scholarly journals Dying for the state: the missing just war question?

2010 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 215-234
Author(s):  
ILAN ZVI BARON

AbstractThis article introduces the problem of having to risk one's life for the state in war, asking first why this question is no longer asked in the just war literature and then suggesting five issues that relate to this question: 1) that of individual consent, 2) whether or not any state can be justified in obliging its citizens in this regard and whether or not the type of government is important, 3) whether or not the problem of the obligation differs between conscript and volunteer armies, 4) the problem of political obligation and how any individual could be justifiably obliged to risk his or her life for the state in war, and 5) the question of whether a citizen may be obliged to go into any war. The argument is that these questions are no longer given much attention in the just war literature because of the way that the concept of proper authority has come to be understood. The article concludes by suggesting that the problem of the ‘obligation to die’ should be included in our understanding and use of just war theory and the ethics of war.

2019 ◽  
pp. 263-283
Author(s):  
Helen Frowe

This chapter assesses war and intervention. Just war theorists share two beliefs: that wars can, at least in theory, sometimes be just, and that the fighting of war is governed by moral rules. Just war theory is usually divided into jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. Jus ad bellum (justice prior to war) sets the conditions under which it is just to declare war. Jus in bello (justice during the war) sets the ‘rules of engagement’, governing the conduct of combatants during a conflict. Jus post bellum (justice after war) deals with topics like war reparations and punishment of aggression and had, until recently, received comparatively little attention in the just war literature. Meanwhile, pacifism and realism offer alternative approaches to the ethics of war.


Author(s):  
Paola Pugliatti

This chapter recounts how developments in the technology of battle had by Shakespeare’s time caught up with even the relatively resistant, cavalry-oriented English nobility. Outlining these technical advances, it discovers numerous moments in Shakespeare indicative of popular responsiveness to war and its new face. Alone among English writers, it was Shakespeare who (repeatedly) termed cannon-fire ‘devilish’; and the chapter demonstrates how different characters in 1Henry IV are on the turn in the long evolution from (equestrian) medieval chivalry, through (treacherous, infantry-deployed) gunpowder weapons, to the perfumed post-militarist courtier. It notes Shakespeare’s staged presentation of conscription as farcically at odds with the official theory of a voluntarism for able-bodied adults. Two soldiers miserably questioning the ethics of war the night before Agincourt prove well apprised of the Christian just war theory—yet Williams shrewdly contests its exculpation of royal leaders from responsibility for their subjects’ deaths.


Horizons ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 119-123
Author(s):  
Laurie Johnston

Pope Francis titled his recent World Day of Peace message “Nonviolence: A Style of Politics for Peace.” The use of the word “style” is unusual but important. It reveals the significance of the way we talk about the questions of violence and peace—our rhetoric, in other words. It has been suggested that talking about “just war theory” can, in fact, obstruct the development and use of nonviolent techniques for the resolution of conflict. My contribution to this roundtable will examine the extent to which that is the case.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Parry

The vast majority of work on the ethics of war focuses on traditional wars between states. This chapter aims to show that this is an oversight worth rectifying. The strategy is largely comparative, assessing whether certain claims often defended in discussions of interstate wars stand up in the context of civil conflicts and whether there are principled moral differences between the two types of case. Firstly, the chapter argues that thinking about intrastate wars may help us make progress on important theoretical debates in recent just war theory. Secondly, it considers whether certain kinds of civil wars are subject to a more demanding standard of just cause, compared to interstate wars of national defence. Finally, it assesses the extent to which having popular support is an independent requirement of permissible war and whether this renders insurgencies harder to justify than wars fought by functioning states.


Author(s):  
Jean Bethke Elshtain

This chapter examines Augustine of Hippo's political thought. After providing a brief biography of St Augustine, it considers the fate of his texts within the world of academic political theory and the general suspicion of ‘religious’ thinkers within that world. It then analyses Augustine's understanding of the human person as a bundle of complex desires and emotions as well as the implications of his claim that human sociality is a given and goes all the way down. It also explores Augustine's arguments regarding the interplay of caritas and cupiditas in the moral orientations of persons and of cultures. Finally, it describes Augustine's reflections on the themes of war and peace, locating him as the father of the tradition of ‘just war’ theory.


