Another intuitionistic completeness proof

1976 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 644-662 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. De Swart
Keyword(s):  
Slight Modification ◽  
Kripke Model ◽  
Completeness Theorem ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Kripke Models ◽  
Single Model ◽  
Completeness Proof ◽  
Definition Of

In March 1973, W. Veldman [1] discovered that, by a slight modification of a Kripke-model, it was possible to give an intuitionistic proof of the completeness-theorem for the intuitionistic predicate calculus (IPC) with respect to modified Kripke models. The modification was the following: Let f represent absurdity, then we allow the possibility that and we agree that, for all sentences ϕ, , if . Just one modified Kripke model is constructed such that validity in implies derivability in IPC. While usually one thinks of as some subset of ⋃nNatn and of as the discrete natural ordering in ⋃nNatn, in Veldman's model , is a spread and , where Γα and Γβ are sets of sentences associated with α, resp. β, is a nondiscrete ordering.In the completeness-proofs, both for Beth and for Kripke models that we present here, we consider only models over ⋃nNatn, with the natural discrete ordering and we need validity in all models, not just in one, to get derivability in IPC. Also we have to modify the definition of a model in a somewhat different way than Veldman did. We agree that if ∨s[M⊨sf], then M⊨sϕ for each s ∈ ⋃nNatn and for each sentence ϕ.One can view a single model of the type constructed in [1] as the result of throwing together all the models of (the type constructed in) this paper into one big model, which has the somewhat strange properties mentioned above.

Sufficient conditions for the undecidability of intuitionistic theories with applications

1972 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 375-384 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dov M. Gabbay
Keyword(s):  
Decision Problem ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Kripke Model ◽  
The Other ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Kripke Models ◽  
Symmetric Relation ◽  
Undecidable Theory ◽  
Classical Models ◽  
Classical Predicate

Let Δ be a set of axioms of a theory Tc(Δ) of classical predicate calculus (CPC); Δ may also be considered as a set of axioms of a theory TH(Δ) of Heyting's predicate calculus (HPC). Our aim is to investigate the decision problem of TH(Δ) in HPC for various known theories Δ of CPC.Theorem I(a) of §1 states that if Δ is a finitely axiomatizable and undecidable theory of CPC then TH(Δ) is undecidable in HPC. Furthermore, the relations between theorems of HPC are more complicated and so two CPC-equivalent axiomatizations of the same theory may give rise to two different HPC theories, in fact, one decidable and the other not.Semantically, the Kripke models (for which HPC is complete) are partially ordered families of classical models. Thus a formula expresses a property of a family of classical models (i.e. of a Kripke model). A theory Θ expresses a set of such properties. It may happen that a class of Kripke models defined by a set of formulas Θ is also definable in CPC (in a possibly richer language) by a CPC-theory Θ′! This establishes a connection between the decision problem of Θ in HPC and that of Θ′ in CPC. In particular if Θ′ is undecidable, so is Θ. Theorems II and III of §1 give sufficient conditions on Θ to be such that the corresponding Θ′ is undecidable. Θ′ is shown undecidable by interpreting the CPC theory of a reflexive and symmetric relation in Θ′.

operators and alternating sentences in arithmetic

1980 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 144-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Larry Manevitz ◽  
Jonathan Stavi
Keyword(s):  
Standard Model ◽  
Natural Number ◽  
Combinatorial Problem ◽  
The Other ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Completeness Proof ◽  
The Standard Model ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
The One ◽  
Definition Of

Determining the truth value of self-referential sentences is an interesting and often tricky problem. The Gödel sentence, asserting its own unprovability in P (Peano arithmetic), is clearly true in N(the standard model of P), and Löb showed that a sentence asserting its own provability in P is also true in N (see Smorynski [Sm, 4.1.1]). The problem is more difficult, and still unsolved, for sentences of the kind constructed by Kreisel [K1], which assert their own falsity in some model N* of P whose complete diagram is arithmetically defined. Such a sentence χ has the property that N ⊨ iff N* ⊭ χ (note that ¬χ has the same property).We show in §1 that the truth value in N of such a sentence χ, after a certain normalization that breaks the symmetry between it and its negation, is determined by the parity of a natural number, called the rank of N, for the particular construction of N* used. The rank is the number of times the construction can be iterated starting from N and is finite for all the usual constructions. We also show that modifications of, e.g., Henkin's construction (in his completeness proof of predicate calculus) allow arbitrary finite values for the rank of N. Thus, on the one hand the truth value of χ in N, for a given “nice” construction of N*, is independent of the particular (normalized) choice of χ, and we shall see that χ is unique up to (provable) equivalence in P. On the other hand, the truth value in question is sensitive to minor changes in the definition of N* and its determination seems to be largely a combinatorial problem.

