A New China, the Old Politics

Worldview ◽  
1972 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 10-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
O. Edmund Clubb

An occurrence in 1968 far from China's borders may have contributed substantially to bringing about a change in Peking's foreign policy. On August 20-21, there was the startling intervention in Czechoslovakia by the USSR and four other Warsaw Pact powers. A warning letter the five had sent previously to the Czechoslovak Communist Party set forth a significant rationale: “… we cannot agree to have hostile forces push your country away from the road of socialism and create the danger of Czechoslovakia being severed from the socialist community… . The frontiers of the socialist world have moved … to the Elbe and the Bohemian Forest. We shall never agree to these historic gains of socialism … being placed in jeopardy.” The Brezhnev Doctrine of “limited sovereignty” had been born, and if it were judged warrant for taking action against unorthodoxy in Czechoslovakia, it was in logic equally applicable to China. In any event, Moscow's military action against the deviant Communist state was by itself an indication that, in some circumstances, the Soviet Union might be prepared to employ its armed forces elsewhere outside its borders.

Author(s):  
Jorge I. Domínguez

Cuba’s Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), founded in 1959, have been among the world’s most successful military. In the early 1960s, they defended the new revolutionary regime against all adversaries during years when Cuba was invaded at the Bay of Pigs in 1961, faced nuclear Armageddon in 1962, and experienced a civil war that included U.S. support for regime opponents. From 1963 to 1991, the FAR served the worldwide objectives of a small power that sought to behave as if it were a major world power. Cuba deployed combat troops overseas for wars in support of Algeria (1963), Syria (1973), Angola (1975–1991), and Ethiopia (1977–1989). Military advisers and some combat troops served in smaller missions in about two dozen countries the world over. Altogether, nearly 400,000 Cuban troops served overseas. Throughout those years, the FAR also worked significantly to support Cuba’s economy, especially in the 1960s and again since the early 1990s following the Soviet Union’s collapse. Uninterruptedly, officers and troops have been directly engaged in economic planning, management, physical labor, and production. In the mid-1960s, the FAR ran compulsory labor camps that sought to turn homosexuals into heterosexuals and to remedy the alleged socially deviant behavior of these and others, as well. During the Cold War years, the FAR deepened Cuba’s alliance with the Soviet Union, deterred a U.S. invasion by signaling its cost for U.S. troops, and since the early 1990s developed confidence-building practices collaborating with U.S. military counterparts to prevent an accidental military clash. Following false starts and experimentation, the FAR settled on a model of joint civilian-military governance that has proved durable: the civic soldier. The FAR and the Communist Party of Cuba are closely interpenetrated at all levels and together endeavored to transform Cuban society, economy, and politics while defending state and regime. Under this hybrid approach, military officers govern large swaths of military and civilian life and are held up as paragons for soldiers and civilians, bearers of revolutionary traditions and ideology. Thoroughly politicized military are well educated as professionals in political, economic, managerial, engineering, and military affairs; in the FAR, officers with party rank and training, not outsider political commissars, run the party-in-the-FAR. Their civilian and military roles were fused, especially during the 1960s, yet they endured into the 21st century. Fused roles make it difficult to think of civilian control over the military or military control over civilians. Consequently, political conflict between “military” and “civilians” has been rare and, when it has arisen (often over the need for, and the extent of, military specialization for combat readiness), it has not pitted civilian against military leaders but rather cleaved the leadership of the FAR, the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), and the government. Intertwined leaderships facilitate cadre exchanges between military and nonmilitary sectors. The FAR enter their seventh decade smaller, undersupplied absent the Soviet Union, less capable of waging war effectively, and more at risk of instances of corruption through the activities of some of their market enterprises. Yet the FAR remain both an effective institution in a polity that they have helped to stabilize and proud of their accomplishments the world over.


