Rationalization and the status of folk psychology

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adina L. Roskies

Abstract Cushman's theory has implications for the philosophical debate about the nature of folk psychological states, for it entails realism about propositional attitudes. I point out a tension within his view and suggest a different view upon which rationalization emerges as a consequence of the adaptiveness of mentalizing. This alternative avoids the strong metaphysical implications of Cushman's theory.

2003 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Offer

Herbert Spencer remains an important and intriguing figure in thinking about political, social and moral matters. At present his writings in relation to idealist thought, social policy, sociology and ethics are undergoing reassessment. This article is concerned with some recent interpretations of Spencer on individuals in social life. It looks in some detail at Spencer's work on psychology and sociology as well as on ethics, seeking to establish how Spencer understood people as social individuals. In particular the neglect of Spencer's denial of freedom of the will is identified as a problem in some recent interpretations. One of his contemporary critics, J.E. Cairnes, charged that Spencer's own theory of social evolution left even Spencer himself the status of only a ‘conscious automaton’. This article, drawing on a range of past and present interpretative discussions of Spencer, seeks to show that Spencerian individuals are psychically and socially so constituted as to be only indirectly responsive to moral suasion, even to that of his own Principles of Ethics as he himself acknowledged. Whilst overtly reconstructionist projects to develop a liberal utilitarianism out of Spencer to enliven political and philosophical debate for today are worthwhile – dead theorists have uses – care needs to be taken that the original context and its concerns with the processes associated with innovation (and decay) in social life are not thereby eclipsed, the more so since in some important respects they have recently received little systematic attention even though the issues have contemporary relevance in sociology.


2020 ◽  
pp. 29-52
Author(s):  
Peter Langland-Hassan

The question of whether imagination can be reduced to other folk psychological states will turn, in part, on what we take those other states to be—on how we view their ontological status. There are very different views in philosophy and psychology concerning the nature of folk psychological states, ranging from eliminativism, to dispositionalism, to representationalsim. This chapter explains how those different ontological viewpoints bear on the project of explaining imagination. An important conclusion is that the explanations pursued in this book do not assume or require the existence of mental representations of any sort and thus should be of interest to theorists with quite different commitments concerning folk psychological ontology. However, in some cases, when assessing competing arguments, it will be essential to grasp the difference between “heavy-duty” (representationalist) views of folk psychological states and “light-duty” (dispositionalist) views.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Glover

This chapter reflects on Steven Hyman's Loebel Lectures, which revolve around a contrast between folk psychology and what neuroscience is starting to reveal. Folk psychology is the unscientific picture of what goes on in people’s minds when they perceive, remember, think, feel, decide, and act. It is based on introspection and on intuitive ‘reading’ of other people. In contrast to folk psychology is the fine structure neuroscience is starting to reveal: the brain mechanisms underlying perception, memory, thought, emotion, decision, and action. Hyman says that mapping out this fine structure has the promise of changing the understanding and treatment of psychiatric disorders. Out of this emerges Hyman’s philosophical claim that neuroscience radically challenges the status of folk psychology. Folk psychology, being in conflict with neuroscience, is largely false.


2019 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 230-252
Author(s):  
Lucy Campbell

AbstractA widespread view in the philosophy of mind and action holds that intentions are propositional attitudes. Call this view ‘Propositionalism about Intention’. The key alternative holds that intentions have acts, or do-ables, as their contents. Propositionalism is typically accepted by default, rather than argued for in any detail. By appealing to a key metaphysical constraint on any account of intention, I argue that on the contrary, it is the Do-ables View which deserves the status of the default position, and Propositionalism which bears the burden of proof. I go on to show that this burden has not been met in the literature.


2005 ◽  
Vol 56 ◽  
pp. 24-25
Author(s):  
David Papineau

According to an influential view in contemporary cognitive science, many human cognitive capacities are innate. The primary support for this view comes from ‘poverty of stimulus’ arguments. In general outline, such arguments contrast the meagre informational input to cognitive development with its rich informational output. Consider the ease with which humans acquire languages, become facile at attributing psychological states (‘folk psychology’), gain knowledge of biological kinds (‘folk biology’), or come to under–stand basic physical processes (‘folk physics’). In all these cases, the evidence available to a growing child is far too thin and noisy for it to be plausible that the underlying principles involved are derived from general learning mechanisms. This only alternative hypothesis seems to be that the child’s grasp of these principles is innate. (Cf. Laurence and Margolis, 2001.)