Decidability of some intuitionistic predicate theories

1972 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 579-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dov M. Gabbay
Keyword(s):  
Reduction Method ◽  
Abelian Groups ◽  
Sufficient Conditions ◽  
Kripke Model ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Kripke Models ◽  
Classical Counterpart ◽  
First Order ◽  
Intuitionistic Theory ◽  
Classical Predicate

Suppose T is a first order intuitionistic theory (more precisely, a theory of Heyting's predicate calculus, e.g., abelian groups, one unary function, dense linear order, etc.) presented to us by a set of axioms (denoted also by) T.Question. Is T decidable?One knows that if the classical counterpart of T (i.e., take the same axioms but with the classical predicate calculus as the underlying logic) is not decidable, then T cannot be decidable. The problem remains for theories whose classical counterpart is decidable. In [8], sufficient conditions for undecidability were given, and several intuitionistic theories such as abelian groups and unary functions (both with decidable equality) were shown to be undecidable. In this note we show decidability results (see Theorems 1 and 2 below), and compare these results with the undecidability results previously obtained. The method we use is the reduction-method, described fully in [12] and widely applied in [3], which is applied here roughly as follows:Let T be a given theory of Heyting's predicate calculus. We know that Heyting's predicate calculus is complete for the Kripke-model type of semantics. We choose a class M of Kripke models for which T is complete, i.e., all axioms of T are valid in any model of the class and whenever φ is not a theorem of T, φ is false in some model of M.

Applications of trees to intermediate logics

1972 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dov M. Gabbay
Keyword(s):  
Kripke Model ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Kripke Models ◽  
Geometric Properties ◽  
Intermediate Logics ◽  
Truth Value ◽  
Constant Domains ◽  
Completeness Theorems

We investigate extensions of Heyting's predicate calculus (HPC). We relate geometric properties of the trees of Kripke models (see [2]) with schemas of HPC and thus obtain completeness theorems for several intermediate logics defined by schemas. Our main results are:(a) ∼(∀x ∼ ∼ϕ(x) Λ ∼∀xϕ(x)) is characterized by all Kripke models with trees T with the property that every point is below an endpoint. (From this we shall deduce Glivenko type theorems for this extension.)(b) The fragment of HPC without ∨ and ∃ is complete for all Kripke models with constant domains.We assume familiarity with Kripke [2]. Our notation is different from his since we want to stress properties of the trees. A Kripke model will be denoted by (Aα, ≤ 0), α ∈ T where (T, ≤, 0) is the tree with the least member 0 ∈ T and Aα, α ∈ T, is the model standing at the node α. The truth value at α of a formula ϕ(a1 … an) under the indicated assignment at α is denoted by [ϕ(a1 … an)]α.A Kripke model is said to be of constant domains if all the models Aα, α ∈ T, have the same domain.

scholarly journals Formula size games for modal logic and μ-calculus

2019 ◽  
Vol 29 (8) ◽  
pp. 1311-1344 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lauri T Hella ◽  
Miikka S Vilander
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Optimal Strategy ◽  
Order Logic ◽  
First Order Logic ◽  
Kripke Models ◽  
First Order ◽  
Modal Operators ◽  
Crucial Difference ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Person Game

Abstract We propose a new version of formula size game for modal logic. The game characterizes the equivalence of pointed Kripke models up to formulas of given numbers of modal operators and binary connectives. Our game is similar to the well-known Adler–Immerman game. However, due to a crucial difference in the definition of positions of the game, its winning condition is simpler, and the second player does not have a trivial optimal strategy. Thus, unlike the Adler–Immerman game, our game is a genuine two-person game. We illustrate the use of the game by proving a non-elementary succinctness gap between bisimulation invariant first-order logic $\textrm{FO}$ and (basic) modal logic $\textrm{ML}$. We also present a version of the game for the modal $\mu $-calculus $\textrm{L}_\mu $ and show that $\textrm{FO}$ is also non-elementarily more succinct than $\textrm{L}_\mu $.

