The freedom of Christ and explanatory priority

AbstractCall the claim, common to many in the Christian intellectual tradition, that Christ, in virtue of his created human intellect, had certain, infallible, exhaustive foreknowledgethe Foreknowledge Thesis. Now consider what I will callthe Conditional:if the Foreknowledge Thesis is true, then Christ's created human will was not free. In so far as many, perhaps all, of the people who affirm the Foreknowledge Thesis also wish to affirm the freedom of Christ's human will, the truth of the Conditional would be most unwelcome to them. I consider an argument in support of the Conditional; I argue that it is not successful.

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Principles of a Successful Social Life, In The Light of Islamic Teachings

American Journal of Economics and Business Management ◽

10.31150/ajebm.v3i3.173 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 3 (3) ◽

pp. 37-50

Author(s):

Muhammad Suleman Nasir

Keyword(s):

Social Life ◽

Code Of Conduct ◽

Well Being ◽

Human Interaction ◽

Way Of Life ◽

The People ◽

Analytical Research ◽

Sound Foundation ◽

Human Intellect ◽

Islamic Society

Society means a group of people who are living together. People need society from birth to death. Without a collective life, man's deeds, intentions, and habits have no value. Islamic society is the name of a balanced and moderate life in which human intellect, customs, and social etiquette are determined in the light of divine revelation. This system is so comprehensive and all-encompassing that it covers all aspects and activities of life. Islam is a comprehensive, universal, complete code of conduct, and an ideal way of life It not only recognizes the collectiveness of human interaction. Rather, it helps in the development of the community and gives it natural principles that strengthen the community and provides good foundations for it and eliminates the factors that spoil it or make it limited and useless. The Principles of a successful social life in Islamic society seem to reflect the Islamic code of conduct and human nature. Islam is the only religion that advocates goodness and guarantees well-being. Islam gives us self-sacrifice, generosity, trust and honesty, service to the people, justice and fairness, forgiveness and kindness, good society and economy, good deeds, mutual unity, harmony, and brotherhood. Only by practicing the pure thoughts, beliefs, and unparalleled ideas of the religion of Islam, can a person live a prosperous life and he can feel real peace and lasting contentment in the moments of his life. A descriptive and analytical research methodology will be used in this study. It is concluded that for a prosperous social life it is necessary to abide by the injunction of Islamic principles, which provides a sound foundation for a successful social life here in the world and hereafter.

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To Whom the Rules Apply

Morality and the Nature of Law ◽

10.1093/oso/9780198723479.003.0008 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 167-196

Author(s):

Kenneth Einar Himma

Keyword(s):

Legal Norm ◽

Normative System ◽

The People ◽

In Virtue Of

This chapter is concerned with two arguments for the claim that the norms of an institutional normative system with moral criteria of validity are incapable of guiding behavior (the Guidance Arguments). The problem, on this line of reasoning, is that neither a rule of recognition that validates norms on the basis of moral merit nor a norm that is valid in virtue of moral merit can properly guide the people they must be able to guide to perform law’s conceptual function. This chapter thus challenges the Guidance Arguments. It argues that the guidance function of law does not imply that every legal norm must be capable of guiding or informing the behavior of every person. It implies only that every legal norm must be capable of guiding or informing the behavior of every person whose behavior it governs.

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“Mirum est si intellectus noster omnem scientiam accipiens ex phantasmate”

Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter ◽

10.1075/bpjam.00058.ile ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 23 ◽

Author(s):

Ile Vlad

Keyword(s):

Unique Feature ◽

Natural Philosophy ◽

The Body ◽

Direct Influence ◽

Living Things ◽

Albert The Great ◽

Human Intellect ◽

In Virtue Of ◽

The Brain ◽

Humoral Activity

Abstract Albert`s so called “anthropology” is putting the human being on the top of a hierarchy of living things in virtue of a unique feature – i.e. the possession of the intellect – that offers the possibility to transcend the changing realm of nature and to rise its possessor to the dignity of his creator. Although, throughout his corpus Albert often defends the independence of the human intellect from matter and consequently from the body and senses, his works of natural philosophy seem to give us a different perspective. In De animalibus, Albert is considering the brain as the divine member of the body responsible for the operations of sensation and, to a certain degree, of intellection. Such being the case, the entire humoral activity of the human body has a direct influence on the activity of the intellect, in spite of its divine nature. Accordingly, the main purpose of my study is to point out how the classical humoral theory is integrated by Albert the Great in his physiological consideration for an explanation of the intellect placed between the murky boundaries of natural philosophy and metaphysics.