2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 242-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Pattison

Recent discussions in Just War Theory have been framed by a polarising debate between “traditionalist” and “revisionist” approaches. This debate has largely overlooked the importance of an applied account of Just War Theory. The main aim of this essay is to defend the importance of this applied account and, in particular, a nonideal account of the ethics of war. I argue that the applied, nonideal morality of war is vital for a plausible and comprehensive account of Just War Theory. A subsidiary aim of the essay is to show that once we appreciate the importance of the applied, nonideal account, it becomes clear that the positions proposed by revisionists and traditionalists are, in fact, much closer than often presumed.


Daedalus ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 146 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-70
Author(s):  
Allen S. Weiner

A central element of the dominant view of just war theory is the moral equality of soldiers: combatants have equal rights to wage war against one another and are entitled to certain protections if captured, without regard to which side's cause of war is just. But whether and how this principle should apply in asymmetric armed conflicts between states and nonstate groups is profoundly unsettled. I argue that we should confer war rights on fighters for nonstate groups when they are engaged in violence that has risen to the level of armed conflict, and when the state against which the war is being waged is not entitled to assert its monopoly on the legitimate exercise of force, either because 1) the nonstate group has established sufficient control over territory to assert its own governing authority; or 2) because the group is located abroad. Conferring war rights on nonstate fighters does not, however, permit them to engage in acts that violate the laws of war. Fighters who commit such violations are individually subject to prosecution without regard to their group's entitlement to war rights.


2016 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 53-68
Author(s):  
Bojana Simeunovic

The asymmetric nature of recent wars, in which victory plays neither a constituting nor regulatory role - which thereby do not yield clearly defined winners or losers - calls for a renewed analysis of the concept of war ending. Operating within the bounds of the legalistic paradigm of just war theory, this work is based on an elementary assumption embedded in the ethics of war ending: that conflict circumstances are prone to change, and therefore examining ad bellum criteria ex ante during newly emerged circumstances can be inaccurate. The aim of this article is to examine and determine if ethics of war ending constitute a separate entity within the theory of just war and what does it encompass, as well as what the appropriate criteria is for determining the moral justification for ending or continuing a conflict.


2021 ◽  
Vol 63 (11) ◽  
pp. 58-73
Author(s):  
Arseniy D. Kumankov

The article deals with the problem of moral justification of humanitarian intervention by modern just war theorists. At the beginning of the article, we discuss the evolution of the dominant paradigms of the moral justification of war and explain why the theory and practice of humanitarian intervention appears only at the present stage of the development of ethics and the law of war. It is noted that theorization of humanitarian intervention began in the last decades of the 20th century. This is due to a significant transformation, a retreat in the legal and ethical studies of war from the position of radical condemnation of aggressive actions and the recognition of the political subjectivity of non-state groups. Thus, there is a rethinking of the long tradition, the Westphalian system of international relations, according to which the state was recognized as the main participant of big politics, and its sovereign right to conduct domestic policy was considered indisputable. Further, we take the works of Michael Walzer as the main source of modern conceptualization of the ethics of humanitarian interventionism, since Walzer repeatedly addressed this topic and formulated a position on this issue that is representative of the entire modern Just War Theory. The arguments of Walzer and his supporters in favor of the moral justification of humanitarian intervention are considered. Among them are the following. First, the argument about the state as an organization which goal is to protect the rights of its own citizens. If this goal is not not achieved, the state shall loose its power over these people and in this territory. Second, Walzer calls for identifying governments and armed forces involved in mass murders as criminal and, therefore, deserving of punishment. Finally, there is, perhaps the most important, demonstrative argument: an appeal to the self-evident impossibility to stand aside in cases of mass violence in any state. This is followed by a critique of these arguments, as well as a demonstration of how the modern Just War Theory can respond to these criticisms.


Author(s):  
Joshua Shaw

This essay considers the role of war in Levinas’s philosophy and his philosophy’s place in the secondary literature on the ethics of war. It is argued that his understanding of war most closely matches just war theory, although it bears similarities as well to pacifist fears about the depersonalization that occurs in war. These comparisons are used to raise concerns about both Levinas’s philosophy and just war theory. Reading just war theory through the lens of his philosophy exposes the inability of just war theory to settle pacifist fears about wartime depersonalization. Conversely, reading Levinas through the lens of this debate reinforces the worry that there may be an unbridgeable gap between ethics and justice in his philosophy.


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