On the strong semantical completeness of the intuitionistic predicate calculus

1968 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richmond H. Thomason
Keyword(s):  
Model Theory ◽  
Completeness Theorem ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
First Order ◽  
Semantic Tableaux ◽  
Weak Completeness ◽  
Skolem Theorem ◽  
Completeness Theorems

In Kripke [8] the first-order intuitionjstic predicate calculus (without identity) is proved semantically complete with respect to a certain model theory, in the sense that every formula of this calculus is shown to be provable if and only if it is valid. Metatheorems of this sort are frequently called weak completeness theorems—the object of the present paper is to extend Kripke's result to obtain a strong completeness theorem for the intuitionistic predicate calculus of first order; i.e., we will show that a formula A of this calculus can be deduced from a set Γ of formulas if and only if Γ implies A. In notes 3 and 5, below, we will indicate how to account for identity, as well. Our proof of the completeness theorem employs techniques adapted from Henkin [6], and makes no use of semantic tableaux; this proof will also yield a Löwenheim-Skolem theorem for the modeling.

The Difference Between Causal Analysis and Predictive Models: Response to “Comment on Young and Holsteen (2017)”

2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 431-447 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristobal Young
Keyword(s):  
Treatment Effects ◽  
Robustness Analysis ◽  
Model Space ◽  
Parameter Estimates ◽  
Single Model ◽  
Omitted Variable Bias ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Variable Bias ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Model Robustness

The commenter’s proposal may be a reasonable method for addressing uncertainty in predictive modeling, where the goal is to predict y. In a treatment effects framework, where the goal is causal inference by conditioning-on-observables, the commenter’s proposal is deeply flawed. The proposal (1) ignores the definition of omitted-variable bias, thus systematically omitting critical kinds of controls; (2) assumes for convenience there are no bad controls in the model space, thus waving off the premise of model uncertainty; and (3) deletes virtually all alternative models to select a single model with the highest R 2. Rather than showing what model assumptions are necessary to support one’s preferred results, this proposal favors biased parameter estimates and deletes alternative results before anyone has a chance to see them. In a treatment effects framework, this is not model robustness analysis but simply biased model selection.

Sets of theorems with short proofs

1974 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-242 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Richardson
Keyword(s):  
Proof Complexity ◽  
Predicate Calculus ◽  
Definable Set ◽  
Semantic Tableaux ◽  
Skolem Functions ◽  
Definition Of

R. Parikh has shown that in the predicate calculus without function symbols it is possible to decide whether or not a given formula A is provable in a Hilbert-style proof of k lines. He has also shown that for any formula A(x1, …, xn) of arithmetic in which addition and multiplication are represented by three-place predicates, {(a1, …, an): A(a1, …, an) is provable from the axioms of arithmetic in k lines} is definable in (N,′, +,0). See [2].In §1 of this paper it is shown that if S is a definable set of n-tuples in (N,′, +, 0), then there is a formula A(x1, …, xn) and a number k so that (a1 …, an) ∈ S if and only if A(a1 …, an) can be proved in a proof of complexity k from the axioms of arithmetic. The result does not depend on which formalization of arithmetic is used or which (reasonable) measure of proof complexity. In particular, this gives a converse to Parikh's result.In §II, a measure of proof complexity is given which is based on counting the quantifier steps in semantic tableaux. The idea behind this measure is that A is k provable if in the attempt to construct a counterexample one meets insurmountable difficulties in the definition of the appropriate Skolem functions over sets of cardinality ≤ k. A method is given for deciding whether or not a sentence A in the full predicate calculus is k provable. The question for the full predicate calculus and Hilbert-style systems of proof remains open.

Finite Kripke models and predicate logics of provability

1990 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 1090-1098 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergei Artemov ◽  
Giorgie Dzhaparidze
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Kripke Model ◽  
Finite Model ◽  
Kripke Models ◽  
Model Property ◽  
Logical Formula ◽  
Finite Model Property ◽  
Modal Predicate Logics ◽  
The One ◽  
Arithmetical Interpretation

AbstractThe paper proves a predicate version of Solovay's well-known theorem on provability interpretations of modal logic:If a closed modal predicate-logical formula R is not valid in some finite Kripke model, then there exists an arithmetical interpretation f such that PA ⊬ fR.This result implies the arithmetical completeness of arithmetically correct modal predicate logics with the finite model property (including the one-variable fragments of QGL and QS). The proof was obtained by adding “the predicate part” as a specific addition to the standard Solovay construction.

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