An elitist naturalistic fallacy and the automatic-controlled continuum

2000 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 695-696 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandra L. Schneider

Although a focus on individual differences can help resolve issues concerning performance errors and computational complexity, the understanding/acceptance axiom is inadequate for establishing which decision norms are most appropriate. The contribution of experience to automatic and controlled processes suggests difficulties in attributing interactional intelligence to goals of evolutionary rationality and analytic intelligence to goals of instrumental rationality.

Author(s):  
Keith E. Stanovich ◽  
Richard F. West ◽  
Maggie E. Toplak

Because rationality is an issue across many disciplines, it has acquired many different definitions. This chapter describes definitions of rationality from cognitive science that are amenable to a program of measuring individual differences. Definitions of both epistemic and instrumental rationality are described in terms in terms of axiomatic utility theory and probability theory. It is argued that the wide range of tasks investigated in the heuristics and biases literature captures most aspects of epistemic and instrumental rationality.


2000 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 645-665 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith E. Stanovich ◽  
Richard F. West

Much research in the last two decades has demonstrated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision making and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be interpreted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experimenter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implications of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance errors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations underlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Unexpected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin C. Ruisch ◽  
Rajen A. Anderson ◽  
David A. Pizarro

AbstractWe argue that existing data on folk-economic beliefs (FEBs) present challenges to Boyer & Petersen's model. Specifically, the widespread individual variation in endorsement of FEBs casts doubt on the claim that humans are evolutionarily predisposed towards particular economic beliefs. Additionally, the authors' model cannot account for the systematic covariance between certain FEBs, such as those observed in distinct political ideologies.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter C. Mundy

Abstract The stereotype of people with autism as unresponsive or uninterested in other people was prominent in the 1980s. However, this view of autism has steadily given way to recognition of important individual differences in the social-emotional development of affected people and a more precise understanding of the possible role social motivation has in their early development.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin Arceneaux

AbstractIntuitions guide decision-making, and looking to the evolutionary history of humans illuminates why some behavioral responses are more intuitive than others. Yet a place remains for cognitive processes to second-guess intuitive responses – that is, to be reflective – and individual differences abound in automatic, intuitive processing as well.


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily F. Wissel ◽  
Leigh K. Smith

Abstract The target article suggests inter-individual variability is a weakness of microbiota-gut-brain (MGB) research, but we discuss why it is actually a strength. We comment on how accounting for individual differences can help researchers systematically understand the observed variance in microbiota composition, interpret null findings, and potentially improve the efficacy of therapeutic treatments in future clinical microbiome research.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason D'Cruz

Abstract In making the case that “rationalization is rational,” Cushman downplays its signature liability: Rationalization exposes a person to the hazard of delusion and self-sabotage. In paradigm cases, rationalization undermines instrumental rationality by introducing inaccuracies into the representational map required for planning and effective agency.


1991 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 277-277 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sharon L. Wadle

Lack of training is only an excuse for not collaborating outside of the therapy room. With our present training, speech-language clinicians have many skills to share in the regular classroom setting. This training has provided skills in task analysis, a language focus, an appreciation and awareness of individual differences in learning, and motivational techniques.


2019 ◽  
Vol 62 (12) ◽  
pp. 4335-4350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Seth E. Tichenor ◽  
J. Scott Yaruss

Purpose This study explored group experiences and individual differences in the behaviors, thoughts, and feelings perceived by adults who stutter. Respondents' goals when speaking and prior participation in self-help/support groups were used to predict individual differences in reported behaviors, thoughts, and feelings. Method In this study, 502 adults who stutter completed a survey examining their behaviors, thoughts, and feelings in and around moments of stuttering. Data were analyzed to determine distributions of group and individual experiences. Results Speakers reported experiencing a wide range of both overt behaviors (e.g., repetitions) and covert behaviors (e.g., remaining silent, choosing not to speak). Having the goal of not stuttering when speaking was significantly associated with more covert behaviors and more negative cognitive and affective states, whereas a history of self-help/support group participation was significantly associated with a decreased probability of these behaviors and states. Conclusion Data from this survey suggest that participating in self-help/support groups and having a goal of communicating freely (as opposed to trying not to stutter) are associated with less negative life outcomes due to stuttering. Results further indicate that the behaviors, thoughts, and experiences most commonly reported by speakers may not be those that are most readily observed by listeners.


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