Talking to others: The importance of responsibility attributions by observers

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefanie Hechler ◽  
Thomas Kessler

AbstractThis commentary extends Doris's approach of agency by highlighting the importance of responsibility attributions by observers. We argue that (a) social groups determine which standards are relevant and which actors are responsible, (b) consensus about these attributions may correct individual defeaters, and (c) the attribution of moral responsibility reveals agency of observers and may foster the actors' agency.

Author(s):  
Paul Spicker

Moral collectivism is the idea that social groups can be moral agents; that they have rights and responsibilities, that groups as well as individuals can take moral action, that the morality of their actions can sensibly be assessed in those terms, and that moral responsibility cannot simply be reduced to the actions of individuals within them. This position is not opposed to individualism; it is complementary.


1992 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 485-502 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ishtiyaque Haji

John Martin Fischer has recently proposed that actions and omissions are asymmetric with respect to the requirement of alternative possibilities for moral responsibility: whereas moral responsibility for an action does not require freedom to refrain from performing the action, moral responsibility for failure to perform an action does require freedom to perform the action. In what follows, I first critically assess Fischer's asymmetry principle. In arguing against the principle, I raise some concerns about Fischer's association of responsibility with control. I then motivate a riddle regarding omissions: some cases appear to show that a person is not responsible for failing to bring about something in virtue of the fact that the person could not bring about that thing. Other cases, though, seemingly show that a person is responsible for failing to bring about something even though the person could not bring about that thing. What explains the asymmetry in responsibility attributions in these cases involving omissions? Third, I consider some answers to this riddle and explain why they are inadequate. Finally, I sketch my own answer.


2014 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 5-20
Author(s):  
Mario De Caro ◽  
Massimo Marraffa

The paper addresses two issues that have been recently debated in the literature on free will, moral responsibility, and the theory of punishment. The first issue concerns the descriptive project, the second both the substantive and the prescriptive project. On theoretical, historical and empirical grounds, we claim that there is no rationale for fearing that the spread of neurocognitive findings will undermine the ordinary practice of responsibility attributions. We hypothetically advocate two opposite views: (i) that such findings would cause the collapse of all punitive practices; (ii) that, on the contrary, such findings would open the way to more humane forms of punishment, which would be justified on purely utilitarian grounds. We argue that these views are both wrong, since whereas a sound punitive system can be justified without any reference to moral responsibility, it will certainly not improve the humaneness of punishment.


Author(s):  
Kiara Roth ◽  
Kai Kaspar

AbstractHolding companies accountable for their decisions’ environmental side effects becomes increasingly important in the light of current debates on the climate crisis. The present study investigated a young sample’s (n = 925) causal and moral responsibility attributions to a company’s manager and their subordinate employee, who were either young or middle-aged. The agents jointly made a profit-oriented decision which either harmed or helped the environment. Results were analyzed with respect to the valence of the side effect, the agents’ social role, the agents’ age group, and participants’ affective state. We successfully replicated findings from prior studies, showing that more intention and moral responsibility is ascribed to the manager in case of a negative side effect than in case of a positive side effect, and that the manager deserves more blame for negative side effects than the employee, whereas the employee deserves more praise for positive side effects. Additionally, responsibility attributions varied with the agents’ age group, participants’ positive and negative affective state, and participants’ gender. By incorporating these hitherto neglected factors, the study complements existing theories of responsibility attribution and intergroup perception. The findings further highlight the contribution of affective mechanisms as driving factors of responsibility attributions. Combining moral responsibility research, intergroup research, and affective measures promises to foster the understanding of how and to whom people ascribe blame, praise, and causal responsibility for environmental consequences.


2020 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 219-227 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bojana M. Dinić ◽  
Tara Bulut Allred ◽  
Boban Petrović ◽  
Anja Wertag

Abstract. The aim of this study was to evaluate psychometric properties of three sadism scales: Short Sadistic Impulse Scale (SSIS), Varieties of Sadistic Tendencies (VAST, which measures direct and vicarious sadism), and Assessment of Sadistic Personality (ASP). Sample included 443 participants (50.1% men) from the general population. Reliability based on internal consistency of all scales was good, and results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) showed that all three scales had acceptable fit indices for the proposed structure. Results of Item Response Theory (IRT) analysis showed that all three scales had higher measurement precision (information) in above-average scores. Validity of the scales was supported through moderate to high positive correlations with the Dark Triad traits, especially psychopathy, as well as positive correlations with aggressiveness and negative with Honesty-Humility. Moreover, results of hierarchical regression analysis showed that all three measures of direct, but not vicarious sadism, contributed significantly above and beyond other Dark Triad traits to the prediction of increased positive attitudes toward dangerous social groups. The profile similarity index showed that the SSIS and the ASP were highly overlapping, while vicarious sadism seems distinct from other sadism scales.


2016 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 206-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Verónica Sevillano ◽  
Susan T. Fiske

Abstract. Nonhuman animals are typically excluded from the scope of social psychology. This article presents animals as social objects – targets of human social responses – overviewing the similarities and differences with human targets. The focus here is on perceiving animal species as social groups. Reflecting the two fundamental dimensions of humans’ social cognition – perceived warmth (benign or ill intent) and competence (high or low ability), proposed within the Stereotype Content Model ( Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002 ) – animal stereotypes are identified, together with associated prejudices and behavioral tendencies. In line with human intergroup threats, both realistic and symbolic threats associated with animals are reviewed. As a whole, animals appear to be social perception targets within the human sphere of influence and a valid topic for research.


2010 ◽  
Vol 41 (2) ◽  
pp. 76-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Asbrock

The stereotype content model says that warmth and competence are fundamental dimensions of social judgment. This brief report analyzes the cultural stereotypes of relevant social groups in a German student sample (N = 82). In support of the model, stereotypes of 29 societal groups led to five stable clusters of differing warmth and competence evaluations. As expected, clusters cover all four possible combinations of warmth and competence. The study also reports unique findings for the German context, for example, similarities between the perceptions of Turks and other foreigners. Moreover, it points to different stereotypes of lesbians and gay men.


Author(s):  
Pieter Van Dessel ◽  
Jan De Houwer ◽  
Anne Gast ◽  
Colin Tucker Smith

Prior research suggests that repeatedly approaching or avoiding a certain stimulus changes the liking of this stimulus. We investigated whether these effects of approach and avoidance training occur also when participants do not perform these actions but are merely instructed about the stimulus-action contingencies. Stimulus evaluations were registered using both implicit (Implicit Association Test and evaluative priming) and explicit measures (valence ratings). Instruction-based approach-avoidance effects were observed for relatively neutral fictitious social groups (i.e., Niffites and Luupites), but not for clearly valenced well-known social groups (i.e., Blacks and Whites). We conclude that instructions to approach or avoid stimuli can provide sufficient bases for establishing both implicit and explicit evaluations of novel stimuli and discuss several possible reasons for why similar instruction-based approach-avoidance effects were not found for valenced well-known stimuli.


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