Chinese children's understanding of false beliefs: the role of language

1999 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-21 ◽  
Author(s):  
KANG LEE ◽  
DAVID R. OLSON ◽  
NANCY TORRANCE
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Early Development ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Developmental Pattern ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
Old Chinese ◽  
False Belief Tasks ◽  
Probe Question

The present study investigated the universality of the early development of young children's understanding and representation of false beliefs, and specifically, the effect of language on Chinese-speaking children's performance in false belief tasks under three between-subjects conditions. The three conditions differed only in the belief verb that was used in probe questions regarding one's own or another person's beliefs, namely the Chinese verbs, xiang, yiwei, and dang. While the three words are all appropriate to false beliefs, they have different connotations regarding the likelihood of a belief being false, with xiang being more neutral than either yiwei or dang. Experiment i involved thirty-five Chinese-speaking adults who responded to false belief tasks to be used in Experiment 2 in order both to establish an adult comparison and to obtain empirical evidence regarding how Chinese-speaking adults use the three belief verbs to describe different false belief situations. In Experiment 2, 188 three-, four-, and five-year-old Chinese-speaking children participated in three false belief tasks. They were asked to report about an individual's false belief when either xiang, yiwei, or dang was used in the probe question. Results revealed a rapid developmental pattern in Chinese-speaking children's understanding of false belief, which is similar to that found with Western children. In addition, children performed significantly better when yiwei and dang, which connote that the belief referred to may be false, were used in belief questions than when xiang, the more neutral verb, was used. This finding suggests an important role of language in assessing children's understanding of belief and false belief.

scholarly journals Process in the Community, Detain Offshore or ‘Turn Back the Boats’? Predicting Australian Asylum-seeker Policy Support from False Beliefs, Prejudice and Political Ideology

2018 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 562-582 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa K Hartley ◽  
Joel R Anderson ◽  
Anne Pedersen
Keyword(s):  
Political Ideology ◽  
Asylum Seekers ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Policy Support ◽  
Hierarchical Regression ◽  
Future Research ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
Predictive Role ◽  
Practical Implications

Abstract Over the past few decades, there has been a progressive implementation of policies designed to deter the arrival of people seeking protection. In Australia, this has included offshore processing and towing boats of asylum seekers away from Australian waters. In a community survey of 164 Australians, this study examined the predictive role of false beliefs about asylum seekers, prejudice and political ideology in support of three policies. Multiple hierarchical regression models indicated that, although political ideology and prejudice were significant predictors of policy support, false beliefs was the strongest predictor. For the policy of processing asylum seekers in the community, less endorsement of false beliefs was a significant predictor, while, for the policy of offshore processing, more endorsement of false beliefs was a significant predictor. For the boat turn-back policy, an increase in false-belief endorsement was the strongest predictor; although increases in prejudice and a prejudice–political ideology interaction (i.e. the predictive value of prejudice was stronger for participants who identified as politically conservative) also independently predicted support. Practical implications and future research avenues are discussed.

The Belief-Desire Model of Action Explanation Reconsidered: Thoughts on Bittner

2017 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 290-308 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Turner
Keyword(s):  
False Belief ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
Culturally Specific ◽  
Explanatory Role ◽  
Cultural Artifact ◽  
Action Explanation ◽  
Radical Critique

The belief-desire model of action explanation is deeply ingrained in multiple disciplines. There is reason to think that it is a cultural artifact. But is there an alternative? In this discussion, I will consider the radical critique of this action explanation model by Rüdiger Bittner, which argues that the model appeals to dubious mental entities, and argues for a model of reasons as responses to states or events. Instead, for Bittner, agents are reason-selectors—selecting the states or events to respond to and selecting the ones the agent is disposed to respond to. By getting rid of the explanatory role of beliefs, this model runs into difficulties over errors usually attributed to false beliefs. These can be resolved by expanding the notion of dispositions to cover the case of false belief. But this suggests that the belief-reason model serves to divide the category of dispositions in an arbitrary or culturally specific way.

