Predictions of Actions and Their Justifications in False-Belief Tasks: The Role of Executive Function

2014 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 500-510 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Putko ◽  
Agata Złotogórska

Abstract The main objective of this study was to examine whether children’s ability to justify their action predictions in terms of mental states is related, in a similar way as the ability to predict actions, to such aspects of executive function (EF) as executive control and working memory. An additional objective was to check whether the frequency of different types of justifications made by children in false-belief tasks is associated with aforementioned aspects of EF, as well as language. The study included 59 children aged 3-4 years. The ability to predict actions and to justify these predictions was measured with false-belief tasks. Luria’s hand-game was used to assess executive control, and the Counting and Labelling dual-task was used to assess working memory capacity. Language development was controlled using an embedded syntax test. It was found that executive control was a significant predictor of the children’s ability to justify their action predictions in terms of mental states, even when age and language were taken into account. Results also indicated a relationship between the type of justification in the false-belief task and language development. With the development of language children gradually cease to justify their action predictions in terms of current location, and they tend to construct irrelevant justifications before they begin to refer to beliefs. Data suggest that executive control, in contrast to language, is a factor which affects the development of the children’s ability to justify their action predictions only in its later phase, during a shift from irrelevant to correct justifications.

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (9) ◽  
pp. 1271-1289 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael J. Kane ◽  
Georgina M. Gross ◽  
Charlotte A. Chun ◽  
Bridget A. Smeekens ◽  
Matt E. Meier ◽  
...  

Undergraduates ( N = 274) participated in a weeklong daily-life experience-sampling study of mind wandering after being assessed in the lab for executive-control abilities (working memory capacity; attention-restraint ability; attention-constraint ability; and propensity for task-unrelated thoughts, or TUTs) and personality traits. Eight times a day, electronic devices prompted subjects to report on their current thoughts and context. Working memory capacity and attention abilities predicted subjects’ TUT rates in the lab, but predicted the frequency of daily-life mind wandering only as a function of subjects’ momentary attempts to concentrate. This pattern replicates prior daily-life findings but conflicts with laboratory findings. Results for personality factors also revealed different associations in the lab and daily life: Only neuroticism predicted TUT rate in the lab, but only openness predicted mind-wandering rate in daily life (both predicted the content of daily-life mind wandering). Cognitive and personality factors also predicted dimensions of everyday thought other than mind wandering, such as subjective judgments of controllability of thought. Mind wandering in people’s daily environments and TUTs during controlled and artificial laboratory tasks have different correlates (and perhaps causes). Thus, mind-wandering theories based solely on lab phenomena may be incomplete.


2010 ◽  
Vol 106 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abdrabo Moghazy Soliman

Despite its significance, the central executive is the least explored component of working memory, particularly in complicated contexts. Exp. 1 investigated the role of executive control of working memory in situation awareness in a real-life driving simulation. Exp. 2 examined the extent to which taxing the central executive might affect situation awareness. High, Medium, and Low Situation Awareness groups were formed as assessed using the Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique. Executive function was measured using several tests. Results from Exp. 1 demonstrated that the Low Situation Awareness group performed significantly worse on all executive function tasks compared to High and Medium Situation Awareness groups. Findings from Exp. 2 suggested that concurrent load on the central executive dramatically affected the Low Situation Awareness group but not the High Situation Awareness group: the former had significantly more driving violations under central executive load.


