Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter

1986 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-423 ◽  
Author(s):  
Walter F. Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Judicial Supremacy

The question of WHO is the ultimate constitutional interpreter poses one of the fundamental problems with which a coherent constitutional theory must come to grips. Any answer will be closely connected to other basic theoretical interrogatives, such as WHAT is the constitution and HOW should it be interpreted. Three principal theories compete here: Judicial supremacy, legislative supremacy, and departmentalism. This paper suggests a sort of analysis that transforms the question of WHO from one that yields a universally applicable response into a more complex set of queries about degrees of deference one institution owes another under varying circumstances. What emerges is a modified version of departmentalism.

scholarly journals Politics and constitutional jurisgenesis: A cautionary note on political constitutionalism

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-111
Author(s):  
MING-SUNG KUO
Keyword(s):  
Popular Sovereignty ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Constitutional Politics ◽  
Constitutional Order ◽  
Law And Politics ◽  
The People ◽  
Robust Version ◽  
Judicial Supremacy ◽  
The Relationship

Abstract:This article aims to provide an alternative account of political constitutionalism by situating it in a broader process of constitutional politics than the traditional court vs parliament debate has suggested. Drawing upon Robert Cover’s distinction between the jurispathic and the jurisgenerative constitution, I argue that parliamentary decision-making is not necessarily more congenial to a jurisgenerative constitutional order than judicial review as political constitutionalists contend. I trace the jurispathic character of current scholarship on political constitutionalism to the presupposition of institutional sovereignty in a narrow understanding of constitutional politics, which its defenders share in common with the supporters of judicial supremacy. To move towards a robust version of non-court-centred jurisgenerative constitutionalism, which I call constitutional jurisgenesis, we need to rethink the place of politics in a constitutional order. From Cover’s idea of constitutionalnomosI take two further lessons for this new understanding of constitutional politics. First, constitutional theory should reconsider the role of institutional sovereignty in the relationship between law and politics in constitutional orders. Second, to engage the people in constitutional politics, we need to shift attention from the popular sovereignty-centred debate to constitutional narratives, which are oriented towardsnomos-building.

Discovering Sovereignty in Dialogue: Is Judicial Dialogue the Answer to Constitutional Conflict in the Pluralist Legal Landscape?

2013 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 341-376 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ming-Sung Kuo
Keyword(s):  
Focus Of Attention ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Judicial Supremacy ◽  
Dialogic Approach ◽  
Single Power ◽  
Judicial Role

Legal scholars have been inspired by the dialogic approach and rallied around it as the solution to constitutional conflict in domestic constitutional orders and the transnational legal landscape. This paper aims to show that the gravitation towards judicial dialogue in contemporary constitutional theory misses the point, given the ambiguities surrounding it. My investigation reveals that the dialogic approach does not succeed in guiding the inter-departmental or inter-regime interactions in a way that no single power would exert unilateral domination. The emergence of judicial supremacy in both national and transnational constitutional orders further suggests that underlying those ostensible examples of judicial dialogue is a transfigured conception of sovereignty. As it is the rise of judicial sovereignty that drives the move towards judicial dialogue in contemporary constitutional developments, I suggest that legal scholars shift focus of attention from the idea of dialogue to the enhanced judicial role in the new constitutional era.

Part VI Constitutional Theory, F The Canadian Constitution in a Comparative Law Perspective, Ch.50 The Canadian Constitution and the World

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Choudhry Sujit
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Complex Interplay ◽  
Constitutional Politics ◽  
Judicial Supremacy ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Dialogue Theory ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter examines the influence of elements of Canada’s constitutional model abroad, in three areas: (1) the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as an innovative way to institutionalize the relationship among legislatures, executives, and courts with respect to the enforcement of a constitutional bill of rights, as justified by “dialogue theory”, that contrasts starkly with its leading alternatives, the American and German systems of judicial supremacy; (2) Canada’s plurinational federalism as a strategy to accommodate minority nationalism and dampen the demand for secession and independence within the context of a single state, by divorcing the equation of state and nation; and (3) the complex interplay between a constitutional bill of rights and minority nation-building, as reflected in the constitutional politics surrounding the recognition of Quebec’s distinctiveness, and the role of the Supreme Court of Canada in adjudicating constitutional conflicts over official language policy arising out of Quebec.

Recovering the Political Constitution: The Madisonian Vision

2004 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Thomas
Keyword(s):  
Essential Feature ◽  
The Political ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Constitutional Interpretation ◽  
Proper Place ◽  
Constitutional Politics ◽  
Essential Step ◽  
Judicial Supremacy ◽  
Constitutional System ◽  
Constitutional Meaning

Constitutional theory has recently turned to the importance of extrajudicial constitutional interpretation. Yet much of the scholarly debate remains rooted in “legal” views of the Constitution, which continue to give primacy to the Court. This article seeks to go further by articulating a Madisonian view of the Constitution, which resituates questions of interpretation within a larger institutional framework. This Madisonian view suggests that the Constitution calls forth continual debate about constitutional meaning. The “settlement” of constitutional issues is not an essential feature of our constitutional system and, thus, constitutional politics with overlapping views, discontinuities, and essentially unsettled meanings are inherent features of the Madisonian Constitution. Recovering the Madisonian vision is an essential step in restoring both the political branches and the Court to the proper place in the constitutional scheme and, in doing so, overcoming the deeply ingrained myth of judicial supremacy.

Constituting Scotland

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Elliot Bulmer
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Theory ◽  
Constitutional Design ◽  
Global Trends ◽  
National Movement ◽  
Comparative Constitutional Law ◽  
Constitutional Thought ◽  
Scottish Government ◽  
Historical Trajectory ◽  
Constitutional Tradition

The rise of the Scottish national movement has been accompanied by the emergence of distinct constitutional ideas, claims and arguments, which may affect constitutional design in any future independent Scotland. Drawing on the fields of constitutional theory, comparative constitutional law, and Scottish studies, this book examines the historical trajectory of the constitutional question in Scotland and analyses the influences and constraints on the constitutional imagination of the Scottish national movement, in terms of both the national and international contexts. It identifies an emerging Scottish nationalist constitutional tradition that is distinct from British constitutional orthodoxies but nevertheless corresponds to broad global trends in constitutional thought and design. Much of the book is devoted to the detailed exposition and comparative analysis of the draft constitution for an independent Scotland published by the SNP in 2002. The 2014 draft interim Constitution presented by the Scottish Government is also examined, and the two texts are contrasted to show the changing nature of the SNP’s constitutional policy: from liberal-procedural constitutionalism in pursuit of a more inclusive polity, to a more populist and majoritarian constitutionalism.

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