Associations among the Subtests: A Short-Form CART

Chapter 12 describes a large-scale study of the short-form version of the CART. The short-form is composed of 11 of the 20 subtests and can be completed in less than two hours by most subjects. The short-form CART includes both the Probabilistic and Statistical Reasoning and the Scientific Reasoning subtests, as both are at the core of most definitions of rational thinking. All four subtests that directly tap the avoidance of miserly processing are included in the short form. The Probabilistic Numeracy subtest is included in the short-form CART because it is statistically quite potent for the amount of time that it takes. All four subtests assessing contaminated mindware are included in the short-form. Chapter 12 reports the results of a study of short-form performance involving 372 subjects. Reliabilities of all the subtests are reported, as well as correlations with cognitive ability and the Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale. Correlations among all the subtests are reported as well as a principal components analysis of the subtests.

The CART: Context, Caveats, and Questions

This chapter contextualizes the CART within the broader literature on cognitive ability assessment and critiques the CART, pointing out certain caveats and cautions that follow from its status as a beta (or early prototype) version of a rational thinking assessment. The chapter discusses the relation of the CART to other related instruments in the literature. The relation of the CART to the Great Rationality Debate in cognitive science is discussed. Within-subtest reliability is discussed, as is the CART’s overall structure. The reasons for omitting certain heuristics and biases tasks are explained. The chapter examines some limitations on its use. Coaching effects are discussed.

Associations among the Subtests: The Full-Form CART

This chapter describes a large-scale study of the full-form version of the CART involving 747 subjects. Reliabilities of all the subtests are reported, as well as correlations with measures of cognitive ability and the four thinking disposition scales of the CART. Correlations among all the subtests are reported as well as a principal components analysis of the subtests. Comparisons between the full-form CART and the short-form CART are presented as well as comparisons with even briefer forms of the test than the short form.

Contaminated Mindware

Knowledge becomes implicated in rationality in two different ways. When the knowledge bases discussed in Chapter 9 are missing, the problem is called a mindware gap. A different type of mindware problem arises because some acquired mindware can be the direct cause of irrational actions that thwart our goals. This type of problem has been termed the problem of contaminated mindware. Four subtests of the CART assess contaminated mindware: the Superstitious Thinking subtest; Antiscience Attitudes subtest; Conspiracy Beliefs subtest; and Dysfunctional Personal Beliefs subtest. The history of each subtest is described, as well as a large study of each subtest in which correlations with cognitive ability and thinking dispositions are examined. Correlations among these subtests themselves are reported.

Avoidance of Miserly Information Processing: Indirect Effects

Chapter 7 discussed four subtests that are direct measures of the avoidance of miserly processing on the CART. Chapter 8 discusses how the CART also contains six other subtests that assess the ability to avoid suboptimal thought patterns that arise indirectly from miserly thinking tendencies. Three of those subtests assess an important component of axiomatic utility theory: the ability to avoid being affected by irrelevant context when decision-making. The three subtests that measure the ability to avoid this tendency are: the Framing subtest, the Anchoring subtest, and the Preference Anomalies subtest. Three other subtests are described in this chapter. The avoidance of myside bias is a fundamental component of performance in most discussions of rational thinking. We used our original version of an Argument Evaluation subtest to measure this component of rational thinking. The ability to avoid overconfidence is measured on the CART by the Knowledge Calibration subtest. Finally, the Rational Temporal Discounting subtest assesses the ability to pass up an immediate reward for a delayed larger one. The history of each subtest is described, as well as a large study of each subtest in which correlations with cognitive ability and thinking dispositions are examined.

Overcoming Miserly Processing: Detection, Override, and Mindware

This chapter unpacks the logic of heuristics and biases tasks in terms of the tripartite model of mind developed in Chapter 2. There are three requirements for success on tasks. First, the necessity of overriding Type 1 processing must be detected. Second, the mindware that allows the computation of more rational responses needs to be available. Third, cognitive capacity is needed in order that override and simulation activities can be sustained. This chapter stresses that the presence of mindware, detection of the need for override, and sustained override capability are not just three separate categories of cognitive requirements, but are intertwined in important ways. The dependencies among the three categories are described. For example, mindware overlearning facilitates detection. A taxonomy of thinking errors is described. Three different types of miserly processing and two different kinds of mindware problem are distinguished. Normative responding on most tasks is multiply determined, however, because of the dependencies between mindware, conflict detection, and override. The taxonomy and framework developed in this chapter forms the basis for our Comprehensive Assessment of Rational Thinking (CART).

Rationality, Intelligence, and the Functional Architecture of the Mind

Because the operationalization of rational thinking comes from the heuristics and biases tradition, this chapter explicates the logic of heuristics and biases tasks in terms of contemporary theories of the functional architecture of the human mind. A tripartite model of the mind is described that is based on current dual-process theories. With this model as a framework, it is easy to see that the concept of rationality and the concept of intelligence are two different things. Rationality is actually a more encompassing mental construct than is intelligence. Thus, as measures of rationality, the tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, while tapping intelligence in part, actually encompass more cognitive processes and knowledge than are assessed by IQ tests.

Definitions of Rationality in Philosophy, Cognitive Science, and Lay Discourse

Because rationality is an issue across many disciplines, it has acquired many different definitions. This chapter describes definitions of rationality from cognitive science that are amenable to a program of measuring individual differences. Definitions of both epistemic and instrumental rationality are described in terms in terms of axiomatic utility theory and probability theory. It is argued that the wide range of tasks investigated in the heuristics and biases literature captures most aspects of epistemic and instrumental rationality.

The Dispositions and Attitudes of Rationality

This chapter describes the thinking dispositions of rationality, which in the CART are assessed by supplemental measures. These thinking dispositions help to contextualize the scores on other components of the CART. However, they are not scored as part of the CART itself. Rather, they were developed to serve as useful supplements to the CART subtests. They provide clues as to which underlying mechanisms are involved when suboptimal thinking is taking place. The CART contains four thinking disposition scales that reflect relatively disparate domains of cognitive regulation: the Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale; the Deliberative Thinking scale; the Future Orientation scale; and the Differentiation of Emotions scale. The history of each subtest is described, as well as a large study of each subtest in which correlations with cognitive ability are examined. Correlations among these scales themselves are reported.

Probabilistic Numeracy, Financial Literacy, Sensitivity to Expected Value, and Risk Knowledge

This chapter focuses on a set of subtests of the CART that are more knowledge dependent than are the subtests discussed in the previous chapters. Although these subtests do have processing requirements, successful performance on them is much more dependent on the presence of specific declarative knowledge. The subtests of the CART discussed in this chapter are: the Probabilistic Numeracy subtest; Financial Literacy and Economic Knowledge subtest; Sensitivity to Expected Value subtest; and the Risk Knowledge subtest. The history of each subtest is described, as well as a large study of each subtest in which the reliability and correlations with cognitive ability are examined.