2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Nęcka ◽  
Agata Lulewicz

Abstract Starting from the assumption that working memory capacity is an important predictor of general fluid intelligence, we asked which aspects of working memory account for this relationship. Two theoretical stances are discussed. The first one posits that the important explanatory factor is storage capacity, roughly defined as the number of chunks possible to hold in the focus of attention. The second one claims that intelligence is explained by the efficiency of executive control, for instance, by prepotent response inhibition. We investigated 96 children at the age between 10 and 13. They completed a version of the n-back task that allows assessment of both storage capacity and inhibitory control. They also completed Raven’s Progressive Matrices as the fluid intelligence test and the Test for Creative Thinking - Drawing Production, for control purposes. We found that Raven’s scores correlated negatively with the number of unnecessary responses to irrelevant stimuli but they did not correlate with the number of signal detections. We conclude that children’s fluid intelligence depends on inhibitory control, with no relationship with storage capacity.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie Ashton ◽  
Roland Georg Benoit ◽  
Conny W.E.M. Quaedflieg

Unwanted imaginations of future fears can, to some extent, be avoided. This is achieved by control mechanisms similar to those engaged to intentionally forget unwanted memories. Intentional forgetting relies on the executive control network, whose functioning is impaired after exposure to acute stress. This study investigates whether acute stress affects the ability to intentionally control future fears and, furthermore, whether individual differences in executive control predict a susceptibility to these effects. The study ran over two consecutive days. On day 1, the working memory capacity of one hundred participants was assessed. Thereafter, participants provided descriptions and details of fearful episodes that they imagined might happen in their future. On day 2, participants were exposed to either the stress or no-stress version of the Maastricht Acute Stress Test, after which participants performed the Imagine/No-Imagine task. Here, participants repeatedly imagined some future fears and suppressed imaginings of others. Results demonstrated that, in unstressed participants, suppression successfully induced forgetting of the episodes’ details compared to a baseline condition. However, the observed reduction in anxiety toward these events remained unchanged. Acute stress was found to selectively impair intentional forgetting and, further, this effect was moderated by working memory capacity. Specifically, low working memory predicted a susceptibility to these detrimental effects. These findings provide novel insights into conditions under which our capacity to actively control future fears is reduced, which may have considerable implications for understanding stress-related psychopathologies and symptomatologies characterized by unwanted apprehensive thoughts.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Changzhi Zhao ◽  
Siyuan Shang ◽  
Alison M. Compton ◽  
Genyue Fu ◽  
Liyang Sai

This study used longitudinal cross-lagged modeling to examine the contribution of theory of mind (ToM), executive function (EF) to children’s lying development and of children’s lying to ToM and EF development. Ninety-seven Chinese children (initial Mage = 46 months, 47 boys) were tested three times approximately 4 months apart. Results showed that the diverse desire understanding and knowledge access understanding components of ToM, as well as the inhibitory control component of EF predicted the development of children’s lying, while the diverse belief understanding and false belief understanding components of ToM, and the working memory component of EF did not predict development of children’s lying. Meanwhile, children’s lying predicted development of children’s belief-emotion understanding components of ToM, but not any other ToM components, or EF components. These findings provide longitudinal evidence for the relation between ToM, EF, and children’s lying during the preschool years.


2019 ◽  
Vol 148 (8) ◽  
pp. 1335-1372 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alodie Rey-Mermet ◽  
Miriam Gade ◽  
Alessandra S. Souza ◽  
Claudia C. von Bastian ◽  
Klaus Oberauer

2007 ◽  
Vol 29 (6) ◽  
pp. 783-791 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin A. Sibley ◽  
Sian L. Beilock

In the current work we asked whether executive function, as measured by tests of working memory capacity, might benefit from an acute bout of exercise and, more specifically, whether individuals who are lower or higher in working memory to begin with would be more or less affected by an exercise manipulation. Healthy adults completed working memory measures in a nonexercise (baseline) session and immediately following a 30-min self-paced bout of exercise on a treadmill (exercise session). Sessions were conducted 1 week apart and session order was counterbalanced across participants. A significant Session × Working Memory interaction was obtained such that only those individuals lowest in working memory benefited from the exercise manipulation. This work suggests that acute bouts of exercise may be most beneficial for healthy adults whose cognitive performance is generally the lowest, and it demonstrates that the impact of exercise on cognition is not uniform across all individuals.


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