scholarly journals When Seeing Is Not Believing: Children's Understanding of Humans' and Non-Humans' Use of Background Knowledge in Interpreting Visual Displays

2003 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebekah Richert ◽  
Justin Barrett ◽  
Roxanne Moore Newman
Keyword(s):  
Background Knowledge ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Visual Displays ◽  
Visual Access ◽  
Different Types ◽  
False Belief Tasks ◽  
American Children ◽  
Intentional Agents

AbstractTo explore 3- to 7-year-old children's developing understanding of human and non-human minds, a battery of "background knowledge" tasks was administered to 51 American children. The children were asked to speculate about how three other intentional agents (mother, dog, and God) would understand various visual displays. First, children answered when they themselves did not understand the displays, then they answered after they had been given information necessary to understand the displays. Results revealed that children begin to understand the role of background knowledge around the same age that they pass false-belief tasks; and that before thoroughly understanding the role of background knowledge they already begin to discriminate between different types of minds. By age four, children began to show some understanding that because of having different minds than people, God is more able and dogs are less able to understand some visual displays even with full visual access.

scholarly journals Growing Up Thinking of God’s Beliefs: Theory of Mind and Ontological Knowledge

SAGE Open ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 215824401880987 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cinzia Di Dio ◽  
Sara Isernia ◽  
Chiara Ceolaro ◽  
Antonella Marchetti ◽  
Davide Massaro
Keyword(s):  
Social Cognition ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Growing Up ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
Belief Attribution ◽  
Knowledge Bias

The study of social cognition involves the attribution of states of mind to humans, as well as, quite recently, to nonhuman creatures, like God. Some studies support the role of social cognition in religious beliefs, whereas others ascribe religious beliefs to an ontological knowledge bias. The present study compares these distinct approaches in 37 catholic children aged 4 to 10 years, who were administered an adapted version of the unexpected content task assessing false beliefs of different agents: a human, a dog, a robot, and God. The children were also administered an intentionality understanding task, a component of mentalization abilities, and an interview on ontological knowledge assessing emotions, intentions, imagination, and epistemic knowledge. In line with previous research, the results showed that children did not attribute false beliefs to God as they did to the human and to other nonhuman agents. Importantly, while false-belief attribution to the human was associated with the children’s ability to attribute mental states (intentionality understanding), false-belief attribution to God was related to children’s ontological knowledge. We conclude that, contrary to false-belief attribution to the human and to other nonhuman agents, children’s understanding of God’s mind is largely a function of ontological knowledge about God, rather than of children’s social cognitive functions.

Children Are Cursed

2003 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 283-286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan A.J. Birch ◽  
Paul Bloom
Keyword(s):  
Young Children ◽  
False Belief ◽  
The Other ◽  
Knowledge Attribution ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
Older Children ◽  
False Belief Tasks ◽  
Curse Of Knowledge ◽  
Knowledge Bias

Young children have problems reasoning about false beliefs. We suggest that this is at least partially the result of the same curse of knowledge that has been observed in adults—a tendency to be biased by one's own knowledge when assessing the knowledge of a more naive person. We tested 3- to 5-year-old children in a knowledge-attribution task and found that young children exhibited a curse-of-knowledge bias to a greater extent than older children, a finding that is consistent with their greater difficulty with false-belief tasks. We also found that children's misattributions were asymmetric. They were limited to cases in which the children were more knowledgeable than the other person; misattributions did not occur when the children were more ignorant than the other person. This suggests that their difficulty is better characterized by the curse of knowledge than by more general egocentrism or rationality accounts.

scholarly journals Children can use others’ emotional expressions to infer their knowledge and predict their behaviors in classic false belief tasks

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yang Wu ◽  
Laura Schulz
Keyword(s):  
False Belief ◽  
Emotional Expressions ◽  
False Beliefs ◽  
False Belief Tasks ◽  
Behavior Based

In this study, we investigate whether emotional expressions provide cues to knowledge sufficient for predicting others’ behavior based on their true and false beliefs. We adapted the classic Sally-Anne task (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985) such that children (N = 62, mean: 5.58 years, range: 4.05-6.98 years) were not told whether Sally saw Anne move the object or not. However, when Sally came back looking angry, even four-year-olds inferred that she had seen Anne move her toy; when she came back looking happy, children inferred that she had not seen the transfer. Based on these inferences, five and six-year-olds, although not four-year-olds, were able to predict where Sally would look for her toy.

