China and the Great Power Triangle

1980 ◽  
Vol 83 ◽  
pp. 490-509 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerald Segal

The notion of a great power triangle composed of the U.S., U.S.S.R. and PRC, and the “card games” played within this geometric configuration, are now particularly prevalent in the field of international politics. It is the purpose of this analysis to study the relevance of the great power triangle concept for Chinese foreign policy. A primary assumption will be that an understanding of Beijing's previous policies in a tripolar system will be a useful guide to the policies and problems of the present. Therefore we will begin with a review of the development of tripolarity and China's past attitudes. We will then concentrate on some crucial aspects of the triangle, the difficulties facing the Chinese leaders, and some possible policy options derived from our focus on the great power triad.

Asian Survey ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 553-573
Author(s):  
Simon Shen ◽  
Peng Liu

Abstract By conducting a set of quantitative surveys, this study evaluates the perception of Chinese students on terrorism. Three questions are tackled: (1) how they know about terrorism; (2) how they evaluate terrorist organizations and the U.S., and (3) how they view the corresponding Chinese foreign policy.


Author(s):  
Bayasgalan Sanallkhundev

Since the 1900s when Mongolia fought for its independence, it was looking for an ally or a supporter on which it could rely on. One of the options was third neighbor. During the dramatic times Mongolia tried to approach Japan, as the closest possible country to have relation, and the U.S. as a country somehow caught its attention, to establish, if not diplomatic, at least trade relation. Third neighbor policy is unique, as it is associated only with Mongolia due to its unique geographic location. Looking for third neighbor, it is important for Mongolia to maintain balance between two big neighbors, and to have relationship with other developed countries. But the U.S. saw Mongolia not only as a young and a good example of democracy, and strategic partner, but also possible “ally” which lies between Russia and China. Third neighbor policy is not just an ordinary policy in foreign policy; it is a concept which is important for Mongolia, for a country which is sandwiched between two big nuclear Powers. With changing international environment Mongolia’s strategic importance never left behind. Here will be discussed that Mongolia’s third neighbor policy cannot be limited just with foreign policy or relationships with other countries. But it could have broader meaning from geo-strategic perspective, depending from international politics. I am arguing that third neighbor policy is more than just a foreign policy, it is a concept.


1986 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 235-241
Author(s):  
J. D. Armstrong

If Churchill's aphorism about Russia being ‘a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma’ was an apt formulation of Western puzzlement about that nation, several further layers of obfuscation would be required accurately to depict Western perceptions of China. Since 1949 a number of conflicting conceptions of China's nature and purpose have vied with each other to gain the allegiance of analysts, governments and the general public alike. There was, for too many years, the China of American demonology: aggressive, expansionist and cruel, conspiring with the USSR to bring about world domination, its implacable rulers brooding malevolently over their nation of docile ants. Even while this notion held centre stage, an alternative perspective was available from such eminent Sinologists as C. P. Fitzgerald and I. K. Fairbank: that China had not undergone such a dramatic metamorphosis under the communists as many believed but was still ‘eternal China’, reproducing the same age-old patterns of behaviour that had persisted with little change through many centuries, if not millennia. Then, during the 1960s a new image emerged: China the ultrarevolutionary power, itself engaged upon a process of radical transformation through the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution, while simultaneously acting as the principal inspiration of violent revolution elsewhere in the world. The Sino-American rapprochement soon produced an entirely different perspective: China was now a responsible great power, maintaining a global balance of power in accordance with the Nixon–Kissinger vision of international order.


1973 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 80-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kuang-sheng Liao ◽  
Allen S. Whiting

Area studies have been under attack for many years as lacking the rigorous methods of disciplined inquiry such as are possessed by economics and political science. However, in the last decade, social scientists have attempted to bridge this academic gap. In the study of Chinese foreign policy, for instance, Charles A. McClelland employed several statistical methods for examining Chinese behaviour in international crises. Similarly, Paul Smoker undertook a serial correlation analysis to examine both the freedom of decision and interaction and reaction of the Indian and Chinese Governments.


1980 ◽  
Vol 82 ◽  
pp. 214-249 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Garver

It has become conventional wisdom that the U.S.–Chinarapprochementwas a result (from the Chinese side) of Beijing's fear of the Soviet Union. Specifically, the Warsaw Pact occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the border confrontation which developed rapidly in the months after the clashes at Zhen Bao island on the Ussuri River in March 1969, are seen as exacerbating Chinese fears of Soviet attack.1 These fears had emerged during the Cultural Revolution when Moscow began insinuating that it might intervene in China in support of the anti-Maoist, “healthy forces.” 2 It was in hopes of deterring possible Soviet invasion, surgical strike, or intervention – so the argument runs – that Beijing wanted to improve relations with Washington. By establishing more cordial relations between Beijing and Washington, the risks which Moscow would assume in making a decision to attack China would be increased. Soviet-American détente would, conceivably, be endangered. The possibility of a Soviet-American confrontation arising out of such a Soviet attack on China could not be ruled out. This added increment of uncertainty about the U.S. response to a Soviet attack on China would be useful in preventing such an attack. Thus, it is concluded, in November 1968 Beijing moved to reopen the talks with the U.S. at Warsaw as a first step towards substantially improving Sino-American relations. Two years after the clashes at Zhen Bao the U.S. table tennis team arrived in Beijing in April 1971. A snowballing series of events rapidly unfolded, culminating in the 15 July 1971 announcement of Henry Kissinger's visit to China and President Nixon's impending visit


2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (6) ◽  
pp. 880-895 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nien-chung Chang Liao

The current debate on the question of whether China has become more assertive involves two opposing opinions on Beijing’s foreign policy orientation. This article argues that the key question is whether China is about to change its approach to foreign policy, one which has enabled its “peaceful rise” in recent decades. It examines variations in Chinese foreign policy by developing a set of interrelated indicators of changes in a state’s external behavior. The results reveal a marked increase in China’s military spending and power projection capability, foreign aid, and diplomatic initiatives after the 2008 global financial crisis, as well as an expansion of Beijing’s alliance commitments through the establishment of partnership relationships around the world. These findings not only support the increased assertiveness argument but also indicate a larger transformation in Chinese foreign policy—China is becoming more active diplomatically as part of its quest for great power status.


1969 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
pp. 41-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Gittings

“Oppose the strategy of striking with two ‘fists’ in two directions at the same time, and uphold the strategy of striking with one ‘fist’ in one direction at one time.” This is a good year for looking back at the triangular relationship between China, the Soviet Union and the United States—and not only because it is the twentieth anniversary of the People's Republic. For it is also a year which has seen the contradictions in this relationship sharpened to an extreme and almost satirical degree.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 160-167
Author(s):  
Artyom Rinchinov

Amid the escalating disagreements in US-China relations, which became the main theme of the global foreign policy agenda in 2010s, the contours of the new policy of Chinese Foreign Ministry have been showing more and more clearly. Traditionally, the narrative of Western analysts has described this policy as a well-thought-out scheme designed by Beijing to take over the global leadership, linked directly to the figure of the Communist Party of China Chairman, Xi Jinping. The purpose of this article is to examine the origins and milestones of the current Chinese foreign policy doctrine. Having analyzed them, the author came to the conclusion that the PRC’s behaviour in international politics is largely reactive. During the Republican administrations in the U.S. it was China that was the main advocate of the idea of «global peace» and was forced to undertake fundamentally new international commitments.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document