Hidden Hands and Cross-Purposes: Austria and the Irreconcilable Conflict between Neutrality and Market Laws

2012 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
pp. 165-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew E. Harrod

Austria emerged in 1955 from a ten-year occupation administered by the four major powers of the successful anti-Third Reich coalition of World War II—France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States—as a united, independent state. The 15 May 1955 State Treaty signed by these countries and Austria spared Austria the fate of Cold War division suffered by Austria's neighbor to the north (in the ultimate East-West breakdown of Germany's parallel postwar quadripartite occupation). Paving the way for Austria's good fortune was a political quid pro quo agreed between Austrian leaders and their Soviet counterparts in Moscow the previous April. In the 15 April 1955 Moscow Memorandum, Austria consented to becoming a permanently neutral state modeled on Switzerland. This neutrality precluded a possible Austrian membership in NATO in exchange for a long-delayed Soviet assent to an end of Austria's occupation regime with a concomitant abandonment of the Soviet occupation zone and the withdrawal of all occupation troops. After the completion of this withdrawal, a fully sovereign Austria made good on its pledge with the passage on 26 October 1955 of a constitutional law declaring Austria to be “permanently neutral” and foreswearing all military alliances.

2012 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 97-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Johan Matz

This article provides an in-depth examination of the U.S. government's role in the case of Raoul Wallenberg, the courageous Swedish envoy who died mysteriously in the Soviet Union after being arrested by Soviet occupation forces at the end of World War II for unknown reasons. The article recounts how U.S. officials, particularly the diplomat Herschel V. Johnson, tried to alleviate the plight of Hungarian Jews after German forces occupied Hungary in 1944. A key part of this policy was their effort to work with Sweden in enlisting Wallenberg's help. The U.S.-Swedish relationship was never particularly close, and the mistrust that officials in each country felt toward the other side impeded any coordinated action. The article discusses the bureaucratic impediments on the U.S. side and highlights some of the obstacles that Johnson strove to overcome. The article builds on the report produced by the Eliasson Commission documenting the Swedish government's handling of the Wallenberg case. Although the Swedish authorities bore by far the greatest amount of blame for doing nothing in the face of Soviet stonewalling, Matz argues that U.S. officials also made significant misjudgments that may have exacerbated the situation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 688-700
Author(s):  
Dr. Maitham Abdul Kuder Jabbar

Since the beginning of the sixteenth century, the island of Malta has represented one of the most important countries and islands allied to Britain in the Mediterranean basin, after it extended its influence to it, and made it one of the strategic military bases in its expansionist policy and for many centuries, and after World War II and the emergence of the so-called socialist and capitalist camps or It is also expressed in the eastern camp represented by the Warsaw Pact led by the Soviet Union, and the western camp represented by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization led by the United States of America and its ally Britain, and with the increase in the importance of the Middle East region, and the flow of oil in it in commercial quantities, the importance of the island of Malta for Britain has increased, so it sought with all its diplomatic efforts To conclude a set of military agreements, alliances and treaties, and as a result of the importance of these agreements in directing the compass of Britain’s foreign policy, we had the desire to discuss the topic (British-Maltese relations in light of the bilateral military agreement 1971). The subject of the research was divided into an introduction and two sections. In the introduction, we discussed briefly the British control of the important sea lanes, which represented one of its strategic goals, and how it imposed its control over those lanes for many centuries. As for the first topic, it was due to the research necessity of several axes. The first axis was discussed The most important reasons that prompted the Maltese government to sign the bilateral military agreement with Britain, and one of the most prominent of those reasons was the political and social role of the Roman Catholic Church, and then economic factors and their impact on the signing of the agreement, and with regard to the second axis, it was about the signing of the bilateral military agreement in July 1971. The third axis discussed the terms of the agreement, which were in its entirety in the interest of the Maltese government, and the second topic talked about the position of the NATO countries on that agreement, especially the British government and the American administration.


2021 ◽  
Vol 03 (07) ◽  
pp. 215-225
Author(s):  
Alghalia Salim AL-MUGHAIRI

The research deals with the study of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during the period from 1979 to 1989 as an example of the political relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, where the world witnessed the outbreak of the Cold War between the two poles: the Soviet Union and the United States of America after the end of World War II in 1945 AD, and both of these two great powers were keen to highlight Its dominance in various aspects, especially the military, and this war received strong and strict international reactions, and the United States of America was one of the most prominent countries that condemned this war and demanded the withdrawal of the Soviet Union. The research aims to shed light on the roots of the interest of Russia and then the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and focus on the reasons that prompted the Soviet Union to launch war on Afghanistan and follow the events of the war and its escalation between 1979 and 1989 and focus on some international attitudes towards the war, especially the United States of America, and also clarify the reasons for the withdrawal of forces The Soviet Union of Afghanistan and its consequences. The research adopts the descriptive historical method, which was employed in deriving historical facts and talking about all aspects covered by the study, and the analytical method that was used in analyzing the information of documents and texts, and comparing them to reach information related to the subject of the study.


