatory innovations, including the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act and proposals for tax reform of the private investment fund industry.

Sentiment and the Effectiveness of Technical Analysis: Evidence from the Hedge Fund Industry

2016 ◽  
Vol 51 (6) ◽  
pp. 1991-2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Smith ◽  
Na Wang ◽  
Ying Wang ◽  
Edward J. Zychowicz
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Lower Risk ◽  
Market Timing ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Technical Analysis ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Short Sale ◽  
Timing Ability ◽  
Fund Industry

This article presents a unique test of the effectiveness of technical analysis in different sentiment environments by focusing on its usage by perhaps the most sophisticated and astute investors, namely, hedge fund managers. We document that during high-sentiment periods, hedge funds using technical analysis exhibit higher performance, lower risk, and superior market-timing ability than nonusers. The advantages of using technical analysis disappear or even reverse in low-sentiment periods. Our findings are consistent with the view that technical analysis is relatively more useful in high-sentiment periods with larger mispricing, which cannot be fully exploited by arbitrage activities because of short-sale impediments.

Hedge fund marketing by broker‐dealers questions and comments in response to recent developments

2003 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-12
Author(s):  
Michael R. Butowsky ◽  
Michele L. Gibbons
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Funds Of Hedge Funds ◽  
Recent Developments ◽  
Promotional Efforts ◽  
Fund Industry

This article discusses the implications of heightened regulatory attention to hedge funds by focusing on the practical questions that are on the minds of many in the hedge fund industry and, possibly, even in the thoughts of the regulators themselves. The primary regulatory condition relevant to the offer and sale of interests in hedge funds is the prohibition on general solicitation or general advertising by the sponsor of the hedge fund. Under NASD rules, brokers must (1) provide balanced disclosures in their promotional efforts; (2) perform reasonable‐basis suitability determinations; (3) perform customer‐specific suitability determinations; (4) supervise associated persons selling hedge funds and funds of hedge funds; and (5) train associated persons regarding the features, risks, and suitability of hedge funds and funds of hedge funds. Internal controls, including supervision and compliance, must include written procedures to ensure that sales of hedge funds and funds of hedge funds comply with all relevant NASD and SEC rules. Promotion of hedge funds must be balanced by a fair presentation of the risks and potential disadvantages of hedge fund investing

Benchmarking and Bias in Hedge Funds

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey S. Smith ◽  
Kenneth Small ◽  
Phillip Njoroge
Keyword(s):  
Selection Bias ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Academic Research ◽  
Fund Performance ◽  
Measurement Bias ◽  
Return Smoothing ◽  
Survivorship Bias ◽  
Hedge Fund Returns ◽  
Hedge Fund Performance

This chapter discusses investment benchmarking and measurement bias in hedge fund performance. A good benchmark should be unambiguous, investible, measurable, appropriate, reflective of current investment opinions, specified in advance, and accountable. Additionally, a good benchmark should be simple, easily replicable, comparable, and representative of the market that the benchmark is trying to capture. Several biases, such as database selection bias, survivorship bias, style classification bias, backfill bias, self-reporting bias, and return-smoothing bias exist that impede the process of creating a benchmark. These biases increase the difficulty of studying hedge fund returns and managerial skill. However, most of the academic research on hedge fund returns report positive alphas for hedge funds.

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