2021 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 173-196
Author(s):  
Vanja Subotic

Three decades ago, William Ramsey, Steven Stich & Joseph Garon put forward an argument in favor of the following conditional: if connectionist models that implement parallelly distributed processing represent faithfully human cognitive processing, eliminativism about propositional attitudes is true. The corollary of their argument (if it proves to be sound) is that there is no place for folk psychology in contemporary cognitive science. This understanding of connectionism as a hypothesis about cognitive architecture compatible with eliminativism is also endorsed by Paul Churchland, a radical opponent of folk psychology and a prominent supporter of eliminative materialism. I aim to examine whether current connectionist models based on long-short term memory (LSTM) neural networks can back up these arguments in favor of eliminativism. Nonetheless, I will rather put my faith in the eliminativism of the limited domain. This position amount to the following claim: even though that connectionist cognitive science has no need whatsoever for folk psychology qua theory, this does not entail illegitimacy of folk psychology per se in other scientific domains, most notably in humanities, but only if one sees folk psychology as mere heuristics.


1999 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver Robert Scholz

AbstractWhen we attempt to understand a person we make use of a body of practices called “folk psychology”. After clarifying the status and the content of folk psychology, the paper focuses on the current debate about its form. A version of the ‚theory theory’ is sketched that tries to do justice to the holism of the mental and to the constraining role of presumptions of coherence for the ascription of intentional states. Against this background, it is argued that radical simulationism, the main competitor of the ‚theory theory’, is untenable. Understanding a person cannot be solely a matter of mental simulation.


Author(s):  
Ian Tipton

George Berkeley, who was born in Ireland and who eventually became Bishop of Cloyne, is best known for three works that he published while still very young: An Essay towards a New Theory of Vision (1709), Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713), and in particular for A Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). In the Principles he argues for the striking claim that there is no external, material world; that houses, trees and the like are simply collections of ‘ideas’; and that it is God who produces ‘ideas’ or ‘sensations’ in our minds. The New Theory of Vision had gone some way towards preparing the ground for this claim (although that work has interest and value in its own right), and the Dialogues represent Berkeley’s second attempt to defend it. Other works were to follow, including De Motu (1721), Alciphron (1732) and Siris (1744), but the three early works established Berkeley as one of the major figures in the history of modern philosophy. The basic thesis was certainly striking, and from the start many were tempted to dismiss it outright as so outrageous that even Berkeley himself could not have taken it seriously. In fact, however, Berkeley was very serious, and certainly a very able philosopher. Writing at a time when rapid developments in science appeared to be offering the key to understanding the true nature of the material world and its operations, but when scepticism about the very existence of the material world was also on the philosophical agenda, Berkeley believed that ‘immaterialism’ offered the only hope of defeating scepticism and of understanding the status of scientific explanations. Nor would he accept that his denial of ‘matter’ was outrageous. Indeed, he held that, if properly understood, he would be seen as defending the views of ‘the vulgar’ or ‘the Mob’ against other philosophers, including Locke, whose views posed a threat to much that we would ordinarily take to be common sense. His metaphysics cannot be understood unless we see clearly how he could put this interpretation on it; and neither will we do it justice if we simply dismiss the role he gives to God as emerging from the piety of a future bishop. Religion was under threat; Berkeley can probably be judged prescient in seeing how attractive atheism could become, given the scientific revolution of which we are the heirs; and though it could hardly be claimed that his attempts to ward off the challenge were successful, they merit respectful attention. Whether, however, we see him as the proponent of a fascinating metaphysics about which we must make up our own minds, or as representing merely one stage in the philosophical debate that takes us from Descartes to Locke and then to Hume, Kant and beyond, we must recognize Berkeley as a powerful intellect who had an important contribution to make.


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