1959 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 482-484 ◽  

The Permanent Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) met in Paris early in May 1959 to consider the proposals of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom for presentation to the Soviet Union at the forthcoming conference of foreign ministers. According to the press, the proposals won a favorable reception from the Council. No formal action of approval was required, but agreement was reached on the principle of a permanent liaison between the western ministers and the Council during the Geneva conference, scheduled to begin on May 11.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Ariel Davis

Since the end of World War II, the United States has been a leading proponent of liberal internationalism and Western democratic values around the world. Modern historians generally agree that the post-war order, which produced multi-national institutions and promoted democracy, free trade, and peace, was largely shaped by the United States and the other two Allied powers, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. This paper explains how the Tehran and Yalta Conferences served as early examples of President Franklin Roosevelt’s vision for international cooperation and American global leadership. Specifically, this essay analyzes how Roosevelt used these conferences to unite the other Allied powers in an effort to end World War II and establish the foundations for the liberal international post war order. To demonstrate the significance of these conferences and their role in the development of the liberal post-war order, conference minutes between the leaders of the Allied powers and their respective foreign policy experts are analyzed. Academic writings from military and international historians are also used to evaluate the execution and outcomes of the agreements reached during these conferences.


2020 ◽  
pp. 114-139
Author(s):  
David F. Schmitz

With the German invasion of the Soviet Union and the Japanese taking all of Indochina, Roosevelt prepared the country for war and began to implement his grand strategy for victory. The president implemented his expansive vision of the Monroe Doctrine to allow naval escorts of lend-lease supplies across the North Atlantic, extended American aid to Russia, creating the Grand Alliance of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, and joined with London in enumerating Western war aims through the adoption of the Atlantic Charter. At the same time, he extended the economic embargo against Japan to include oil, bringing the final break in relations with Tokyo. By the fall 1941, the U.S. Navy was engaged in the Battle of the Atlantic with German submarines. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 brought the United States directly into World War II.


2019 ◽  
pp. 199-230
Author(s):  
Anand Toprani

This chapter offers a reassessment of Germany’s oil strategy during World War II. Fuel consumption during Germany’s early campaigns (1939–40) was lower than expected, but the swift victory over France left the Third Reich in a quandary. Before the war, Europe had imported two-thirds of its petroleum consumption. Germany’s prewar efforts had only aimed to make it self-sufficient—the Third Reich could not hope, however, to replace the supplies other European nations had imported from overseas. German planners concluded that unless Germany took control of the oil resources of either the Soviet Union or the Middle East, fuel shortages would soon derail the entire war effort. This looming energy crisis in Europe strengthened Hitler’s ideological and strategic conviction that Germany should risk a two-front war in 1941 by attacking the Soviet Union before the United States could intervene.


1980 ◽  
Vol 74 (1) ◽  
pp. 122-133 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claus Arndt

During the current political era, which has been marked by the attempts of the two superpowers to abate the economic and political burdens of their intercontinental and other “military build-up” through mutual dialogue (e.g., SALT, MBFR) and to achieve a certain détente in their relationship, a government came to power in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) after the 1969 parliamentary elections, whose declared goal was to make its own German contribution to help bring about a relaxation in international tensions, secure the peace in Central Europe, and make life there more tolerable for its inhabitants. The effort was all the more important because Germany was and is the only place on earth where the United States and the Soviet Union face each other directly. Initially, this political goal, securing the peace by relaxing tensions, was effected by the establishment of an extensive system of international treaties, usually between the Federal Republic of Germany on the one side, and the states of Eastern Europe with Communist governments on the other. Only to the extent that Berlin and the rights of the Allied powers of World War II were affected, were the three Western occupying powers (the United States, the United Kingdom, and France) included in the system of treaties, partly by exchanges of notes and partly directly (e.g., the Berlin Quadripartite Agreement).


Author(s):  
Benjamin Tromly

During the height of the Cold War in the 1950s, the United States government unleashed covert operations intended to weaken the Soviet Union. As part of these efforts, the CIA undertook support of Russian exiles, populations uprooted either during World War II or by the Russian Revolution decades before. No one seemed better prepared to fight in the American secret war against communism than the uprooted Russians, whom the CIA directed to carry out propaganda, espionage, and subversion operations from their home base in West Germany. Yet the American engagement of Russian exiles had unpredictable outcomes. Drawing on recently declassified and previously untapped sources, Cold War Exiles and the CIA examines how the CIA’s Russian operations became entangled with the internal struggles of Russia abroad and also the espionage wars of the superpowers in divided Germany. What resulted was a transnational political sphere involving different groups of Russian exiles, American and German anti-communists, and spies operating on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Inadvertently, CIA’s patronage of Russian exiles forged a complex sub-front in the wider Cold War, demonstrating the ways in which the hostilities of the Cold War played out in ancillary conflicts involving proxies and non-state actors.


1999 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 537-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vally Koubi

Because of the nature of modern weapons, significant innovations in arms technology have the potential to induce dramatic changes in the international distribution of power. Consider, for example, the “strategic defense initiative” (SDI), a program initiated by the United States in the early 1980s. Had the program been successfully completed, it might have led to a substantial devaluation of Soviet nuclear capabilities and put the United States in a very dominant position. It should not then come as a surprise that interstate rivalry, especially among super powers, often takes the form of a race for technological superiority. Mary Acland-Hood claims that although the United States and the Soviet Union together accounted for roughly half of the world's military expenditures in the early 1980s, their share of world military research and development (R&D) expenditures was about 80 percent. As further proof of the perceived importance of R&D, note that whereas the overall U.S. defense budget increased by 38 percent (from $225.1 billion to $311.6 billion in real terms) from 1981 to 1987, military R&D spending increased by 100 percent (from $20.97 billion to $41.96 billion). Moreover, before World War II military R&D absorbed on average less than 1 percent of the military expenditure of major powers, but since then it has grown to 11–13 percent. The emphasis on military technology is bound to become more pronounced in the future as R&D becomes the main arena for interstate competition.


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