The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: An Unlikely Weapon in the Fight Against AIDS

2001 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 469-485
Author(s):  
Andrea M. Curti

One of the most controversial aspects of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is its trade policy governing pharmaceutical products that treat AIDS and other diseases. Critics contend that the WTO unreasonably restricts the trade of pharmaceuticals in order to protect the profit margin of western drug producers at the expense of infected populations in developing countries. Supporters of the WTO's trade policy argue that protecting the intellectual property (IP) rights of pharmaceutical products is essential to providing an incentive for further drug research and development.

Author(s):  
Sivan Shlomo Agon

The present chapter concludes the work. It sums up the key findings of the study while discussing the results emerging from a comparative analysis of the three categories of disputes examined throughout the book. The chapter then revisits the central arguments put forth in the book and articulates the lessons to be learned for the study of the goals, operation, and effectiveness of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement System (DSS), and of international courts more broadly. It also discusses some of the insights to be offered with respect to possible institutional changes or reforms of the WTO DSS, with a view to ensuring the system’s future effectiveness. The chapter closes with several observations that go beyond effectiveness, pertaining to the costs and unintended consequences attendant on more effective and empowered international adjudication.


Author(s):  
Carsten Herrmann-Pillath

Based on Rodrik’s diagnosis of a “globalization trilemma” in designing the institutions of international economic exchange, this chapter suggests a solution that applies Sen’s argument favoring realization-focused comparisons over transcendental institutionalism in evaluating institutions. In the paradigm of deliberative trade policy, this contribution approaches the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a regime of deliberation, reaching beyond the scope of interactions with civil society. This prepares the ground for normative principles of WTO reform that shift the emphasis from efficiency to justice, mainly in the procedural sense. The central operational criterion is the inclusiveness of international trade and trade policy. This is applied on the issues of multilateralism versus regionalism and the design of the dispute settlement process. A WTO renewed under the auspices of deliberative trade policy can meet the challenges of new trade policy issues such as coordination of regulatory regimes under the conditions of rapid and unpredictable technological change, and can resolve the tension between democracy and globalization as laid out in the globalization trilemma.


Author(s):  
Rambod Behboodi

SummaryThe disputes between Canada and Brazil over subsidies to the regional aircraft industry were the first cases under Part II (covering prohibited subsidies) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Duties (SCM Agreement) of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The PROEX case, involved the scope of the concept of “special and differential treatment” under Article 27 of the SCM Agreement, and the interpretation of the first paragraph of Item (k) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies as set out in Annex I to the SCM Agreement. The Canada — Aircraft case involved, for the first time, Article 1 of the SCM Agreement, which defines what practices constitute a subsidy, and Article 3, which prohibits subsidies “contingent, in law or in fact, upon export performance.” The case also dealt with important procedural issues relating to WTO dispute settlement. The author reviews critically these decisions with respect to both substantive and procedural issues.


Author(s):  
Christiane Gerstetter

This chapter analyses how the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement bodies legitimize their decisions and by implication also the WTO Dispute Settlement System as well as the WTO as an institution more broadly. The author argues there are two relevant dimensions for understanding how judges legitimize judicial decisions: the substantive outcomes of cases, that is who wins and loses and what interpretations are adopted, and the way a judicial decision is justified. She concludes that the WTO dispute settlement bodies act strategically in order to win the acceptance of the member states, and ultimately legitimize this dispute settlement system as a judicial entity.


2017 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 395-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
PETROS C. MAVROIDIS ◽  
NIALL MEAGHER ◽  
THOMAS J. PRUSA ◽  
TATIANA YANGUAS

AbstractThe World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement process allows a defending Member a ‘reasonable period of time’ (RPT) to implement any findings that its contested measures are inconsistent with WTO law. If agreement on this RPT cannot be reached, Article 21.3(c) of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) provides for the possibility of arbitration on the length of the RPT. The DSU provides limited guidelines on the RPT, stating only that it should not normally exceed 15 months. In practice, Arbitrators have developed the standard that the RPT should reflect the shortest possible period under the domestic legal system of the defending Member to make the changes necessary to comply with the WTO rulings. Our research confirms that in practice Arbitrators have determined this period by ‘splitting the difference’ approximately between the periods suggested by the complaining and defending Member. In addition, the process appears to reward defending Members that request an RPT that exceeds the 15-month guideline in Article 21.3(c).


Author(s):  
Sivan Shlomo Agon

Recent years have confronted the World Trade Organization (WTO) Dispute Settlement System (DSS) with an intense wave of complex linkage disputes. US-Clove Cigarettes, which stands at the centre of this chapter, serves as the second case study in the investigation into the DSS’s goal-attainment endeavours in this category of WTO disputes. The chapter begins with a review of several jurisprudential milestones leading from the early US-Shrimp, examined in Chapter 5, to the more recent US-Clove Cigarettes, examined here, with a view to portraying the legitimation continuum of which the latter dispute forms a part. The chapter then discusses the intricate legitimacy setting in which US-Clove Cigarettes unfolded and, through a close goal-oriented analysis, shows how the intensified legitimacy concerns aroused shaped the goals pursued by the DSS and the judicial choices made towards their achievement. The chapter concludes by linking the goal-attainment efforts identified to the broader DSS goal-based effectiveness framework advanced in the book.


2002 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-134 ◽  
Author(s):  
KYM ANDERSON

The dispute resolution procedures of the World Trade Organization allow sanctions to be imposed when a country is unwilling to bring a WTO-inconsistent trade measure into conformity. Apart from the fact that the procedure for triggering the retaliation process has ambiguities that need to be removed, the retaliation itself has some undesirable economic features. This paper looks at why compensation is not preferred to retaliation and then examines five economic features of the temporary trade retaliation that WTO may permit under certain conditions. Both efficiency and equity concerns are raised. The paper concludes with some suggestions for reforming this part of WTO dispute resolution during the review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding that is due to be completed by May 2003.


2004 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 861-895 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorand Bartels

As with other legal systems based on a separation of powers, the World Trade Organization is marked by a degree of tension between its political organs and its quasi-judicial organs, in particular the Appellate Body. In late 2000 this tension spilled out into the public domain, when the Appellate Body announced a procedure for the filing ofamicus curiaebriefs in theEC-Asbestoscase.1The question of public participation in WTO dispute settlement proceedings is sensitive to many WTO Members, and in expressly encouraging the submission ofamicusbriefs in this way the Appellate Body was felt to be overstepping its functions.2In the end, this dispute settled with a draw, the Appellate Body deciding that it had no need to consider any of theamicusbriefs submitted in that particular case, and yet still maintaining that panels and the Appellate Body have the right to take unsolicitedamicusbriefs into account, should they so choose.


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