2020 ◽  
pp. 97-110
Author(s):  
Yevgeny Ryabinin

The hypothesis of this research is that Russia has been imposing its influence on Ukraine since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Before the political and military crisis in 2013, it was an indirect influence, whereas since 2014 it has been a direct impact in many spheres. It is necessary to underline that Ukraine has always been split into two parts in terms of foreign policy priorities, language, religion, and culture. This fact was mentioned by Samuel Huntington, who predicted an intense crisis in bilateral relations between Russia and Ukraine in his work Clash of Civilizations. There were two parties in Ukraine that were widely supported in South-Eastern Ukraine, namely the Party of Regions and the Communist Party. The former never spoke about the integration of Ukraine as part of Russian integrational projects because its politicians were afraid of aggressive Russian capital. So they only used pro-Russian rhetoric to win elections. The Communist Party openly backed integration with Russia, but didn’t get enough support as for this idea. It is also demonstrated that there were no parties that were backed financially by Russia, because the parties that offered a kind of a union with Russia never got any seats in the parliament. Since 2014, Russia has been imposing its influence on Ukraine in various spheres, such as economics, politics, diplomacy, the military sphere, etc. Having signed two cease-fire agreements, Russia and Ukraine have failed to apply them and the crisis continues to this day.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1187-1216
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Hosking

The USSR was a unique empire in the universality of its claims and its aim of complete equality between nationalities. Its strengths and weaknesses were indissolubly connected. It was formally a federal state, with extensive rights given to constituent nationalities; in practice it was tightly centralized through Gosplan, the armed forces, the security services, and the Communist Party, with its messianic ideology. The USSR’s tight centralization ensured that in wartime it could mobilize social energy to an unprecedented extent, but also that in peacetime localized patronage became the main form of social cohesion. The economy was so rigidly planned as to discourage innovation, which meant that the USSR could not maintain its superpower status. Its nationality policy both encouraged ethnic feeling and repressed it. The final collapse was precipitated by the clash between the largest republic, Russia, and the Soviet Union as a whole.


1997 ◽  
Vol 25 (02) ◽  
pp. 255-268
Author(s):  
Basil Dmytryshyn

Literature in many languages (documentary, monographic, memoir-like and periodical) is abundant on the sovietization of Czechoslovakia, as are the reasons advanced for it. Some observers have argued that the Soviet takeover of the country stemmed from an excessive preoccupation with Panslavism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by a few Czech and Slovak intellectuals, politicians, writers and poets and their uncritical affection and fascination for everything Russian and Soviet. Others have attributed the drawing of Czechoslovakia into the Soviet orbit to Franco-British appeasement of Hitler's imperial ambitions during the September 1938, Munich crisis. At Munich, Czechoslovakia lost its sovereignty and territory, France its honor, England its respect and trust; and the Soviet Union, by its abstract offer to aid Czechoslovakia (without detailing how or in what form the assistance would come) gained admiration. Still others have pinned the blame for the sovietization of Czechoslovakia on machinations by top leaders of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, who, as obedient tools of Moscow, supported Soviet geopolitical designs on Czechoslovakia, who sought and received political asylum in the USSR during World War II, and who returned to Czechoslovakia with the victorious Soviet armed forces at the end of World War II as high-ranking members of the Soviet establishment. Finally, there are some who maintain that the sovietization of Czechoslovakia commenced with the 25 February 1948, Communist coup, followed by the tragic death of Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk on 10 March 1948, and the replacement, on 7 June 1948, of President Eduard Beneš by the Moscow-trained, loyal Kremlin servant Klement Gottwald.


1977 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 673-706 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Andrew

On the morning of Saturday 25 October 1924 Philip Snowden, the Labour chancellor of the exchequer, was woken by the sound of J. H. Thomas, the colonial secretary, hammering on his bedroom door. ‘Get up, you lazy devil!’ Thomas is reported to have said. ‘We';re bunkered.’ What Thomas really said was probably more vivid but less printable. The cause of his excitement was the publication of the Zinoviev letter, the greatest Red Scare in British political history. Allegedly written by Zinoviev, president of the communist International, to the British Communist party on 15 September 1924. this sinister document instructed British Communists to put pressure on their sympathizers in the Labour party, to ‘strain every nerve’ for the ratification of the recent treaty with the Soviet Union, to intensify ‘agitation-propaganda work in the armed forces’, and generally to prepare for the coming of the British revolution. A copy of the letter was first obtained by the Daily Mail, then circulated by the Mail to the rest of Fleet Street. It was published in the press four days before the general election of 29 October 1924, at a critical moment in the life of the first Labour government. Until its publication Labour leaders felt their election campaign was going well. Afterwards they changed their minds.