Predictions of Actions and Their Justifications in False-Belief Tasks: The Role of Executive Function

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 500-510 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Putko ◽  
Agata Złotogórska
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Executive Function ◽  
Language Development ◽  
Executive Control ◽  
Working Memory Capacity ◽  
Mental States ◽  
False Belief ◽  
Current Location ◽  
False Belief Tasks ◽  
Development Of Language

Abstract The main objective of this study was to examine whether children’s ability to justify their action predictions in terms of mental states is related, in a similar way as the ability to predict actions, to such aspects of executive function (EF) as executive control and working memory. An additional objective was to check whether the frequency of different types of justifications made by children in false-belief tasks is associated with aforementioned aspects of EF, as well as language. The study included 59 children aged 3-4 years. The ability to predict actions and to justify these predictions was measured with false-belief tasks. Luria’s hand-game was used to assess executive control, and the Counting and Labelling dual-task was used to assess working memory capacity. Language development was controlled using an embedded syntax test. It was found that executive control was a significant predictor of the children’s ability to justify their action predictions in terms of mental states, even when age and language were taken into account. Results also indicated a relationship between the type of justification in the false-belief task and language development. With the development of language children gradually cease to justify their action predictions in terms of current location, and they tend to construct irrelevant justifications before they begin to refer to beliefs. Data suggest that executive control, in contrast to language, is a factor which affects the development of the children’s ability to justify their action predictions only in its later phase, during a shift from irrelevant to correct justifications.

Membangun Fondasi Keilmuan Ekonomi Islam: Telaah Metodologi Muhammad Akram Khan

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 152-170
Author(s):  
Ahmad Ubaidillah
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Inductive Method ◽  
Ethical Values ◽  
Institutional Conditions ◽  
Faith Based ◽  
Behavioral Parameters ◽  
Science Methodology ◽  
Islamic Society

Throughout my experience in tracking down and reading books on faith-based economics, in this case Islam, there are no books that specifically list the title of "Islamic economics". If there is, it is only initiated or introduced. Most books coming down to us still use the titles starting with the word, for example, system, concept, principle, or the doctrine of Islamic economics. Why do the authors of the book Islamic economics seem not dared to give his book title with label "science"? I presume that Islamic economics has not been considered as a science. In building a science, methodology is required. Islamic Economics also requires a well-established methodology to build the foundation of science. The study answers questions; how is methodology which is offered by Muhammad Akram Khan to build Islamic economics. The method used in this research is the study of literature with qualitative approach.The result of study concludes that Khan offers methodology of Islamic economics, if summarized, written as follows: First, Islamic economics uses a framework derived from the texts of divinity (revelation). Second, Islamic economics uses the inductive method, which gives witness to the truth or falsity assumptions and predictions about the two criteria of rationality and empirical evidence. Third, Islamic economy is built on ethical values ​​such as justice, virtue, moderation, sacrifice, caring for others, in the analysis, as behavioral parameters. Fourth, Islamic economics is a normative discipline. Islamic Economics investigates ways and means to change the existing economy with Islamic economy. Fifth, Islamic economics ask different questions with conventional economics. Its attention is on welfare (falah) human and creating social and institutional conditions that maximize falah in society. Clearly, Islamic economics strongly supports research programs that help maximize falah. Furthermore, Khan elaborates several issues related to the methodology that often appears in the forum of Islamic economists. There are some problems that Khan proposes, they are the interaction with modern economics, the role of revelation, assuming ideal Islamic society, and the general theory of Islamic economics.

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