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“Where the People Can Sing, the Poet Can Live”

A Political Companion to James Baldwin ◽

10.5810/kentucky/9780813169910.003.0011 ◽

2017 ◽

Author(s):

Ulf Schulenberg

Keyword(s):

Political Philosophy ◽

African American ◽

Democratic Society ◽

Individual Responsibility ◽

Intellectual Tradition ◽

The People

This chapter places Baldwin within a larger intellectual tradition of both Western political philosophy and the African American intersections with(in) it. Ulf Schulenberg’s work then narrows its focus to develop and trace Baldwin’s humanism, a humanism that argues for individual responsibility in a democratic society. Schulenberg’s essay challenges public-private dichotomies, drawing off of Baldwin’s collapsing of the interior and exterior lives, and ultimately brings to discussion Baldwin’s view of the potential of democracy should individuals all recognize their collective and individual responsibilities.

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A Dimensão Eclesiológica do Batismo na Lumen Gentium

10.31012/978-65-5861-357-2 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Bráulio Lobo da Silva

Keyword(s):

Jesus Christ ◽

Human Action ◽

People Of God ◽

Mission Of God ◽

Presence Of God ◽

Lumen Gentium ◽

The People ◽

Child Of God ◽

In Virtue Of ◽

The Church

The present work aims to present the ecclesiological dimension of baptism in Lumen Gentium, in view of an ecclesiology of communion. God in his magnificence creates all things in view of the salvation of the cosmos. To make this, he relies on the contribution of human action. From human freedom God wants to save by making them the sign and sacrament of salvation for other humans. Hence, he has constituted a people to be the light and presence of God inside of humanity. This same people constituted, as God's property, had been prepared to receive Jesus Christ to fulfill salvation, generating from within themselves the new people of God who is the Church. Thus, baptism constitutes the human being as a new creature regenerated in Christ, forming the new people of God, making him a child of God and a member of the Church. As the mission of God continues in the Church and in every baptized person, all the people of God have the privilege of helping in salvation. In this way, every baptized person has his radical equality in virtue of the dignity of baptism, where all are missionary disciples. Thus, as a people of God, the laity is an ecclesial subject and a missionary disciple because he is a baptized, participant in the divinity of Jesus Christ and the director of the kingdom and salvation of God in the world.

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I. Election and Inheritance in Early Germanic Kingship

Cambridge Historical Journal ◽

10.1017/s1474691300003425 ◽

1941 ◽

Vol 7 (1) ◽

pp. 1-22 ◽

Cited By ~ 10

Author(s):

P. Grierson

Keyword(s):

Classical Theory ◽

Royal Family ◽

German State ◽

The People ◽

The Family ◽

Full Force ◽

Hereditary Character ◽

In Virtue Of

Few historical doctrines agreed better with the prejudices of what one may call the romantic-liberal school of historians of the last century than the classical theory of Germanic kingship. In early Teutonic society, according to this theory, there were normally no kings, but in each nation there was a royal race from which kings could be chosen by the ‘folk’ if need arose. ‘Kings’, wrote Tacitus, ‘are chosen by reason of their nobility, dukes because of their good qualities’, and it was assumed that such an arrangement, which so judiciously combined a romantic respect for aristocratic traditions with a democratic element of popular selection, still held good in the epoch of the Barbarian Invasions. More sober historians of a later epoch echoed the enthusiasm of earlier scholars. The king, wrote Kern, ‘possessed a certain hereditary reversionary right, or at least a privileged “throne-worthiness” in virtue of his royal descent. But it was the people who summoned him to the throne with the full force of law, in as much as they chose from among the members of the ruling dynasty either the next in title or the fittest. … What distinguished the king from a freely elected official was his hereditary right to the throne; but this was an hereditary right not of any individual ruler, but of a ruling family…All members of the ruling family are royal’. Bury put it even more clearly. ‘A German state might have a king or it might not, but in either case it was virtually a democracy.… Some of them had kings; any of them might at any moment elect a king; but the presence or absence of a king might almost be described as a matter of convenience, it had no decisive constitutional importance…. But the people who had no king required an executive officer of this kind likewise. Well, they had an officer who was called a graf…. The graf was elected by the assembly, and the assembly might elect anyone they liked. The king was likewise elected by the assembly, but in his case their choice was limited to a particular family, a royal family. In other words, the kingship was hereditary, and the grafship was not. But this hereditary character of the kingship was of a limited kind. When a king died, the office did not devolve on any particular kinsman of his; the sovran people might elect any member of the family they chose; they might refuse to elect any successor at all.

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