2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (3) ◽  
pp. 253-286
Author(s):  
Jakub Szumski

The article examines the relationship between the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, and the First Secretary of the Polish United Worker’s Party, Edward Gierek, during the 1970s and contributes to the understanding of relationships between Brezhnev and other leaders of the Eastern Bloc. In order to fulfill his foreign policy goals, Brezhnev needed active and willing cooperation from the Eastern Bloc and its leaders benefited from this endeavor. Gierek responded to this demand by entering into an “uneven friendship” with Brezhnev that was established according to the Soviet “friendship code.” This privileged relationship was dependent on the inner situation within the Soviet leadership, the progress of détente, Poland’s domestic stability, and ultimately did not counterbalance Poland’s structurally disadvantageous status in the Eastern Bloc.


1988 ◽  
Vol 44 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 226-239
Author(s):  
R. Gopalakrishnan

Soviet intervention in Afghanistan clearly indicates the strategic implications of its location. The political instability in the region (rise of fundamentalism in Iran, Iran-Iraq War and so on) has added to this significance. Be that as it may, Afghanistan's situation can be expressed in terms of its susceptibility to external pressures and intense factionalism within the land-locked state's dynamic populations. This latter aspect had divided the country several times over. Afghan foreign policy, therefore, has been viewed in this perspective. The present article reviews the stated facts to highlight the geographical significance of the location and its impact on the foreign policy. Introduction of the armed forces in national politics (this formed an important element in the country's politics right from the beginning) has been the most conspicuous development; it determined the who's and what's of the government. Traditional pressure groups, despite retaining some of their old hold on the society, had given way to radical groups or factions, armed forces and insurgent elements. These penetrated various strata of the Afghan society. Since 1963, when political liberalisation and participation was introduced, disruptive tendencies gradually impinged on the state's activities. Generally, this was evident between 1963–73 and was particularly so after the 1973 coup, when the Monarchy was replaced by a republican regime under Daud. Both, the Armed Forces and the Communist Party were involved but were sidelined once power was secured. This change did not bring the expected transformations in the patterns of administration. The change was only in name and power was still concentrated with Daud who began to implement his own policies that emerged between 1953–63. The period of his first stint in power coincided wiih an aggravation of problems, political and economic, caused by a closure of transit facilities. However, this pause was fully exploited by the radical parties who gradually brought the dominant elements of the Armed Forces under their influence, so that, they were able to deliver a coup d'etat under the leadership of Tarakki in April 1978. The new regime was not able to maintain effective control over the political situation that for the next twenty months brought internal political instability to its height and compelled the Soviet Union to move (this was perhaps to protect its vulnerable southern underbelly). The period from April 1978 onwards, saw active non-cooperation, large scale desertions from the Armed Forces and a deterioration of the economy. In addition, open opposition by the religious groups and insurgent elements presented a political picture that has been so vividly illustrated by Afghan political history. Intense factionalism and infighting within the regime saw Amin replacing the moderate Tarakki in September 1979. This led to a worsening of the political situation with the state at war with itself. This compelled the Soviet Union to move into Afghanistan. In a short but bloody war, Amin was disposed and a government under Karmal was established with Soviet support1. These developments then, clearly suggest the need to review the background of the patterns and problems of the foreign policy of Afghanistan as determined and identified by its locational characteristics.


Worldview ◽  
1977 ◽  
Vol 20 (12) ◽  
pp. 15-19
Author(s):  
Walter C. Clemens

A resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union dated January 31, 1977, declares that “the victory of October |1917| is the main event of the twentieth century, one that radically changed the course of development for all humanity.” The reason is simple: That victory produced the world's first Socialist state.“Under Communist Party leadership the workers of our country successfully coped with the main and most complicated task of the socialist revolution—the creative.” This was done, we are told, under most difficult conditions, starting with the low level of productive forces and culture inherited from czarist Russia and including the hardships imposed by a series of external attacks.


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